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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTIOU
A. REASON FOR CHOICE OF SUBJECT
The principal reason for the author's choice of sub-
ject can be indicated tersely in these statements of belief:
(1) Totalitarianism axid absolutism are rampant in our ¥/orld
today, Man is becoming lost in mass movements, and the
depersonalization of life is steadily increasing, (2) Indi-j
vidualisn emphasizes the importance of the very elements
which totalitarianism neglects; individualism is thus a
needed corrective, (3) Philosophical anarchism is the
purest form of individualism. To ujiderstand the principles
of philosophical anarcliism, then, is to establish a proper
basis for the study of individualism in general, (4)
William G-odwin's social philosophy contains the fullest
expression of philosophical anarchism, Y/hile Proudlion gave
:j
a measure of popularity to the economic implications of
anarcliism to the extent that one might assume that Proudhon
is the most authentic voice of philosophical ans-rcliism, it
is indeed Godwin who has given us the only systematic pres-
:
entation of this social philosophy, Jaszi supports this '
I
belief v/hen he says that "the first systematic exponent of
4
2anarchist doctrine was William Godwin,
B. DEPERSONALIZATION AND ITS CAUSES
Since the phenomenon of depersonalization is helieved.
to be so inimical to tlie philosophy of individualism, let
us consider several aspects of this phenomenon before we
proceed to the study of Godwin,
V/riting with the perspective which the passing of
time alone can give, historians at the close of our century
will give our children's children an orderly chronicle of
these years of cliaos. One ventures to predict that, though
the tragedies of the World War and the world depression
were cruel anachronisms, neither the war nor the depression
is the greatest tragedy of the era. Less spectacular but
more basic, the supreme tragedy is the depersonalized
nature of human society,
Vi/hether the war and the depression were causally
related to the phenomenon of depersonalization, or v/hether
the relation was only concomitant, is not for us here to
determine. It is enough for us to observe that deperson-
alization is a social pathology so basic that it opens the '
^ Oscar Jaszi, "Anarchism", Encyclopaedia of the
Social Sciences
,
II, 52,

way for almost every ill of humianity - not war and. poverty
only, but crime, suicide, mental diseases, moral deteri-
oration, and spiritual barrenness*
1. DEPERSONALIZATION DEPUTED
A depersonalized society is one in y/hich the primary
groups have lost status. Persons have become merely people.
Men have become masses and masses have become mobs. Mechan-
isms dominate organisms. Social forces have become formal-
I
I
ized, then impersonalized, and finally depersonalized. It
is not the instance of the forgotten man, to borrov; the
fariiiliar phrase. To be a forgotten man suggests that there
are persons who can and v/ho ought to remember.
Vi/hat has brought about this depersonalization? The
factors and forces are many. Multiple causation requires
us to consider a number of elements which have bearing on
the matter.
2. THE EXPANDING UImIVERSE
Observe, in the first place, the effect of the
expanding universe. The Psalmist looked into the heavens
|
and meditated on the littleness of man. Astronomy was very
miniature then. The man of today, unless he shares the ,
1
Psalmist's faith In the supremacy of spiritual values over
stellar and spatial vastness, becomes astronomically intim-
idated. He becomes lost in cosmic and galactic magnitudes.
He does not always realize, as did one of our contempo-
raries, that the greatest fact about astronom:^'- is the
astronomer.
3. BIOLOGY
In the second place, observe how an inadequate con-
ception of biology has tended to weaken the status of per-
sons* Reducing man to a mere biological organism, he is
nothing more than "a clot of blood on a clod," Biological
evolution can be especially devastating if only its half-
truths are considered. Darwin, Lamarck, aand Spencer are
not enough. There are also Bergson, Morgan, and Smuts.
Creativity, emergency, and holism are no less essential to
the meaning of evolution than are natural selection,
acquired characteristics, and mutations.
4. CHEMISTRY
Then observe that chemistry, unless viewed in its
larger relations, can be as explosive as some of its new
|
formulae to the status of persons. Man's genesis may have
been colloidal, but his exodus has been into the realm of a|

5II
consciousness v/hicli no chemistry can explain. His "body may
be worth only ninety-six cents in the chemist's shop, but ,
man is a body with a soul. Rather, man Is a soul with a
body. Chemistry does not cope with this truth,
5« GEOLOGY
Again, geology can contribute its share to the effacJ
ing of personal significance. The records of the rocks not
only push back history considerably beyond 4004 B.C, (at
nine o'clock in the morningl), but they also indicate that
\
the world managed very well indeed before man announced his
arrival, A glance at the geological shaft is somewhat dis-
concerting to any homocentric view of the universe
•
6. PHYSICS
Finally, physics is capable of being so construed as
to tmdermine belief in selfhood. Certain modern concepts
of matter, time, space, and causality disturb a person's
|
complacency concerning his place in the world. Some of his
old supports are gone. Quite literally, he does not stand
on solid ground,
1^
7, THE l^ATUHAL SCIENCES
^
We have been considering the exact sciences, ^ii/hile
||
they have had their part in the depersonalizing of society.

6yet it should be made clear that they have had to bear
false accusations. The battle of words between science and
religion, for example has turned out to be a rather silly
affair. The antagonisms were, for the most part, ill
||
founded. The versus has become the and. The exact sciences,
as such, engender no hostility. By their very nature they
are religiously neutral and ethically unmoral.
8. THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Not so, however, with the social sciences. To the
extent that they involve the human equation, to that extent
do they lend themselves to ethical and spiritual implica-
tions. While they may be put to good or to bad uses, the
sciences themselves are wholly amoral. But it is quite in
the nature of the social sciences, in so far as they are
normative, to exercise influence in the areas of morality
and religion. For this reason, religion iias much more
justifiable cause for anxiety over what may be thought and
taught today in sociology, psychology, economics, history,
and political science.
Aside from the influence of certain views in both
'
the exact and the social sciences which make for depersonal-
ized life, there are several more general, as well as more
striking, factors. 11

79. EFFECTS OF IITOSTRIALIZATION
First, society has become industrialized. It is not
too much to say that a great deal of the dislocation in the
world today is due to the abrupt transition from an agrarian
to an industrial life. An industrial age cares more for
j
money and machines than it does for men. In one sense men
do not as much as exist in our modern mills and factories.
,i
We have mill hands and factory hands, but no men. This
fragmentary viev; of a human being produces, in turn, a frag-
mentary conception of work. Workers do not make things;
they make parts of things. The economic man has supplanted
Rousseau's natural man. The capitalistic economy regards
man as a commodity.
10. EFFECTS OF URBANIZATION
Not only has society become industrialized. It has
also become urbanized. The metropolis knows no boundary
lines today. Figuratively stated, city limits no longer
exist. The remotest rural settlement feels the impact of
urban influences. Megalopolis dominates the thinking and
living of people everywhere. The impersonal nature of city
life is notorious and needs no emphasis here. The more
crov/ded we are into metropolitan areas, the more lonely we
are, I
r(
8I
Oup attempts to regain status are often as pathetic
as they are ineffectual. Vi/'e are a race of joiners. Espe-
cially prized is the membership in a group that will hail
us by our first najnie. Syndicated coliAinns on advice to the
lovelorn and lonely vainly attempt to make the reading pub-
lic a great happy family. Hollywood tells us what its
|
stars eat for breakfast, hoping thereby to capture the inti-
mate touch. But these efforts tov/ard making society person-
alized succeed no better than do Madame Tussaud^s wax fig-
ures in becoming human beings.
C. DELIOCRACY AND DEPERSONALIZATION
Can democracy endure in a depersonalized world? H. G.
Wells says that democracy dies five miles away from the
parish pump. ¥/endell Phillips warned that the test of
democracy would be in the cities. Democracy can function
properly only where the social forces are well integrated.
The tenuous and Impersonal nature of our civilization
imposes heavy strains on the democratic organism. Ortega
y Gasset in his Revolt of the Masse s emphasizes the danger
of the mass mind. Mass mindedness degenerates democracy
into ochlocracy. Fear and contempt replace faith and con-
fidence in man's relation with man. The classes are afraid
of the masses, and the masses are afraid of themselves.
i
9Alexander Hamilton once expressed the mood when he cried,
"The people, sir, the people is a great beast," Democracy
requires men and persons; it is imperiled by masses and
people. I|
It is significant that the tv/o formidable rivals of
democracy in the world today are both based, one inherently
and the other avov/edly, on the premise that society does
not exist for individuals, but individuals for society. Com-
munism and Fascism are forms of the Great Society, and human
beings can be attached to the Great Society without being
attached to each other. John Dewey comments that "the trag-
edy of the lost individual is due to the fact that while
individuals are now caught up into a vast complex of associ-
ations, there is no harmonious and coherent reflection of
the import of these connections into the imaginative and
emotional outlook on life."^
The irony of Russian Communism seems to be that it
gives the people everything except what they 7;ant most -
personal peace and happiness. As Joseph Wood Krutch rem.arksj
Communism "is based upon the assumption that the only mal-
adjustments from which mankind suffers are social in char-
:
acter, and hence it is sustained by the belief that in a I
_ —
*^ John Dewey, Individualism Old and New
,
60-75.
€i
i
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perfect state all men would be perfectly happy, "'^
|
As for Fascism, in both its Italian and German forms,
the individual is hopelessly regimented in the totalitarian
state* Except for II Duce and Der Fuehrer, all personali-
ties are submerged* In the light of Mussolini's later pro-
gram, it is revealing to read what he wi'^ote in 1920: "We
are approaching the complete destruction of human personal-
ity. This State is the gigantic machine which swallows
living men, and casts them forth again as dead ciphers • • •
The great curse which fell upon the hiunan race in the misty
beginnings of its history and has pursued it through the
centuries has been to biiild up the State and to be perpet-
ually crushed by the State. "'^ But witness Italy nowl
D. INDIVIDUALISM AND ANARCHISM
Our country has had a rich tradition of an individu-
alism necessary to the functioning of a democracy. American
individualism is not to be confused with that iniquitous
self-interest which in its latter days bore the questionable
^ Joseph W. Krutch, The Modern Temper
,
242-249.
^ Benito Andrea Amilcare Mussolini, "Popolo d* Italia'.'
April 6, 1920.
4i
11
label of rugged individualism,^ True individualism has
regard for both freedom and security. Some of the Ideals
and principles of anarchism form essential ingredients of
that social philosophy which we are pleased to call
Americanism.
^ Concerning this spurious type Charles A, Ellwood
comments: "And now individualism threatens us with moral
and social anarchy," Miles Kinimblne, The Process of
Religion
.
129. '
ii
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E. CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER INVESTIGATORS
One of the several considerations which gave incen-
tive for undertaking this present study is the paucity of
existing literature in the field. However ephemeral some
may claim fame to he, Godv/in^s significance and influence
merit more study than they have received. Except for
7
several biographies - only one of these, Paul's, is suf-
ficiently careful of its sources - no volumes are to he
found which concern themselves exclusively with Godv/in.
Purtherm.ore, there is no work which is avowedly devoted to
his social philosophy or his religion. Several accounts
have been written which in a general way consider his
social viev;s, but one fails to discover any sustained
attempt to analyze and evaluate Godwinism. Though he v/as
less a novelist than a social philosopher, it is easier to
find references to him in the fomer light than it is in
the latter. It is true, however, that his Enquiry Concern-
ing Political Justice has elicited a number of articles and
6 Note the comment by Rogers: "The name of William
Godv/in is one which, I am afraid, arouses but little
enthusiasm in the breast of the m-odern student of litera-
ture or politics. Even before his death he had for the
most part lost his vogue, and he has never had the fortune
to be rehabilitated in any large degree," Arthur K, Rogers,
"GodYifin c: Political Justice", Internationa1 Journal of
Ethics
,
Vol, 22, 50,
See bibliography, 199 ff . below.
I(
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commentaries, but most of these are too fragmentary to be
of much, value • Whatever this study may lack in complete-
ness, it at least has the opportunity of being relatively
original and exploratory.
ViHiile the field is decidedly limited, several con-
tributions made by other investigators are notev/orthy, and
they place the present writer heavily in their debt# A
brief reviev/ of the more valuable of these works follov/s.
(1) C» Kegan Paul, William Godwin:
His Friends and Contemporaries
Of all v^orks on Godv/in, Paul's two-volume biography
is most accurate and adequate. It is well documented, and
it draws from authentic sources • Diligence and high stand-
Q
ards of workmanship are evident at every turn. In fact,
one would be compelled to joumey to the British Museum,
for several diary notes and letters of Godwin v/ere it not
for Paul's scholarly inclusion of them* The enthusiasm
which greeted the publication of this biography is indi-
cated in an intelligent review found, in a journal of the
same year. An excerpt from this imsigned article follows:
^ See comment in this connection in The North
American Review
,
Vol. 123, 252.
cf
t
t
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Williarfl Godv/in's life. Important as it was, did
not, like that of a Pitt or a Byron, for example,
call for, or indeed admit of, more than one
exposition. It was therefore of the utmost
importance that the lalDour should he undertaken
by some one possessing the necessary qualities
of high literary capacity, accurate knowledge of
the time, and a faculty of harmonious reflection,
as well as a certain amount of devotion to the
task, without which no such work can "become
possessed of any vital interest, - and of course
that untiring patience and research, for the want
of v/hich not even the finest literary style and
the utmost appreciation of the merits of the
central figure can v/holly compensate. All these
qualities, hoivever, Mr* Kegan Paul seems to
possess in a very remarkable degree, and his
application of them has resulted, in a complete
and satisfactory biography. The reader grov;s
into a perfect knowledge of Godwin, both as
author and as man; his virtues and his failings,
his strength and his weakness, are alike made
evident, with a clearness undimmed by any shade
of partiality. Godwin is shown as he was, with-
out any attempt to convert him in any v/ay into
an unreal hero. V/e feel the picture to be a
true one, and are grateful for it.
The passing of a half-century has proved that the
above reviev^er's commendation was not misplaced. IJo sub-
sequent v;ork has dimmed the reputation which Paul earned.
No later biography approaches the accuracy and exhaustive-
ness of this mon-umental work. Moreover, several of the
later biographers - Bvovm, as we shall see, is one of these
- iiave dravm. liberally from Paul, and they have added
Westm-inster Review
,
n.s.. Vol, 50, 365-366.
iC
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little or nothing to the original contribution. Those whose
interest in Godwin is chiefly literary may regret that Paul
passes so lightly over some of the novels. Those whose
interest is in the social philosophy, however, are grati-
fied that Paul treats so fully the political writings,
especially Enquiry Concerning Political Justice »
(2) Ford K, Brovm, The Life of William Godxvin
Of all volumes on Godwin, probably Brown* s is cur-
rently best knovm* Its light style lends it popular
acceptance, and its recent publication gives it advantage,
No more entertaining account of Godv/in and his views ha;s
been T;ritten, Brown does not intend laboriously to search
out a matter for himself. He quite frankly states at the
outset that Paul is his authority. And a comparative study
of Paul and Brovm. convinces one that the latter borroY/s
very considerably from the former.
The organization of the book is logical and chrono-
logical. The inclusion of so much material on Jacobism
seems unv/arranted, and the courtships and marriages of
Godwin are accorded more space than is necessary for a
•^0 Published in 1926, For complete bibliographical
data, see 200 below.

16
sufficient knowledge of this phase of GodvnLn's life. Brovm
gives a digest - without adequate annotations - of Enquiry
Concerning Political Justice and discusses "briefly several
other political writings. But it is regrettable that he
fails to consider a representative niunher of Godwin's writ-
ing. Preference seems to he given the more literary and
less philosophical v;orks. The whole effect of the hiogra-
phy is to make Godwin live in flesh and blood. With less
interest in accuracy and scientific objectivity than in
color and hunan interest^ Bro-im gives warmth and appeal to
the critical and painstaking data he has taken from Paul,
For those who will not give time and thought to Paul's two
volumes, let them read Brown while they run. As a popular
account, the book is admirable; as a careful and comprehen-
sive study, it is unacceptable.
(3) Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the
Eighteenth Century
Y/hile it suffers from brevity and over simplifica-
tion, Leslie Stephen's account of V/illiam Godwin in English
nThought in the Eighteenth Century is commendable in its
insight and its regard for the historical setting. Stephen
See bibliography 213 below.
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makes a clear exposition of Godv/ln^s view of mind, thought
It is douhtful whether the latter v;ould agree that mind has
been so cavalierly disavowed in the Enquiry Concerning
Political Justice as his critic states, "^"^ Stephen falls to
Indicate that several of Godwin's ideas underv/ent modifi-
cation Y/ith the passing of time. This failure may be due
to a neglect of GodY/ln*s other v/ritings.-'-^ He does observe,
however, that the rigor of Godwin's logic vras later sof-
tened. '^ On the whole, the account, though less critical
than one desires, is a reliable and Informative presenta-
tion of Godwinlsm,
(4) Rapnond Gourg, William Godwin
Gourg's study of Godwin-'*^ reveals little new or
pertinent data concerning his social philosophy and theol-
ogy. As its sub-title indicates, the study is devoted to
Godv/ln's life and principal works. For the biographical
16
material, Gourg relies heavily upon Paulo For the works.
See Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought
in the Eighteenth Century, II, 268.
^^ Stephen makes much use of Godwin, Political
Justice, b^it almost no reference is made to other works.
Stephen, op. cit.. Vol. II, 272.
15 See 205 below.
V/illlam Gourg says: "Nous nous falsons uji devoir
de r0 0oma 11re , en terminant , combien nous a 6tE utile, pour
'ic'rire la vie de Godwin, 1 ' ouvrage de Eegan Paul Gourg,
William Godwin, xvl.

Gourg considers principally Enquiry Concerning Political
^ Justice and those "oeuvre s se rattachant directement a la
Justice politique" ; namely, Caleb Williams, The Enquirer ,
and St, Leon, Emphasis is given to the relation "between
Condorcet and Godwin, and later. Burke and Godwin. The
chapter on the religious ideas of Godwin is confusing in
some of its theological concepts, especially that of deism.
The correlation made between the French Revolution and
political trends in England is skilfully handled. The
bibliography is hardly comprehensive; yet the documentation
is comraendable in its range and quality,
(5) Henri Roussin, V/illiam Godv/in
17This more recent biography of Godwin has little to
offer that is of fresh interest. The arrangement of the
book centers around the French Revolution. The first part,
entitled "Avant la revolution francaise " deals with Godv/in's
youth, his pastorates, and his early literary and political
life. The second part, "La revolution franyalse ", concerns
England's relation to the revolution and the appearance of
Enquiry Concerning Political Justic e, including a summary
•^"^ Published in 1913, For complete bibliographical
data, see
cc
c
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and appraisal of the work. The final part, "Apres la
revolution francaise ", is devoted to Godwin's marital and
pecuniary problems, his experiences with Shelley, and his
last years.
Roussin believes that Godwin's influence on socialise
is greater than is generally recognized, and he believes
this influence is especially marked in the case of Robert
Ov/en« Roussin goes further and states: " Par 1 ' intermedi-
aire d ' Owen et aussi d^Hodgskin, 1 ' action de Godwin s ' est
transmise a Charles Hall , a V/illiam Thomps on, aux leaders
du mouvement cliartiste , et peut-'etre merie a Karl I.Iarx .
"
It is easier to assert that this line of influence exists
than it is to ascertain it, Roussin gives no data in
support of his claim. It is probably more accLirate to
assert that Owen was influenced by the whole movement of
which Godwin was so forcefully a part.
Roussin' s volume has very little documentation. One
gathers that the book was written with the viev/ of stimu-
lating interest in Godv;in among the readers of Prance,
rather than adding to the field of critical scholarship.
If such were the intention of the writer, he has succeeded
Henri Roussin, V/illiam Godwin, 519,
?
20
well. The v/ork Is \7rltten in a lucid and readable style.
He has appended a bibliography v/hich includes several
little-known but significant articles to be foimd in jour-
nals of the early nineteenth-century period*
(6) C. H, Driver* s Article on Williara Godwin
Driver has ivritten a readable and stimulating account
19
of Godwin in the survey volume which Hearnshaw has edited.
It is a sketch and only that. Driver infers more acquaint-
ance with sources than he explicitly states; he did not
intend to ¥/rite a complete treatise. Hor did he. The
references are scanty, and the assertions stand only on
their ovni weight. His "Book List" at the conclusion of his
article indicates discrimination but great limitation in
source materials. He adopts Paulas biography as standard©
(7) Halevy, The Grow/th of Philosophical Radicalism
Halevy gives skeletal consideration to Godwin. His
correlations of Godwin* s vie^vs v/ith those of contemporaries
and immediate predecessors is suggestive and enlightening.
He is too much given, hov/ever, to easy classification and
19 Fossey J. C. Hearnshaw, Social and Political
Ideas, 141-181. For complete bibliographical data, see 206
Below.
20 See ibid., 176.
It
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convenience of labels* In assuming that GodT/in's ideas
conform to existing molds, Halevy fails to reco:jnize the
synoptic and integrated philosophy of the man. \^{h.lle this
reference deserves mention as a contribution to the study
of Godwin, it merits little added comment.

CHAPTER II
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
William Godwin was born on March 3, 1756 at Wisbeach
in Cambridgeshire, England. He v/as seventh in the family
of thirteen children.
A. LIlffiAGE AM) PARENTAGE
His ancestry was composed for the most part of
respectable, middle-class folk. A number of ministers are
found in the paternal lineage. His father's father,
William Godwin, was a dissenting minister of superior abil-
ity, who held an influential parish in London. Two of his
sons were clergymen. One of them, Edv/ard, had a brief but
distinguished career as a Methodist minister. John, a
younger son and the father of the V/illiam Godwin of this
study, was a nonconformist minister of rigid Calvinistic
qualities. He had a faulty education and cared little for
intellectual pursuits. Possessed with no great ambition,
the father was content with little. Although he held a
series of pastorates, no one of them paid more than sixty
pounds a year. The family moved, in 1758, from Wisbeach to
Debenham, Suffolk, where the father preached to a dissent-
ing congregation until a protesting minority of Arians
4f
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forced him to leave. The next parish was at Guestwick,
north of Norwich, to which place the family moved in 1760.
The father died on November 12, 1772,
He iiad ruled his household with a stem and rigorous
hand. His piety was solemn and ponderous. Fear of profan-
ing the Lord's day was ever a "burden on his mind. He
harshly rebuked William on an occasion for taking a cat into
his arms on Sunday, One ventures to believe that it is in
the father's austerity that one finds explanation in part
for Godwin's subsequent repudiation of religion and protest
against tyranny in any form. In any case, evidence of
William's love and sympathy for his father is not to be
found in any available autobiographical or biographical
sources. It is interesting to note that the biography in
Temple Bar pays tribute to the beneficent influences of
William's mother and aimt, ^ but leaves the father wholly
unmentioned. It is not likely tiiat this omission can be
explained merely by the fact that the father died when
William was but sixteen.
Mrs. Godwin, the daughter of a shipowner named Hull,
had little formal education; her spelling gives frequent
See Temple Bar, Vol. 46, 525.
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evidence of this lack. Nevertheless she possessed a large
measure of good sense and shrev/dness. She had warm syrapa-
thies and a great capacity for understanding, A fine integ-
rity of character redeemed her narrow religious viev/s. In
spite of the fact that he had traveled far from her in reli-
gious and political thought, William Godwin showed enduring
loyalty and deep affection for his mother to the end of her
long and burdened life,
||
An aunt. Miss Godwin who later became Mrs, Sothern,
lived in the Godwin family and exercised much influence on
William, She was a Calvinist, and was interested in litera-
ture and theology. Her fondness for reading gave encourage-
ment to William's passion for books,
B. PirfSICAL APPEARANCE
William Godv^in's personal appearance was hardly to
his advantage, A frail physique, a grotesquely large nose,
and an ill-shaped head lent themselves too easily to unkind
caricature. One writer thus describes him:
In person he v;as remarkably sedate and solemn,
resembling in dress and manner a Dissenting
minister rather than the advocate of "free-
thought" in all things - religious, moral,
social, and intellectual; he was short and
stout; his clothes loosely and carelessly put
on, and usually old and worn; his hands were
generally in his pockets; he had a remarkably

large, bald head, and a weak voice; seeming
generally half asleep when he walked, and even
when he talked.
2
Yet his obituary notice reads that "his countenance was of
a particularly mild and pleasing cast,"^ DeQuincey draws
this pen-picture of Godwin: "He was in person a little man,
with manners peculiarly tranquil, philosophic and dignified
- so at least I thought,"^
C. EDUCATION AND INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS
Though physically puny, Godwin was intellectually
precocious. Prom early youth he exhibited an unusual degree
of intelligence about common matters. Acute powers of
observation and analysis were his. Books were his choice
companions at an age when games and play might more reason-
ably have been his chief interest. Intellectual and reli-
gious issues were the absorbing subjects. Long before most
children v/ere prepared to do so, Godwin had read Bunyan*s
The Pilgrim' s Progress and Janeway's A Token for Children ;
Being^ an Account of the Conversion
,
Holy and Exemplary
Lives , and Joyful Deaths of Several Young Children .
2 Samuel C. Hall, A Book _of Memories of Great Men
and Women of the A^, from Personal Acquaintance
, 63.
^ Gentleman's Magazine, "William Godwin: Obituary", !
(unsigned"""editbi'rai:T," 'JmiS', 1^56, 666.
^ Thomas DeQuincey, Literary Reminiscence
s
^
I, 51. I
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Godwin's first schooling was received imder the ^
direction of local masters and tutors. His experiences at
a school in Hindolveston, or Hilderson, made him unhappy
because he observed that most of his school-fello?7S were
lax in their religious devotions. It was at liindolveston
that Godv/in was trained in the legibility and gracefulness
which ever since characterized his penmanship, for the
master was himself an excellent penman and taught v;ell the
art to his students. Godwin then was sent to Norwich -
this at the age of eleven - where he studied under Samuel
Newton, The significant influence here was the Sandemanian
leanings of Newton.^ In 1773, Godwin sought admission at
the venerable dissenters' college, Homerton Academy. Though
most biographers neglect the fact,® he was rejected at
Homerton because of his Sandemanian tendencies. He then
entered the dissenters' college at Hoxton where he remained
throughout a five-year period of intensive study. Here he
came under the influence of the able Dr, Andrew Kippis, who
was liberal in his political views and verged upon Socin-
ianism»'7 The political liberality encouraged Godv/in the
^ For an account of Sandemanianism, see 112 ff
,
® Note, however. The North American Review, Vol,123,
234, Also see Ford K. Brown, The Life of VJilliam Godwin, 10,
See 114 ff •below. il
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more eagerly to set forth his ovm social philosophy. The
Soclnian argument, however, seems to have had little effect
on him,
D. MINISTERIAL EXPERIENCES
In 1777, when he was twenty-one years of age, Godv/in
began to preach as a dissenting minister. Ware, Stow
Market, and Beaconsfield were his early pastorates. It was
during this period of his life that he became interested
more than ever in the teachings of the French philosophers
and the Encyclopaedists particularly. Joseph Pawcett was
one who strengthened this interest.
Returning to London in 1782 after discouraging
results in his parishes, Godwin resolved to improve society
by means of the pen rather than by preaching from the pul-
pit. One of his first literary attempts was the anonymous
biography of Lord Chatham,^ In 1784 he published six ser-
mons under the inappropriate title of Sketches of History»
Puller reference will be made later to this volume.^ In
this connection, however, it is of interest to note tiiat
this collection contains the much-quoted declaration that
^ See 224 below.
^ Ibid., 224 below.

"God, himself, has no right to be a tyrant •"•^^ Other writ-
ings during this period include articles, mostly historical,
for the Annual Register ; three unimportant novels; and a
series of essays on various political, social, and religious
subjects*
E. SEVERAL INFLUENCES ON HIS LIFE
The French Revolution accelerated Godwin's zeal for
social change. He found in the works of Rousseau, d'Holbach,
smd Helvetius many ideas which v/ere compatible with his own.
He moved in the circles of the radical thinl^ers and became
increasingly identified as one of them. Of his associates
and colleagues in this connection we shall have something
to say later, Godwin saw London in the throes of political
unrest, confusion in religion, economic imbalance, and
j
literary decadence. His interests sharpened by the intol- i
erable injustices, GodY/in determined to labor unceasingly
for social reform,
F. LITERARY PRODUCTIONS
In 1793 he published in expensive form the extraor-
dinary work which gave classic expression to his revolu-
tionary philosophy. It was An Enquiry concerning the
1^ William Godwin, Sketches of History , 20,
41
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Principles of Political Justice ^ and Its Influence on Gen««
eral Virtue and Happiness «'^'^ An exposition of this magnum
opus will be found in a later chapter.-'^
He was now an active opponent of the established
order. He associated v/ith Holcroft, Thelwall, Hardy, Horne,
and Tooke. The most outspoken members of this group were
j
caught in the toils of the lav;, but Y/ere later given their
freedom. Lauderdale, Pox, Parr, Holland, and Sheridan pro-
vided additional re-enforcement to G-odwin's ambition to
further social reform. Out of the crucible came two works,
Caleb Williams -^^ and The Enquirer , which emphasized his
case against the established order.
In the same year in v/hich The Enquirer ?ms published,
in 1797, he was united in marriage to the famous authoress,
Mary Wollstonecraft, writer of the Vindication of the
Rights of Woman* -^^ He had lived with her for a short time
11 por its various editions, see 224 below.
See 224 ff , below.
See 224 below.
15 Erroneous ideas might arise among those who have
only heard the name of this book. She made no demand for
political equality with men, and treated the institutions
of religion and marriage with entire respect. Indeed, from
her letters she was remote from any tinge of free thinl^ing
at this time. Better educational opportunities for her sex
was the emphasis of the book.
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before their marriage, "but later married her in conven-
tional manner chiefly for the sake of the yet unborn Mary,
who T/as destined to be the wife of Percy Bysshe Shelley.l^
Mary V/ollstonecraft ' s daughter, Fanny imlay, thereafter
bore the Godwin name,
G. MJIRITAL EXPERIENCES
The Godwin-Wollstonecraft alliance did not remain as
conventional as the marriage ceremony might suggest, Mary
maintained her separate quarters, and Godwin his» Their
notes dealing with their arrangements for meeting reveal a
strong bond of love and devotion to each other. ^''^ But deep
tragedy severed this bond. His wife died while giving
birth to their daughter Mary. Godwin was prostra.te. He
was not even physically able to attend her funeral.
Godwin soon sought the hand of Miss Harriet Lee. The
courtship was by mail, and the correspondence Y/as too phil-
osophical to be passionate. At any rate. Miss Lee refused
GodvtTin, and lived to an old age in the maiden state, Plis
For their viev/s on marriage, see 105 ff , below.
See C. Kegan Paul, William Godv/in, His Friends
and Contemporaries, I, 241 ff . below.
(ft
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next effort was to obtain the consent of the widowed Mrs.
Reveley, She and her husband had been long-standing
friends of V/illiaia Godwin. But again Godv^in met failure,
as lilrs, Reveley suddenly married another.
Having been twice disappointed in his marital hopes,
Godwin found himself captured in 1801 by the attractive and
aggressive Mary Jane Clairmont. She brought with her into
the household tv;o children (one of whom, also Mary Jane,
became Lord Byron's mistress). She was an indulgent mother
but a harsh stepmother. Selfishness, untruthfulness, a bad
temper, and little delicacy of feeling Yiere among her many
faults; shrewdjiess and physical charm \7ere among her vir-
tues. It was a poor match. Although she was a harsh step-
mother, she did aid the faraily by co-operating with Godv/in
in conducting a book business. This business v/as not suc-
cessful, and pecuniary difficulties continued to harass
him. An attempt to produce a play also failed,
H. LATER WITINGS
Godwin then turned more assiduously to writing. He
had met Sir Walter Scott on a sojourn in Edinburgh, and
through Scott arranged a sale for Mandeville , a novel
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which fell belov/ the quality of Caleb Williams, Other
novels and works followed. Among them were his attack on
Malthusianism, Thoughts on Man, and The Lives of the Ilecro-
mancers,^^
I, FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES
In spite of his active pen, he had many embarrassing
financial difficulties. The loans from Shelley were a
21
source of particular unpleasantness His last few years^
hov/ever, were less burdened by economic stress. In 1833
he was appointed yeoman usher of the exchequer to \Yhich
sinecure was attached apartments in Palace Yard. It has
been cryptically observed that this sinecure presented by
the WhlQ government v/as an ironical end for the archpriest
22
of anarchism^
See brief account of this work, 224 ff, below.
For a complete bibliography, chronologically
arranged, see 226 , below.
21
He beco.nie banlcrupt in 1822. During this period of
financial insolvency he produced one of his more valuable
works. The History of the C omtnonwealth.
Fossey J. C. Hearnshaw, The Social and Political
Ideas of Some Representative Tliinliers of the RevolutTbnary
Era, iM.
(i
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J. GODWIN »S DEATH
He died on April 7, 1836 and his remains v;ere depos-
ited in the churchyard of St« Pancras, in St« Pancras Road,
where Mary V/ollstonecraft had been buried,
K, A SUlJimY OF CONDITIONING FACTORS
The foregoing biographical account has value in
indicating some of the influences which were formative fac-
tors in Godwin* s beliefs concerning social philosophy and
theology. Let us here recapitulate several significant
elements found in the biography. First, note the intro-
vertive, reflective nature of Godwin* s youth. His physi-
cal inferiority and liis preference for books rather than
social games doubtless had their effects on his later life.
Second, the unsatisfactory relationship between him and his
father quite possibly has bearing upon Godwin's subsequent
attack against authority and tyranny. Third, his o\m mari-
tal disappointments and frustrations may have been projected
into his denunciation of marriage. Fourth, the stifling
rigors of his early Calvinism and his experiences as a son
of an ill-adjusted, dissenting minister may have been caus-
ative factors in Godwin* s radical views in theology and
ecclesiasticism. Fifth, the conspicuous economic and
4V
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social injustices seen from his youth may have accentuated
his zeal for reform.
f6
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CHAPTER III
GODWIN »S VIEV/S CONCERNING ANARCHY,
SOCIETY, AND GOVERNlvENT
It Is the purpose of this chapter to attempt to show
what Godwin meant by several concepts which are basic to
his social philosophy. After indicating difficulties
encountered in the investigation, we shall deal in a prelim-
inary manner v;ith Godwin's attitude towards anarchism. Then
we shall consider his ideas concerning society and the sev-
eral forms of government, A critical study of these funda-
mental views is believed essential to a clear understanding
of the system of thought he presented.
A. COl^TFUSION AND DIFFICULTIES
One does not proceed far with the task of analyzing
and evaluating Godwin's theory of anarchism before dis-
covering that confusion and contradiction exist both in
what Godwin himself said and in what writers say that he
said. As we shall see, part of the difficulty lies in the
fact that he never did make himself clear and consistent in
his social philosophy, and thus part of the blame for con-
fusion must be charged to him. Again, as we shall also see.
((
(
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many elements in the few extant accounts of his anarchism
are at fault in reaching unfounded conclusions and in giv-
ing erroneous impressions. Yet no little blame for this ,
confusion is due to the lack of precision and uniformity in
the use of terms and concepts, Ja'szi comments in this con-
nection:
There is perhaps no other chapter in the history
of social-political ideas which has caused so
much confusion to the specialist as well as to
the general public as the anarchist doctrine,
. Anarchism covers so many distinct conceptions
and tendencies that it is difficult to reduce
them all to a common denominator,!
For our purposes, however, we may define anarchism^ loosely
as the social philosophy which holds that government is not
only unnecessary but is actually inimical to the best inter-
ests of man. Repudiation of law and property are frequently
corollaries,
B, anarchy: Am anarchism
Godwin at no time explicitly states what he means by
anarchism. Nor does he distinguish between anarchy and
^ Oscar Jaszi, Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
,
II, 46,
^ Anarchy etymologically means "without head."
tI
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anarchism.3 in his concern lest his own system of "beliefs
"be confused with popular conceptions of anarchy, he makes
this statement: "Anarchy as it is usually understood, and
a well conceived form of society v/ithout government, are
exceedingly different from each other. But he does not
define just what anarchy means to him,
Godwin, as Leslie Stephen observes, "admits that
anarchy is an evil,"^ Yet Godwin, as Stephen fails to
observe, never directly attacks anarchy; his references to
it are in relation to other evils in government, such as
despotism. In one instance, he states: "Anarchy may and
has terminated in despotism; and in that case the introduc-
tion of anarchy will only serve to afflict us with variety
of ills."^ Again, he compares anarchy with despotism in
this manner: "Anarchy awakes mind • • • but in despotism
it is trampled into an equality of the most odious sort
^ Note the same failure in R, Bruce Taylor, Encyclo-
paedia of Religion and Ethics
,
I, 419*
^ William Godwin, Enquiry concerning Political Jus-
tice , and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness , II, 361.
Hereafter this often-cited work will be referred to briefly
as Political Justice , All references are to the 1796 edi-
tion.
5 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the
Eighteenth Century," II, 2'T5l
^ Godwin, op. cit., II, 365«
€9
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« , • In despotism there is no encouragement to excellence"'
Godwin further asserts his belief that anarchy is an evil
in this relative statement: "We must not hastily conclude
that the mischiefs of anarchy are v/orse than those v/hich
government is qualified to produce."^ He leaves no doubt
in the reader* s mind that despotism is worse. Despotism is
perennial, while anarchy is transitory.^ Another comparison
between despotism and anarchy is made as follows: " • • •
Despotism, a government, as Mr. Locke justly observes,
altogether Wile and miserable', and 'more to be deprecated
than anarchy itself. Godwin later states: "If vigi-
lance and wisdom be successful in their present opposition
to anarchy, every benefit will be ultimately obtained,
untarnished v/ith violence, and unstained with blood. "-'-I
Although Godwin makes no clear statement as to the
nature of anarchism, and although he miakes no distinction
^ Ibid.
^ Ibid., II, 563,
^ Ibid.
^*^Ibid., I, 15,
^^Ibid., II, 367.
(I
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betv/een anarchy and anarchism, there can he no doubt that
his social philosophy is to he regarded as advocating
anarchism. Jaszi reminds us that "anarchism is not so much
a definite scientific theory as a mass Ideology colored by
many emotional and religious elements. "'-^ Anarchism per-
meates Godwin* s writings, even though there is no definite
scientific theory presented, A statement like the follow-
ing is thoroughly expressive of the basis upon which
anarchism builds its thought: "Every man should stand by
himself and rest upon his ovm understanding. No man must
encroach upon my province nor I upon his."-^^ Or, again:
"The most simple and obvious of all proceedings is for each
man to be the sovereign arbiter of his ov/n concerns. "-^^
Such sentiments represent the anarchistic pattern as surely
as does the similar statement which is more familiar to
American readers: "I was not born to be forced, but I v;ill
breathe after my oxm fashion. "^^ If we find no explicit
formulation of GodY/in's anarchism, therefore, it should be
12
13
14
Jaszi, op. cit., II, 46*
Godwin, op, cit., I, 169.
Ibid., II, 32.
See Henry David Thoreau, "On the Duty of Civil
Disobedience", Miscellanies , (Nev/ Riverside edition), 156o

remembered that the whole force of his writing is to "be
taken as his anarchism. As we shall see later, his views
concerning force, government, law, and property are all of
the essence of anarchism,
C, GODWIN »S VIKYS CONCERNING SOCIETY
The second basic element in Godwin's social philos-
ophy is his conception of society and government and the
distinction he malces betv/een them# It is clear in some
instances that Godwin favors society. "Society is our
proper sphere," he says.^^ Man, he believes, is character-
ized by two propensities - the love of society, and the
love of solitude. All our great lessons from youth to age
are learned in society. "In society all our sv/eetest
affections are called into play, and our main virtues are
exercised. "I''' But society, however informally and volunta-
rily organized, must remember that "the value of individu-
als ought not to be forgotten. "^^ Moreover, "can society
Godwin, Essays
,
219,
1*7 Loc. cit»
Godwin, Political Justice, I, 264.
(
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become the equal of certain individuals of whom it is corn-
posed?"-^^ Godwin seems to think not»
The difficulty to be encountered here is that Godwin
fails to clarify the distinction between society and govern-
ment. He sets out to do so, 20 but he does not hold consist-
ently to the distinction he drew. As a matter of fact, the
distinction is borrowed from Thomas Paine, who argued that
society and government are different in themselves and have
different origins. Paine continues:
Society is produced by our v/ants, and government
by our wickedness. The former promotes our
happiness positively by uniting our affections;
the latter negatively by restraining our vices.
The one encourages intercourse, the other creates
distinctions; the first is a patron, the last a
punisher. Society in every state is a blessing,
but government even in its best state is but a
necessary evil, in its v/orst state an intolerable
one • • • Government like dress is the badge of
lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built on
the ruins of the powers of Paradise. 21
Apparently quite in accord with Paine, Godwin adds that men
associated at first for the sake of mutual assistance. 22
1^ GodY/in, ibid., II, 199.
20 Ibid., I, 125.
21 Thomas Paine, Common Sense
, 1.
22 Godv/ln, op. cit., I, 125.
(
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Here, again, we find agreement with Paine, who wrote: "No
one man was capable without the aid of society of supplying
his own wants. "^^ Free association and common consent are
as distinct from government to Godwin as they were to
Paine, but only in Godv/in»s definitions
i
Stephen asserts that Godwin "would pulverize society.
All association involves some sacrifice of individual judg-
ment • • • Cooperation is hateful to him,"^^ Stephen's
authority for stating that Godv/in would pulverize society Is
to be questioned. We have sho^m, on page six above, that
I
Godwin himself indicates approval of society in some
instances.
But Stephen is right when he observes that all asso-
I
ciation leads to some sacrifice of individual judgment. The
j
significant point is that the observation is Stephen's, not
I Godwin' s# Godwin did not resolve in his social philosophy
the conflict between society and government. The nearest
approach to reckoning with their inter-relation is evidenced
I
I
Paine, op. cit., 1.
Paine wrote: "Instances are not wanting to show
that everything which government can usefully add thereto
has been performed by the common consent of society v/ithout
government," Thomas Paine, Rights of Man
,
II, 64.
Stephen, op. cit., II, 275.
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in this comment: "Y/e are raembers of a community. We are
indissolubly connected with the society of our fellovflaen.
?/e have duties ."^^
Yet Godwin at no time indicates that he v/as av/are of
the implications of the fact of duties. V/hat Stephen appar^
ently sap/, and what he presumes that GodY/in also saw - hut
did notl - is that duties logically necessitate a more for-
mal matrix than is required by the concept of free associ-
ation. That is to say, duties imply a sense of oughtness
which at once renders free association practically impossi-
ble. This sense of oughtness involves moral force and obli-
gation, if not compulsion; hence freedom is restricted.^'''
Moral force leads to implementation. Legislation comes intc
being. Godwin, however, condemns the institution of law:
We can scarcely hesitate to conclude universally
that law is an institution of the most pernicious
tendency. It is an institution which, once begun,
can never be brought to a close. Edict is heaped
upon edict, and volume upon volume^^^
2^ Godwin, Eggays, 217, also 219.
Note Godwin^s o^m statement: "Coercion may be the
duty of individuals within the community." Godwin, Political
Justice, II, 182*
Ibid., II, 204.
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D. GODWIN »S YimS CONCERNING GOVERNIIEI^IT
We have tried to show that Godwin did not sharply
demarcate society and government. About his essential dis-
belief in government, however, there can be no misunder-
standing. He says flatly: "All government corresponds in
a certain degree to v/hat the Greeks denominated a tyranny,"^
In another connection, he asserts:
Government is the perpetual enemy of change* Y/hat
was admirably observed of a particular system of
government, 30 is in a great degree true of all;
They '^lay their hand on the spring there is in
society, and put a stop to its motion, "'^l
These are representative expressions of his attitude towards
government in general. He explains that this attitude was
influenced by conditions in France during the eighteenth
century. Note this coiTiment which he malies about himself in
his preface to Political Justice:
Of the desirableness of a government in the
utmost degree simple he was not made fully
aware, but by ideas suggested by the French
revolution. To the same event he owes the
determination of mind which gave existence to
this work, 32
29 Godwin, ibid., II, 198.
^ Godv/in is referring here to Logan^s History of
Goveimment, 69,
Godwin, op. cit., I, 247,
^2 Ibid,, I, ix.
9
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It was not the French Revolution alone, however,
which moved Godwin to denounce governnient. He was appar-
ently attacking the whole system of thought, so antitheti-
cal to his own, which held tiiat man*s relation to governmenij
is in the nature of a social contract Not only had the
contract theory heen popularized in France "by Rousseau, but
Locke h-ad given it prestige in Godwin^s ovm coimtry.^^
Burke, as a \?l'hig, defended the theory in an eloquent, but
puzzling, address which included these statements:
Society is indeed a contract • • • but the State
ought not be considered as nothing better than a
partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and
coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such
low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary
interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the
parties. It is to be looked on ¥/ith other rever-
ence; because it is not a partnership in things
subservient only to the gross animal existence of
a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partner-
ship in all science; a partnership in all art; a
partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection.
'^'^ The Revolution of 1689 was also justified by
Parliament on the gro^and that James VI "had endeavoured to
subvert the constitution of the kingdom by breaking the
original contract between King and people," (Resolutions of
House of Commons, January, 1689.)
(»
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As the ends of such, a partnership cannot be I
obtained in many generations, it becomes a part-
I
nership not only between those who are living,
but between those v/ho are dead and those who are
to be born. Each contract of each particular
State is but a clause in the great primeval con-
tract of eternal society, linking the lower with
the higher natures, connecting the visible and
invisible world, according to a fixed compact
sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds
all physical and all moral natures each in their
appointed place, 34
This excerpt indicates something of the hold which the con-
tractual theory of government had upon one of Godwin^s con-
temporaries.
One further conditioning factor should be mentioned,
in order that we may understand Godwin* s attitude towards
government more clear3-y. This factor was the publication,
in 1791, of the first part of Thomas Paine »s Rights of Man«
Concerning the flow of influence between Paine and Godwin
we shall have occasion to comment at several points in our
study, but let us here note the manner in which the former
helped to prepare the way for the latter 's attack on gov-
ernment, especially in its contractual sense. Early in the
first part of his book, Paine argues as follows:
Edmimd Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution",
Works, I, 368-569,
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It has been thought a considerable advance
towards establishing the principles of freedom
to say that government is a compact between
those who govern and those v/ho are governed;
but this cannot be true, because it is putting
the effect before the cause; for as man must
have existed before governments existed, there
necessarily v/as a time when governments did not
exist, and consequently there could originally
exist no governors to form such a compact with.
The fact therefore must be that the individuals
themselve s, each in his oxm personal and sovereign
right, entered into a compact with each other to
produce a government: and "this"' is the" only mode
in which governments have a right to arise, and
the only principle on which they have a right to
exist.
To possess ourselves of a clear idea of what
government is, or o\ight to be, v/e must trace it
to its origin. In doing this we shall easily
discover that governments must have arisen either
out of the people or over the people,
Thus a transition was effected for Godwin, Just as
the theory of the divine right of kings was challenged by
the contract theory of government, so do we find the con-
tract theory now challenged by Paine »s theory of man»s
rights. In a sense beginning where Paine concluded,
GodT/in carried the doctrine to its logical end, namely, the
challenging of the value of any government at all,
Godwin, like Paine, avo\7edly rejects the contract
theory* He attacks the position by use of the following
Paine, Rights of Man, 47-48,

48
arguments : (1) The contract theory makes for inequality
and injustice because it implies that the contract has
already been draim between the government and our ancestors.
Thus man today, as well as posterity, is denied the oppor-
tunity of choosing the system of regulations under which he
considers it proper to live* Furthermore, he asks:
And if I be obliged to submit to the established
government till my turn comes to assent to it,
upon v/hat principle is that obligation founded?
Surely not upon the contract into v/hich my father
entered before I v/as born?37
(2) The contract theory assumes, without justification, that
acquiescence means approval of government* To be sure,
Locke seeks to clarify this point by explaining that
a tacit consent indeed obliges a man to obey the
lav7S of any government, as long as he has any
possessions, or enjoyment of any part of the
dominions of that government; but nothing can
make a man a member of the commonwealth, but his
actually entering into it by positive engagement,
and express promise and compact*'^^
Yet, argues Godwin, such a theory leads to the end of all
political science, all discrimination betv/een better and
For his ovm statements concerning these arguments,
see Godv/in, Political Justice
,
I, 190-195.
Godwin, op. cit., I, 191,
John Locke, Treatise of Government^ II, 122*
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worse. Moreover, "acquiescence is frequently nothing more
than a choice on the part of the individual of what he deems
the least evil."*^^ (o) The contract theory creates the
impossible situation of requiring a continued consent to its
laws. One is boimd to a static system of lav/s, and no prog-
ress can be admitted. Ho matter if better information
avails itself, one is held to a contract made under less
enlightened circumstances. (4) The contract theory errone-
ously assumes that lav/ can be stated simply enough for all
persons to understand it alike. The necessity for inter-
I pretation and the possibility of variation in interpretation
||
are ignored. "^That then can be more absurd, " Godwin asks,
|
"than to present to me the lav/s of England in fifty volumes
i
folio, and call upon me to give an honest and uninfluenced
vote upon their contents?"^^ (5) The contract theory
obliges one to consent not only to all the la7:s already
made, but to all the laws that shall hereafter be made.
Rousseau pointed out the injustice of this requirement v;hen
he v/rote the following declaration:
Godv;in, op. cit,, I, 191.
40 Ibid., I, 195.
e
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La souverainete ne peut etre representee, par
la memo raison qu^elle ne peut ^tre alienee;
^
elle consiste essentiellement dans la volonte
generale, et la volonte ne se represent point:
elle est la meme, ou elle est ^autre; il n^y
a point de milieu. Les deputes du peuple ne
font done point ses representans, ils ne font
que ses coinmissaires; ils ne peuvant rien
conclure definitivement* Toute l^i que le
peuple en personne n'a pas ratifiee, est nulle;
ce n'est point une loi«^l
Nor is the use of addresses of adhesion a real remedy for
the injustice here discussed. Such alterations and addenda
are a precarious and equivocal mode of collecting the sense
of a nation, Godwin thinks,^^ (6) The contract theory, in
assuming that government is founded in the consent of the
people, can have no power over any individual by whom that
consent is refused. Godwin adds: "If a tacit consent be
not sufficient, still less can I be deemed to have consentec^
to a measure upon which I put an express negative. "'^'^ Thus
Godwin dismisses the contract theory as fallacious and
impracticable.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book
III, 15.
42
43
See Godwin, op, cit., I, 195.
Ibid.
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Again, like Paine, Godwin holds that "government is
little capable of affording benefit of the first importance
to mankind. "^^ Thoreau carries the argument still farther
when he says that "government never of itself furthered any
enterprise, but by the alacrity with which it got out of its
way«"^^ Godwin also believes that governments "originate
in the errors of man"^^ and that "their tendency is to per4'
petuate abuse* ""^"^ Government, Godwin fuj?ther contends - an(j.
here he is most characteristic of the anarchist, - is a
question of force and not of consent.'^S He adds: "There is
no such disparity among the human race as to enable one man
to hold several other men in subjection, except so far as
they are willing to be subject* "^^ But government in truth,
constitutes other men the arbitrators of one*s own actions
and the ultimate disposers of one^s destiny, He states:
Ibid., II, 230. Cf., n 24, above.
Thoreau, op. cit., 132.
Godwin, Op. cit., I, 222,
47
48
49
50
Ibid., I, 247.
See ibid., I, 227.
Ibid,, I, 145.
See ibid., I, 227.
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The supreme pov/er in a state ought not, in the
strictest sense, to require anything of its meni-
bers, that an understanding sufficiently enlight-
ened would not prescrihe without such interfer-*
ence.51
In another connection he asserts "that government by its
very nature counteracts the improvement of individual intel-
lect. "'^^ Godwin stressed that we should have little govern-
ment as possible. Each man should be wise enough to govern
himself without the intervention of any compulsory restraint^
and, "since government is an evil, the object principally tq
be aimed at is, that we should have as little of it as the
general peace of hitman society will permit, "^^
As to the forms of government, Godwin believes that
some are more evil than others. Monarchy is the worst. It
is essentially corrupt, Of monarchy he later says: "The
Ibid,, 123,
52 Ibid,, I, viii,
Cf, Thoreau: "I heartily accept the motto - 'That
government is best which governs least' (quoting Thomas
Jefferson] ; and I should like to see it acted up to more
rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts
to this, which also I believe, - 'That government is best
which governs not at all; ' and when men are prepared for itj
that will be the kind of government ¥;hich they vd.ll have,"
"On the Duty of Civil Disobedience", Miscellanies , 131,
Godwin acknowledges that he o?;es this conviction
to the political writings of Swift and "to a perusal of the
Latin historians," See Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, ix.
I
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seeds of reason and truth become barren and imreproductlve
in this unv/holesome climate,"^^ Montesquieu* s L* Esprit des
Lois (1748) had declared that monarchy led to despotism, and
Godwin had m''itten of the influence, which Montesquieu had
exerted upon him,^^ The protests in Prance and America I
against monarchy probably accentuated Godwin's opposition to
this form of governjnent.^V He devotes a section of his
Political Justice to the evils of monarchy in general.^^ He
shows that the very education of a prince unfits him for
ruling. Protection from the rougher and more common experi-
ences of life, sycophantic environment, and callousness to
man's sufferings are the inevitable characteristics of a
|
prince's education.^^ The prince is educated for a private
life marked by irresponsibility, impatience, dissipation,
dislike of truth and justice.
55 Godwin, op. cit«, II, 62.
56 Paul had access to Godwin's incomplete diary and
preserved tMs reference. See Paul, IVilliam Godwin
,
I, 67.
157
Cf. Godwin's own statement concerning this influ-
ence. Political Justice
,
I, x.
Godwin, op. cit., II, 1-30.
Ibid., II, 5 ff.
Ibid., II, 20 ff.
r
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Indeed the whole foundation upon which monarchy rests
is false, since monarchs are not entitled to the eminence
they obtain. They possess no intrinsic superiority over
their subjects. "The first lesson of virtue is, obey no
man; the first lesson of monarchy is, obey the king»"^-^
^
The imposture upon which a monarchy is founded is supported
by splendor of court, inflated style of regal formality,
indifference to merit and truth, artificial desires, and
pusillanimity*^^ "Virtue was never yet held in much honour
and esteem in a monarchical country* "^^ Moreover, the
injustice of luxury in royal circles and the inordinate
admiration of wealth are vices to be deplored. '^^
Godwin also believes that "monarchy is not adapted
to the government of large states, "^^ and thus he disagrees
with Rousseau v/ho says "that monarchy is suited only to
61 Ibid.,
62 Ibid.,
63 Ibid.,
64 Paine
has provoked people to think, by making them feel; and when
once the veil begins to rend, it admits not of repair."
Paine, Rights of Man, 559.
Godwin, Political Justice , II, 36.
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large states#"^^ This disagreement reveals a basic differ-
ence in the conception of government as held by these two
writers, Godv/in declares that good government depends on
information and reason, and a large monarchy cannot know the
Interests of the whole.^*'' Rousseau, on the other hand,
argues that a large monarchy more nearly approaches the
nature of a desirable democracy because the ruler has a more
tenuous relation to his people,^^
Concerning a virtuous despotism, Godwin argues in
this manner: "H^/hatever dispositions any man may possess in
favour of the Y/elfare of others, tY;o things are necessary to
give them validity and power: discernment and pov^er."^^ Bul^
however benevolent the monarch, he cannot exercise discern-
ment and power to the extent that his subjects will be I
favorably affected. Monarchy is not adapted to governing
large areas and many people, as we have observed in the pre-
ceding paragraph. The good intentions of a monarch.
Rousseau, The Social Contract, (Tozer trans,), 164.
67
68
69
Godwin, op, cit,, II, 36.
Rousseau, op. cit., 164.
Godwin, op, cit,, II, 32.
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therefore, fall short of reaching those who most need it«
^Ihile Godwin ostensihly addresses himself to the question of
"virtuous despotism", it would seem more accurate to say
that his question was that of benevolent monarchy.
The second main type of government which Godv/in con-
siders is aristocracy. This form is based even more than
is monarchy on the fallacious principle of hereditary preem-
inence Aristocracy erroneously views the multitude as "an
unruly beast"*''^ which necessitates a goverrjnent by the
|
superior few. Though Godwin believes that those who gov-
ern - if governjment be admitted desirable - should be compe-
tent, he argues that competence is not a matter of heredity.
If we can in this manner produce an hereditary legislator,
why not a hereditary moralist or an hereditary poet?"'''-^
Aristocracy is further to be condemned because it encourages
luxury and extravagance of the few at the expense of poverty
and servility of the many,"^^ In fact, while Godwin sets
aristocracy apart as a second and separate form of govern-
ment, it is so similarly treated as to be part of his
Godwin, ibid., II, 85. Also cf, Hobbes' view
that homo homini lupus <
Godwin, ibid., II, 89. He is quoting Paine, q.v..
Rights of Man, 358.
72 See ibid., II, 92.
f(
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I
section on monarchy. The arrangement is hardly logical, but
It serves to emphasize the greater contempt he holds for
aristocracy.
|
The third form of government"^^ which Godwin evaluates
is democracy, v/hich he thus defines: "Democracy is a system
of government according to which every member of society is
considered as a man and nothing more,"'''^ He believes the
weaknesses in democracy are as follows: The ascendancy of
the Ignorant and crafty, the inconstancy and vacillation,
the opportunity for demogogues to take control, and the
suspicion directed tov/ards those of superior merit •'^^
|
Yet Godwin holds that democracy is superior to mon-
archy and aristocracy. In spite of all its weaknesses,
Athenian democracy was more desirable than these other tiro
forms of government,'''^
'^^ Godwin says: "IJo form of governinent can be devised
which does not partake of monarchy, aristocracy or democ-
racy." Godv;ln, Political Justice
,
II, 115. Totalitarianism
currently shows the Incompleteness of his trichotomy.
74 Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 110.
75 Although Godwin at no time acknov;ledges that
Plato has influenced him, it Interesting to note how closely
Godwin^s criticisms of democracy resemble those of Plato.
Cf. Plato, Republic
,
(Davies and Vaughan trans. ), VIII, 270-
504.
'^^ See Godwin, op. cit., II, 114.
c
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Democracy restores to man a consciousness of his
value, teaches liim by the removal of authority
and oppression to listen only to the dictates of
reason, gives hiin confidence to treat all other
men as his fellow hoings, and induces him to
regard them no longer as enemies against whom to
be upon his guard, "but as bretliren whom it
becomes him to assist."^'
Godwin's partial endorsement of democracy is probably
due also to the atomistic nature of this form of government.
Democracy is logically more akin to anarchism, which is
wholly atomistic, than it is to monarchy or aristocracy.
Many of the elements in democracy - its relative freedom,
justice, and equality - are virtues Y/hich find fullest
expression in the ideals of anarchism. Tliis practical rela-
tion of democracy to anarchism quite likely placed the for-
mer in a favorable light in Godwin's thinlcing.
Then, there was the influence of the rights of man
theory. We have seen that Paine popularized this point of
view and that Godwin acknov/ledged his debt to Paine. This
theory rejected both monarchy and aristocracy, and advo-
cated democracy. Of monarchy Paine Yirote that it "appears
to be something going much out of fashion, falling into
ridicule, and rejected in some countries both as uimeces-
sar^r and expensive. ""^^ And of aristocracy he said that it
"^"^ Godv/in, Political Justice
,
II, 116.
Paine, Rights of Man, 366.
(i
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"has a tendency to deteriorate the hunan species,"'''^ Democ-
i*Sv^cy v;as, of course, the the fomi of government v/hich gave
more attention to man's rights, Paine declares "that civil
government is necessary, all civilised nations will agree;
but civil government is republican government* "80
God?/in's persistent belief in man's perfectibility
probably is a further encouragement to his belief that
democracy is better than monarchy or aristocracy. Democracy
has the faith to assume that man is capable of self-govern-
ment and of a proper use of freedom, Rousseau states: "If
there ¥/ere a nation of gods, it would be governed democrat-
ically. So perfect a government is unsuited to men."^-^ But
note Godwin's argiiment: "Nothing can be more unreasonable
than to argue from men as we now find them, to men as they
may hereafter become, "^^ How dominant an influence this
belief in man's perfectibility v/as in all of G-odwin's writ-
ing we shall consider later, "^"^ but here we see its bearing
upon his degree of faith in democracy.
Paine, ibid., 323.
30 Ibid., 367
on
^-^ Rousseau, op
®^ Godv/in, op, cit,,
33 See 165 ff . below.
cit., 160
II, 116,
(
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We have endeavored in these foregoing pages to indi-
cate Godwin's vieY/s concerning anarchism, society, and gov-
erniiient. Pertinent to his ideas in regard to these basic
concepts are the implications of force in its several forms.
The follov/ing chapter attempts to make a critical study of
this problem.

CHAPTER IV
GODWIN'S VIEWS CONCERNING FORCE
IN ITS SEVERAL RELATIONS
Closely related to Godwin* s views concerning govern-
ment are his ideas as to the place of force in his social
philosophy. It is the purpose of this chapter, therefore,
to deal with this fundamental question. We shall endeavor
to show the confusion which exists in this area of Godwin's
thinking; to consider possible distinctions betv;een force,
coercion, and violence; and to study such related problems
as punishment of crime, revolution, and war.
A. CONFUSION AlTD AlffilGUITIES IN TERilS
As already indicated, Godvdn fails to clarify the
distinctions in his use of the concepts of force, coercion,
and violence. He employs three terms in a confused and
indiscriminate matter. In this respect he does not differ
from several other writers who might be mentioned. Rousseau,
for instance, says that "force is a physical power, "-^ but
he later assigns to it a moral emphasis and gives violence
a more physical meaning. Paine also makes no distinctions*
^ Rousseau, Social Contract, 103.

A study of the several dictionaries reveals further confu-
sion and inconsistency. The l^exi English Dictionar:,^ (the
so-called Oxford Dictionary) makes no helpful distinctions.
It defines force as "physical strength or power exerted;
violence or physical coercion",^ The llexT Standard Diction-
ary , on the other hand, defines force as "unlawful vio-
lence",^ ?/ebster'E New Internati
o
nal Dictionary makes
force and violence synonymous, but it adds: "Violence
denotes the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force • • •
Compulsion and, still more, coercion, imply the application,
usLially by some active agent, of physical or (in the case
of coercion more frequently) moral force to control the
action of a voluntary agent,"
These representative sources indicate the difficulty
confronted in finding clear definitions of force, coercion,
and violence. Nor do Skeat^ or Dewey^ sharpen the needed
^ New English Dictionary, IV, 420.
3 Ibid., I, 959.
^ Webster's New International Dictionary, 848*
^ See Walter W. Skeat, Etymological Dictionary , 119,
221, and 692.
^ John Dewey, "Force and Coercion", The International
Journal of Ethics
,
XX^/I, 359-365.
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distinctions. Dr, Georgia Harkness gives the following
helpful analysis of coercion and violence:
No society - not even so small a group as
the family - could exist without some kind
of coercion. Immature memhers must be taught
and in some cases forcibly directed by coercion
from the more mature, lest they destroy them-
selves and others. In the larger society a
police force is imperative to restrain the
results both of ignorance and sin. Within
both areas, physical coercion under some cir-
cumstances is both cuj?ative and necessary.
There are times v/hen children need to be
spanked; there are occasions vihen intoxicated
persons need to be thrust forcibly into a
police car. It is better to disperse a lynch-
ing mob with tear gas than to let them lynch
their victim.
Coercion ceases to be legitimate force and
becomes violence when either physical brutality
or mass destruction replaces the spirit of
redemptive restraint. To imprison an offender
is coercion; to flog him is violence. To dis-
perse a mob with a gas causing physical discom-
fort but no permanent injury is coercion; to
ride ruthlessly throi.igh it and let human beings
be trampled under horses' hoofs is violence.
There is probably a legitimate coercive use of
night-sticks and guns by the police, but there
is certainly an illegitimate use of these v/hen
an arbitrary and brutal demonstration of power
replaces the maintenance of order.
Violence corrupts much family discipline;
it impregnates the police and penal systems
with arrogance; it is the very nature of war.
And whenever coercion gives way to violence it
destroys its end; for it sets in operation
forces of anger, cruelty and retaliation v/hich
in their essential nature are destructive rather
than curative,'''
' Georgia E. Harkness, The Resources of Religion,
62 ff.
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Dr* George A. Coe deals with this same problem of clarifying
the concepts of force, coercion, and violence Ke makes no
careful distinction "between them, hut he does distinguish
hetv/een tv/o kinds of coercion: violent and non-violent«^
The practical problem faced in the interpretation of
these terms as they appear in Godv.'-in's writing is to make
sure whether he gives them physical or moral implications.
One assumes that force is less physical and more organized
than is violence, and that coercion is more successful than
is violence; but these arbitrary distinctions are not held
consistently by Godwin. He frequently does employ the term
violence to mean inadequately organized, mostly physical,
and usually unsuccessful force. ^ As for his use of the
term coercion, one is led to believe that it is physical
but less so than violence. We have noted his statement
tliat "coercion may be the duty of individuals within the
community. "-^0 Coercion is not to be condoned, but it is
better than violence; hence the lesser evil should be
chosen. He states:
8 George A. Coe, "Two Kinds of Coercion", World
Tomorrow
, Vol. 16, 177.
196.
^ See GodT/in, Political Justice, I, 105; II, 182 and
10 Ibid., II, 182.
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As long as nations shall be so far mistaken as
to endure a complex government and an extensive
territory, coercion will be indispensibly fsicj
necessary to general security. It is therefore
the duty of individuals to take an active share
upon occasion, in so much coercion, and in such
parts of the existing system, as shall be suffi-
ent to prevent the inroad of universal violence
and tumult, 11
In another connection, he declares: "Of consequence the
wise and just man, being unable as yet to introduce the
form of society which his understanding approves, will con-
tribute to the support of so much coercion as is necessary
1?
to exclude what is worse, anarchy,"
Yet ideally coercion has no justification even as an
expedient. He believes that "coercion can at no time,
either permanently or prov i s ionally fitalics mine] , make
part of any political system that is built upon the prin-
13
ciples of reason." Here is one of the many instances in
which Godv^in attempts at once to accept the actual situa-
tion as it is and endeavor to proceed from it to the more
desirable, and at once to superimpose the ideal on the
11 Ibid,, II, 359.
12 Ibid,, II, 368,
•^^ Ibid,, II, 358.
0
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^
real. He observes that "coercion has no proper tendency to
prepare man for a state in which coercion shall cease ."-^^
Coercion is therefore of doubtful value even when used as
an expedient. Without the use of coercion, however, the
even more reprehensible elements of anarchy and violence
may go imchecked. Yet so long as coercion is resorted to,
so long are reason and justice thwarted. Godvfin implicitly
considers this dilemma, but he makes no effort to resolve
it.
His views concerning force are almost as inconsist-
ent, although here he makes clearer that he regards force
more favorably as an expedient. In one instance he declares
that "force may never be resorted to, but in the most
extraordinary and imperious emergency."'''^ But precisely ,
what constitutes "most extraordinary and imperious" emer-
gencies he does not say. By whose judgment and by what
criteria are emergencies decided? It would seem that the
general community is to decide. Note this statement:
^^ Ibid., II, 356
15 Ibid., I, 169.
*
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It has appeared to be necessary v/ith respect
to men as v/e at present find them, that force
should sometimes be employed in repressing
Injustice; and for the same reasons we will
suppose this force should as far as possible
be vested in the community. 1^
As with coercion, "force is an expedient the use of
which Is to be deplored • • • It corrupts the man that
employs it, and the man upon whom it is employed. "'•'^
Violence is even more strongly opposed in Godwin*
s
writings* Like Rousseau, he holds that violence is not so
much the product of man^s nature as it is of his institu-
tions. "Man is not originally vicious, "^^^ he insists.
Violence, like coercion, -^^ is not even to be used as a bad
means to a good end. Concerning the evil of violence in
this connection he writes as follows:
... Nothing can be more indefensible than a
project for introducing by violence that state
of society which our judgments may happen to
approve ... To dragoon men into the adoption
of what we think right is an intolerable tyranny.
It leads to unlimited disorder and injustice.
Every man thinks himself in the right; and, if
such a proceeding were universally introduced,
the destiny of manlrind v/ould be no longer a
question of argument, but of strength, presumption
or intrigue .20
1^ Godv/in, ibid., I, 224,
•^'^ Ibid., I, 263.
18 Ibid., II, 203.
^^ See 64 above.
GodY/in, op. cit., I, 259.20
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B. PIMISmiENT OP CRIME
Another aspect of the problem of force which Godwin
considers Is the punishment of crime. In fact, he believes
that this is a very significant consideration. He begins
his chapter by declaring that "the subject of punishment
is perhaps the most fundamental in the science of poli-»
tics."^-^ Driver is so favorably impressed with Godwin's
treatment of the problem that he states that "perhaps the
most brilliant and penetrating of all the sections of Poll-
22tical Justice are those that deal with this subject."
This same v/riter asserts that Godwin's own thinking
on the subject of punishment has been supplemented by the
influence of Beccaria and that the former has borrowed
extensively from the latter. ^'^ Godwin himself aclaiowledges
this influence.2^ Both thinkers deplored the use of coer-
cive authority (thought they differed as to the occasions
upon which it was used justifiably), Godwin's statements
concerning coercion we shall deal with at greater length
Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 321.
2^ C. H. Driver in Fossey Jo C. Heamshaw, Social
and Political Ideas
,
167.
^'^ Loc, cit.
24
See GodY/in, op. cit., II, 348 and II, 353. Note
in the first reference Godwin's comment concerning "the
humane and benevolent Beccaria".
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immediately below. Beccaria said: "Every act of authority
of one man over another, for which there is not an absolute
necessity, is tyrannical. "^^ Secondly, both men indicated
in their entire approach to the problem of crime and punish-
ment the earnest desire to place the question on a. scien-
tific basis. Justice and fairness in dealing with criminalq
are their common emphases»^^ Thirdly, both men held to the
pleasure-pain element in utilitarianism.^*'' They agree, tooj
on a further utilitarian principle in that they hold that
the most important consideration in crime is what it does
to the greatest number of people.'^" Finally, there can be
little doubt that both did much to arouse public interest
in penological reform.
There are, however, two differences between Godwin
and Beccaria which are too fundamental for Driver to have
ignored. The first difference is that Godrdn completely
rejected the contract theory of government, while Beccarial
avows this theory as the basis for his arguments. 30 The
25 Cesare B. Beccaria, An Essa^/ on Crimes and
Punishments, 19.
26 Cf
.
Godv;in, Political Justice, II, 538, and
Beccaria, ibid., 20.
27 Cfol57 below, and Beccaria, op. cit., 35.
28 Cf. 156 below, and Beccaria, op. cit«, 36.
29 See 47 above.
50 Beccaria. op. cit.. 22.
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second difference, no less significant, is that Godwin
believed free will did not exist, while Beccaria held
that man is a free moral agent v/ho has the choice of cora?-
mitting or not committing a crime, and that all who commit
identical crimes deserve identical treatment,
Godwin first inquires into the meaning of pimishment.
One may employ force to compel any member of society to
occupy a post most conducive to the general good, such as
requiring a man to serve as a soldier. Again, one may
put a valuable man to death because he is infected v/ith som£
pestilential disease. Neither of these acts, however, would
Godwin regard as pimishment. \Yhat, then, is pimishinent? He
replies that punishment is the voluntary infliction of evil
upon a vicious being both because public advantage demands
it and because there is a certain fitness or propriety in
the natiire of things which makes suffering the suitable con-
comitant of vice, 53 Both these reasons, hov/ever, take for
granted the validity of the doctrine of free will. They
presuppose that the offender might have chosen to do other
31
32
See 153 below.
For an account of Beccaria »s views, see Albert
Morris, Criminology, 52-53,
55 See Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 322,
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than he did. They further assume that, if sufficiently
painful consequences are attached to criminal actions, mem-
bers of the community will voluntarily refrain from com-
mitting those acts.*^^ Now, Godwin "believes he has already
completely disproved the existence of free will,'^ He
argues as follows:
Mind is an agent, in no other sense tha.n matter is
an agent • • • Morality, in a rational and design-
ing mind, is not essentially different from morality
in an inanimate substance* A man of certain intel-
lectual habits is fitted to be an assassin; a dagger
of a certain form, is fitted to be his instrument
• • • The man is propelled to act by necessary
causes and irresistible motives • • • The assassin
cannot help the murder he commits, any more than
the dagger. 36
Next, Godwin examines the nature of retributive
justice. This idea he Y/holly repudiates. Necessitarianism
must ever be the guiding principle. "There is no such
thing as desert," he says. 3*7 So it is wrong to inflict
punishment except when it is clearly known that general
good will be thus effected. Otherwise, , to punish a man for
what is past and irrecoverable is a most pernicious exhi-
bition of an untutored barbarianism. "The only sense of the
"~
See ibid., II 323.
2^ See ibid., I, 361-421.
See ibid., II, 324.
^'^ See ibid., II, 327.
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word punishment, that can he supposed to be compatible v;ith
the principles of the present work," he explains, "is that
of pain inflicted on a person convicted of past injurious
38
action, for the purpose of preventing future mischief."
V/hat can be said concerning the use of coercion
involved in punisl:iment? Let us reflect a little upon the
species of influence that coercion employs, Godv/in sug-
gests, It tends to make the criminal believe tliat he is
wrong for the reason that he has less power than those
coercing him* Thus, force is appealed to. Might, not
right, appears to be the criterion of superiority, Superior
strength is the standard of justice. Self-defence is the
only occasion for a justifiable employrnent of coercion,
Godwin terms this Instance as "the most innocent of all the
classes of coercion, Even in this case, however, a mere
passive resistance might be better. In this spirit of
absolute pacifism, he queries: "V/ho shall say how far the
whole species might be improved, did they cease to respect
force in others, and did they refuse to employ it for
Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 327,
5^ Ibid., II, 334,
^ Ibid,, II, 337,

73
themselves?"^-'- Certainly coercion in any other case is to
"be rejected outright
Nor can punishment refoirrn a man. Much less is pun-
ishment as restraint justifiable. These beliefs rest on
the fallacy that coercion and adversity create virtue.
Reason alone can create virtue, and reason is outraged by
coercion.
Finally, Godvn.n considers whether punishment is
desirable as a deterrent. He quickly concludes that this
argument is the most specious of them all. Vicarious pun-
ishment never does anyone else any good. "All coercion
sours the mind," Punishment as an example to others
leads only to greater barbarities and cruelties, since it
emphasizes coercion rather than reason.
The difficulty of administering punishment is anoth-
er problem which Godwin raises. In the first place, by
what criteria should the degree of pimishment be measured?
Delinquency and punishment are incoLmiensurable, he argues.
"No standard of delinquency ever has been, or ever can be.
^^ Ibid,, II, 339, Cf. the principles currently
found in India's nonresistance movement and the Fellowship
of Reconciliation.
Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 342,
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discovered, No two crimes v/ere ever alike. "^"^ Reducing
crimes to general classes is absurd* Moreover, it is unfair
to measure pimishment on the basis of overt behavior, since
it is the motive which is the proper object of study. But
motives cannot always be known. Until the precise inten-
tions of an offender is known, no just measure for punish-
ment can be used. Thus Godwin concurs with Beccaria^s
reasoning.^
Now, what can be said for the use of punishment as a
temporary expedient? Godwin insists it is fallacious to
argue that the human species is at present so infested with
evils that punisiiment must be resorted to until men are
better. The first truth is that punishment will never make
men better. "It were idle to expect," he continues, "that
force should begin to do that, which it is the office of
truth to finish. "^^ Furthermore, the only way in v/hich
crime can be eradicated is to change the whole social sys-
tem, since the causes of crime are inlierent in the very
structure of government. It is the characteristic of a
Ibid., II, 347.
Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punisiiment Sj
36-37.
Godv/in, op. cit., II, 360.
Ibid., II, 361.
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well-formed society to create, preserve, and increase the
virtues of its members* Wrong government, not the individi*-
al, produces crime.
The ill propensities of mankind no othervvise tend
to postpone the abolition of coercion, than as
they prevent them from perceiving the advantages
of political simplicity* The moment in which
they can be persuaded to adopt any rational plan
for this abolition is the moment in v/hich the
abolition ought to be effected*
Thus, Godwin urges that the only way to rid society of
crime is not to temporize with punishment, but at once to
change the nature of the social structure* "Punishment can
at no time, either permanently or provisionally, make part
of any political system that is built upon the principles
of reason* "^^
Godwin's next point in his discussion of the problem
of punishment is hardly consistent with his general viev/s
concerning coercion*^^ He states that coercion exercised
in the name of the state upon its respective members cannot
be the duty of the community, "but coercion may be the duty
of individuals within the community. "^^ But the individual
IT
48
Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 362.
Ibid,, II, 563*
See 64 above.
^0 Godwin, op* cit«, II, 363,
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rendering the pimlshrnent must be quite certain that tempo-
rary restraint, not retribution or reform, is his only
motive, Godwin not only at this point broke from his estab
lished opposition to coercion, but also made his argument
vulnerable by failing to show exactly under what exigencies
coercion is justified* Moreover, he himself relies on
motives in tliis connection, in spite of his declaration
that motives cannot be known, ^-^
After denouncing corporal punishment, torture, and
capital punishment, as v/ell as slavery, prison conditions,
and solitar;^'- confinement, Godwin concludes his lengthy
study of crime and punishment with the appeal that every
lover of justice will do his duty to help repeal iniquitous
laws and to help produce that kind of society in which
crime cannot exist, And, in characteristic ultilitarian
language, he makes it clear that duty is the best possible
application of a given power to the promotion of the general
good.^'5
52
53
See 74 above.
Godwin, Political Justic e, II, 393.
Ibid., II, 377.
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C. THE RIGHT OP REVOLUTION
With revolutions shaking "both France and America, it
is but natural that G-odi^/in should include this type of
violence in his discussion. While he does deal with the
matter, it is in a sketchy and not conclusive manner
He defines his term as follows: "Revolutions are a strug-
gle, bet¥feen tv/o parties each persuaded of the justice of
its cause, a struggle not decided by compromise or patient
expostulation, but by force only."^^ As to the incidence
of bloodshed in revolutions, he says: "Perhaps no impor-
tant revolution was ever bloodless*" Revolutions are
the product of passion, not of reason,^''' They are engen-
dered by an indignation against tyranny, but they are them-
selves pregnant with tyranny. Moreover, "during a period
revolution, enquiry and all those patient speculations to
which manlrind are indebted for their greatest improvements,
are suspended. "^^ Revolutions by their very nature are
crude and premature in their effects. The right of
^ See Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, 265 ff
.
55 Ibid., 273.
56 Loc. cit., see also 274.
57 Godv/in, op. cit., I, 246.
58 Ibid., 269.
59 Ibid., 272.
60 Ibid., 274.
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revolution is not a matter of force but of justice* Godwin
here refutes "the right of the stronger" view of Thrasy-
machus,^-'- . Like Rousseau, Godwin rejects the view that
CO
might makes right,^ Probably the most informative state-
ment which Godwin makes at any time in his rather indefi-
nite treatment of the subject is the following:
It has perhaps sufficiently appeared from the
preceding discussion, that revolutions are
necessarily attended with many circumstances
worthy of our disapprobation, and that they are
by no means essential to the political improve-
ment of mankind* Yet, after all, it ought not
to be forgotten that, though the connection be
not essential or requisite, revolutions and
violence have too often been coeval with impor-
tant changes of the social system, ^3
Nevertheless, like Kume, Godv/in rejected the contract
theory of government partly because of the implications of
force. It is not true to historical fact that government
depends on the authority of the governed, Hume argued that
practically all governments h-ave been based "either on
usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a
^-^ See Plato, The Republic , (Davies and Vaughan,
trans.), I, 16,
Rousseau said: "The strongest man is never strong
enough to be always master unless he transforms his power
into right and obedience into duty," Rousseau, Social
Contract, 103
o
Godwin, Political Justice, I, 285,
mft-
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fair consent or volmitary subject of the people," Godwin
stressed this argument and insisted that force, not
contract, is the essence of government,
V/hatever viev/s Godwin may have held in his mind V7iti>-
out committing them to paper - and the two major revolutions
were probably too contemporaneous v/ith his v/ritings for
sufficient detachment and perspective - it is clear that he
deplored their elements of violence YOiile he points out
that "it is not unv/orthy of a good member of society to be
an enemy of the constitution of his country, "^*^ he v/ould
change the constitution by the use of reason rather than by
violence, For "the friend of human happiness will
CO
endeavour to prevent violence*" And again, "Truth and
virtue are competent to fight their own battles. They do
not need to be nursed and patronised by the hand of
tfVOpov/er.
64
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David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature ,
For the full discussion, see Godwin, Political
Justice
,
I, 200 ff.
See 67 above,
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GodT/ln, op, cit,, I, 226,
See ibid,, I, 304,
Ibid,, I, 286,
Ibid,, II, 217,
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D. WAR
No study of GodY7ln's views of force v/ould be complete
without a consideration of his beliefs concerning war. Con*
sistent with his argument that force is the inherent charac-
teristic of government, Godwin in his discussion of the
causes of war shows that certain types of government inevi-
tably produce war.
Monarchy and aristocracy are the breeders of war.
In fact, "it is perhaps impossible to show, that a single
war ever did, or could have taken place, in the history of
manlcind, that did not in some v/ay originate v/ith those two
71great political monopolies, monarchy and aristocracy*
"
Democracy lessens the danger of war.'''^ V/hile democracy has
not been free from v;ar, it is nevertheless true that "war
will be foreign to the character of any people in pro-
portion as their democracy becomes simple and unalloyed."*''^
To be sure, democracy cannot insure its people against
588.
71
72
73
Godwin, Political Justice, II, 143.
Note Paine ' s similar belief in Rights of Man,
Godv/in, op. cit«, II, 144.
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invasion and consequent defensive war. Defensive war, hov\r-
ever, is exceedingly rare.
Unlike Rousseau, Godwin argues that a love of coun-
try can te a vice and not a virtue. Rousseau holds that
the general will deserves our allegiance, and that we are
"but members of the v/hole society. He says:
Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute
sa puissance sous la supreme direction de la
volenti gen^rale; et nous recevons en corps chaque
membre comme partie indivisible du tout.
This statement represents the very essence of his social
contract theory. But Godwin, as we have seen above, '''^
entirely repudiates this theory. Against Rousseau*
s
organic view of government stands Godwin* s atomism with
its corollary that patriotism is an emotion which perpetu-
ates force. This diametrically opposite conception of the
nature of government is fundamental to an understanding of
v/hy Rousseau's view gives quarter to war and why Godv;in*s
view outlaws war. The latter does not hesitate to say that
sfT
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social
, 33.
*75 See 47 above,
7fi Rousseau states: "Q,u*est-ce done que le gouverne-
ment? Un corps intermediaire etabli entre les sujets et le
souverain pour leur mutuelle correspondance. " Rousseau,
Du Contrat Social ^ 95.
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"love of country has too often been foimd to be one of those
Godwin again msikes reason the deciding principle, '°
Lack of reason and the presence of error made government
possible. Because nations were stisceptible to error, war
was introduced* Men were induced deliberately to seek each
other's lives, and to settle controversies between them by
murder rather than by the dictates of reason.'''^ This
murder has then been established as a trade. One part of a
nation pays ajiother part to murder and be murdered in their
stead. The evil of war can be fully realized only by see-
ing a field of battle. He thus describes the atrocities of
war: "Here men deliberately destroy each other by thou-
sands, without resentment against, or even knowledge of,
each other. The plain is strewed with death in all its
forms, "^^ Anguish and wounds display the diversified modes
in Y/hich they can torment the human frame. Towns are
burned; ships are blovm. up in the air, while the maagled
specious illusions which invites warfare*
Godwin, Political Justice, II, 146.
78 See 137 below*
79 Godwin, op, cit II, 148,• 9
80 Ibid II, 149,
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limbs descend on every side; the fields are laid desolate;
the wives of the inhabitants exposed to brutal insult; and
their children driven forth to hunger and nakedness. It is
an inferior circumstance, though by no means unattended
with the widest and most deplorable effects, when Yie add,
to these scenes of horror, and the subversion of all ideas
of moral justice they must occasion in the auditors and
spectators, the immense treasures which are v/rung in the
form of taxes, from those inhabitants whose residence is
81
removed from the seat of war. With Rousseau at this
point Godv/in would agree: "L^homme est naturellement
82
pacifique ," The horrors of war, so forcefu.lly depicted
by Godwin above, kre the results of government.
The usual causes of vmr are without foundation in
truth, Godwin asserts. In the first place, the argiment
is fallacious that v/ar imparts a healthy and vigorous tone
to the mind of a nation. Furthermore, Godwin argues.
81
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Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 148-149,
Rousseau, op, cit,, 305, Note, also, Paine *s
dictum: "Man is not the enemy of man, but tirrough the
medium of a false system of government," Paine, Rights of
Man, 588,
(I
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private insults of tyrants cannot justify the plunging of
a ¥/h.ole nation into v/ar to avenge such insults. His atti-
tude as to the proper manner of dealing with insults direc-
ted toY/ards one*s countrymen when visiting a foreign nation
is interesting. He says that government ought to protect
the tranquillity of those v/ho reside within the sphere of
its functions; but, "if individuals think proper to visit
other countries, they must he delivered over to the protec-
tion of general reason."^
Again, the fact that a more bellicose neighbor is
preparing for the possibility of war is no justifiable
reason for preparing in turn. Godwin deplored what we
contemporaneously refer to as "the mad race for armament,
"
since he believed its natural outcome v/as war. He then
examines another often- cited justification for war; namely,
that nations should at once exercise violence as a protest
against small provocations, for Ignoring small insults
opens the way for large ones. Godwin refutes this argument
by saying that a people which will not fight over triviali-
ties but "does not fail to be moved at the moment it ought
to be moved, is not the people that its neighbours will
Godv/in, op. cit., II, 150.
tI
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delight to vipge to extremities,"^^ Finally, the vindicatior
of national honor is no legitimate cause of war, Godwin con-
tends. True honor is to be found in integrity and justice.
Nations cannot be indicted, as Burke Y/ould put it, for
violating honor#^^ Individuals, not nations, possess or do
not possess honor. Godv/in thus adheres to his atomistic
point of view.
Are there, then, no justifiable causes of war? There
are two legitimate causes, says Godv;in, Rather, there are
two aspects of the same principle; that is, defense of our
ovm liberty and the liberty of others. But Godwin is not
clear here as to what precisely he means by liberty and
what precisely he means by infringement upon that liberty.
Unconsciously, it would seem, he makes his position vulner-
able » Exactly how would he distinguish between a defensive
war and an offensive one, insofar as infringement upon his
liberties are concerned? Furthermore, what circumstances
justify a nation* s going to war to protect the liberties of
others? Godwin apparently overlooks some of the serious
Ibido, II, 151,
85 For his views concerning defensive war, see 82
above.
See also Paino, op. cit,, 388,
ft
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implications of his position. In the main, however, he
consistently opposes war as the negation of all reason and
justice.
e
,CHAPTER V
^GODWIN »S VIEWS CONCERNING PROPERTY
It is our purpose in this chapter to attempt to
analyze and evaluate Godv;ln*s views concerning property.
The question of property rights is almost an inevitable one
for the anarchist to challenge # Its classic treatraent is,
of course, Proudhon*s "What Is Property/? with its reply
that "Property is robbery".-'* Godwin assigns the topic a
significant place in his anarchism. He says: "The subject
of property is the key-stone that completes the fabric of
social justice."^ Driver comLients that Godwin includes
the question of property as one of the several major social
institutions to be denounced. Hal^vy notes that Godwin
submitted the idea of individual property to a more rigor-
4
ous criticism than did Paine,
Godwin begins his discussion with the observation
that "there is nothing that more powerfully tends to
^-T
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What Is Property?
^ Godv/in, Political Justice
,
II, 420.
^ See C. H. Driver on "V/illiam Godv/in" in Possey J.
C4 Hearnshaw, The Social and Political Ideas of Some Repre-
sentative Thinkers of the Revolutionary lEira, 170.
4 ^Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism,
209.

distort our judgment and opinions, than erroneous notions
concerning the goods of fortune."^ The question of property
may be approached, he says, from many angles. Consider, foi
instance, such ramifications as taxation, bounties, monopo-
lies and such claims of the church as first fruits and
tithes. The present inquiry, however, deals not so much
Y/ith these more specific questions concerning property as
with the general principles involved,
A. CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
The good things of the world, as Godwin puts it, may
be divided into four classes: subsistence, the means of
intellectual and moral improvement, inexpensive gratifi-
cations, and such gratifications, "as are by no means
essential to healthful and vigorous existence, and cannot
be purchased but with considerable labour and industry,"
It is concerning these classes, and especially the fourth,
that Godwin develops his thought. Finally, in his prelimi-
nary treatment of the subject, Godwin calls attention to
the fact that the injustice of accumulated property has
^"^dwin, op, cit,, II, 421,
^ Ibid., II, 424,
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been the foimdation of all religious morality* The rich
have "been admonished that their wealth is only a trust, and
tliat they are strictly accountable for their stewardship^*''
But, unfortunately, this doctrine has tended "to place the
supply of our Y/ants in the disposal of a fev7, enabling them
to make a show of generosity with what is not truly their
own, and to purchase the submission of the poor by the pay-
ment of a debt*"® It is an iniquitous system of charity,
instead of a system of justice. It fills the rich with
Q
pride and the poor with servility. Instead of regarding
the slender comforts they are accorded by the rich as their
due, the poor tend to view such comforts as gifts from
their opulent neighbors,
God¥/in then defines what he means by property,
"Property," he says, "implies some permanence of external
possession and includes in it the idea of a possible com<-
petitor."-'-'-^ There are three degrees of property. The
first and simplest degree is that of a permanent right to
those things, the uses of which result in a means of
' See St. Mark X:21. Also, Acts 11:44-45.
® Godv/in, Political Justice
,
II, 430.
9 Cf . the viev;s of Weber and Tawney in this
connection.
10 Godwin, op. cit., II, 432.
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subsistence and happiness. One of the most essential
rights of man is that he may not be molested in the use of
his personal belongings* The second degree of property to
which every man is entitled is the produce of his ovm
industry, the fruits of his ovm labor. Yet even in this
case he is only a steward; he is obligated to use this
property for the benefit of society, so far as he is able.
The third degree of property is a more involved and more
questionable matter. It has to do Y/ith laboring for others,
'It is a system, in whatever manner established, by which
one man enters into the faculty of disposing of the produce
of another 'man's industry," No one lives unto himself
alone. When one indulges in a lujcury, he conderaais to
slavery countless others ¥/ho must supply hirii with his whim.
It is this degree of property v;hlch Godwin believes is capa-
ble of rendering great injustice,
B, POSSIBLE Il^TLUENCES UPON GODV/IN»S VIE\YS
It is possible that Godwin was influenced by
Helve'tius in his views concerning luxury, Helvetius \7r0te:
^^ Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 455,
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"Luxury is harmful not because It is luxury, but merely
because it is the result of a great disproportion betv/een
the wealth of the citizens. "•^'^ Halevy thinks Godwin may
have been influenced by Burke also, Plalevy comments that
Burke, who, in a youtliful work, a curious essay
devoted to the defence of natural society, had
contrasted the state of nature in which "it is
an invariable lav;, that a man's acquisitions are
in proportion to his labours" with the state of
"artificial" society in which it is a law as
constant and as invariable, that those v/ho labour
most enjoy the fewest things; and that those v/ho
labour not at all, have the greatest number of
enjoyments and depicted, in moving terms, the
state of slavery to which British industry reduces
its labourers
It vms Adam Smith, however, who most clearly influ-
enced Godv/in in his viev/s concerning property* Smith's
great work, Aii Inquiry into the Hature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, had already
attained great heights of popularity (by 1780 it had been
translated into four other languages) when Godwin wrote
his views* One basic principle in the V/ealth of Nations
Godwin did not accept. That T/as Smith's belief in self-
interest as an economic motive, "V/e address ourselves.
12 Helvetlus, De 1« Esprit ,
Halevy, op. cit,, 216,
•'-^ Hereafter referred to as Wealth of Nations.
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not to their hLunanity, but to their self love," says Smith,
V/hile G-odwinms thoroughly utilitarian, he did not hold to
this principle of selfishness as being the dominant motive
in society. But in the main Godwin did accept the doc-
trines found in the V/ealth of nations
. For instance. Smith
reasoned that, when once land is occupied and capital has
accumulated, the labourer no longer receives the whole
produce of his labor. Instead, his wages are determined as
a result of a bargain entered into by the employee and the
employer. In such a bargain the employer alv/ays sees to It
17that he has the better of the deal. Godwin follows this
same line of reasoning. -^^
Again, Godwin agreed with Smith that there should be
little or no interference on the part of the government.
Godwin says that "the interference of government, however,
impartially vested, is, no doubt, only to be resorted to,
upon occasions of rare occurrence and indispensable
urgency.""'-^ Smith had already elaborated his principle of
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, I, 13.
See 157 below.
Smith, op. cit., I, 42. Also I, 58.
See Godwin, Political Justice, II, 437.
•^^ Godwin, ibid., II, 434.
1>
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laissez faire, that government should interfere with busi-
ness only on rarest occasions* P/hile he admits that an
economic system v/hich allows another than the worker to
reap the rewards of the vrork, Godwin nevertheless argues
that goverTimental control would be worse. He even protests
against having inheritance suppressed by government, fear-
ing such suppression would create a worse state of affairs
by its inevitable evasions.^-^
Let us briefly trace another influence, Adam Smith
22had treated at some length the labor theory of value. In
this treatment he made a distinction betv/een a natural or
rude state of society and an artificial state. In the
former, the whole produce of labor belongs to the laborer;
in the latter, it is right that profits should be taken
from the produce by other persons v/ho have in some v/ay
assumed responsibilities for the produce. Note that Godwin
would not agree with this view in his ideas concerning the
first degree of property, but that in his presentation of
the third degree of property there is full opportunity for
Smithes principle to be operative.
See Smith, op. cit., I, 309-510, 319, 395, 406-
412; II, 180.
^•^ Godwin, op. cit., II, 439.
See also Ricardo»s treatment of this theory in
^'^^ EllJ^SlH]:^ 2L Political Economy and Taxation.
i(
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Thus v;e see in reference to the question of property
that his views here, as in other instances, v/ere not origi-
nal. Yet he did not merely borrow ideas from others. He
incorporated and synthesized them into his o\m social phi-
losophy. We nov; turn to further implications of the suhject|^
C. EVILS IN THE SYSTEM OP PROPERTY
Godwin says that in reality nothing is our own. We
have nothing that has not a destination prescribed to it by
the immutable voice of reason and justice. But, on the
other hand, if there is an obligation for each man to assist
his neighbor, each one in turn has a right to the assistance
of his neighbor«^^
He then raises tv;o general questions concerning the
problem of property. In the first place, who is the person
intended to make use of a given object? Secondly, who is
the person to whom the preservation and distribution of any
See Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism^
209. Note, too. Smithes inte3?pretation of this fact. He
says: "Han has almost constant occasion for the help of
his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect if from
their benevolence only. He v/ill be more likely to prevail
if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show
them that it is for their o\mi advantage to do for him what
he requires of them." Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations
,
I, 12.
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given amoimt of these objects can most justly and most use-
fully be entrusted?'^ The utilitarian principle is employedj
by Godwin as the basis for deciding such questions. Vi/hat
use of property vlll be for the greatest good for the great-|
est number?
That the existing system of property is not true to
the utilitarian principle is quite evident. Nothing, says
Godv/in, distorts our judgment as much as erroneous views
about property. He denounces the system further in these
words
:
And here with grief it must be confessed that, how-
ever great and extensive are the evils that are
produced by monarchies and courts, by the imposture
of priests and the iniquity of criminal laws, all
these are imbecile and impotent compared with the
evils that arise out of the established acljuinis-
tration of property,
Godwin advances five arguments as to the evils of
property as administered under the prevailing system. In
the first place, the unequal distribution of property
creates, as we have just seen, a sense of dependence upon
the OYmers, Instead of realizing that he has a just right
to a share of the world's goods, the poor man accepts with
servile gratitude the gifts from the rich man., Obsequiousnes!|i
"^^Halevy, ibid,, 209,
25 nGodwin, Political Justice
,
II, 453«
II
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is th.e symptom of this disease of maldistribution. Paupers
and servants are created, and the owners take on increased
poT/ers.
Second, this inequality encourages an over-emphasis
of the acquisitive desires of both the "haves" and the
"have-nots." The system corrupts the moral sense of men.
The craving for opulence distorts integrity and judgment*
A false hierarchy of values is developed. The v/ealthy are
merely the pensioners of society.
Third, intellectual attainments are blighted, proper
ambition is thv/arted, and men are reduced to crushing toil
and desperate economic slavery. "Accumulated property,
"
Godwin declares, "treads the pov/ers of thought in the dust,
extinguishes the sparks of genius, and reduces the great
mass of manlcind to be immersed in sordid cares. "^^ He
observes that the peasants and laborers, under the existing
system, are benumbed with toil, their bodies invaded with
infirmities, and surrendered to an -untimely grave© Further*]'
more, it should be remembered how rapid would be the
advances of intellect if all men were admitted into the
i9
i
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field of knowledge. Poverty alone prevents this.^''' "G-enius
would not be depressed with, false v/ants and niggardly
patronage ."^Q
Fourth, the prevailing system of property multiplies
all m^anner of vices and evils among men, "The fruitful
source of crimes consists in this circumstance, one man's
possessing ahundance, that of which another man is destl-
tute.""' This sovirce of crime will continue as long as
men* 3 minds are possessed with a sense of justice* The reajf
guilt is upon those who hold a monopoly. The crimes of the
poor are hut so many efforts to right the original wrong.
But this grave fault in the system of property must be
rectified by the use of reason, not force. The immediate
tendency of the established administration is to persuade
men that reason is impotent. The injustice of which they
complain is maintained by forces hence, they are inclined
to resort to force for its correction. G-odwln goes so far
as to say that "force grew out of monopoly. "^^ Since the
rich must use force to hold what they have and the poor
are tempted to use force to gain equality, class war
'^^ Note again Godv/in^s unswerving faith in reason
and man's perfectibility.
28 Godwin, ibid., II, 462,
29
30
Ibid., II, 462.
Ibid., II, 463.
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results. Driver comments: "Like all the later social-
ists. Godwin sees in the institution of private property
the basic cause of war." Were this injustice removed,
each man could be -united to his neighbor the v/orld over in
love and mutual kindness. But "as long as this source of
Jealousy and corruption shall remain, it is visionary to
talk of universal peace," Godv/in concludes. '^'^
Fifth, the existing system of property results in
the continuance of a state of under-population. Til/hile it
is hardly within the province of this present study of
GodiYin to deal at length with his views concerning popu-
lation, it may be proper to make several observations in
this connection at this time. Godwin maintained that there
was no danger of population pressure. He argues that "it
has been calculated, that the average cultivation of Europe
might be so improved, as to maintain five times her present
51 For the Marxist view of this cause of class war,
see The C.omnunist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels,
Driver, on "V/illiam Godwin", in Possey J. C.
Hearnshaw^s The Social and Political Ideas of Some Repre-
sentative Thinl^ers of the Revolutionary Era, iTi.
Godwin, Political Justice, II, 466.
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number of inhabitants,"'^^ He further contends in his later
chapter on population that "there is a principle in nature
by means of which every thing seems to tend to its level,
and to proceed in the most auspicious way, when least inter-
fered v;ith by the mode of regulation. "'^^ Again, he argues
that, despite temporal^ increases, population never exceeds
the facility of subsistence, Y/ith Thomas Robert Malthus
Godv/in most thoroughly disagreed, Malthus had advanced his
pessimistic theory that population pressure seriously
menaced civilization. He believed that there "is the con-
stant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the
nourishment prepared for It,"^^ His disturbing book,
published in 1V98, disputed Godwin* s (and incidentally
Malthus 's father, who was in accord with Godwin) view of
the perfectibility of man, Malthus predicted that the
population would increase in geometrical proportion, while
the means of subsistence might increase but only in arith-
metical proportion. Artificial checks v;ere necessary,
GodwDjri vigorously attacked Malthus in the work. Of Popu-
lation : an Enquiry concerning the Power of Increase in the
34
Ibid,, II, 466,
Ibid,, II, 516,
Thomas R, Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of
Pojpulation as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society ,
(
Ninnber of Maiikind.; being an Answer to Mr« Maithus ^ s Essay^*^
With these several facts in mind, we can luiderstand some-
what more clearly Godwin* s views concerning the ?/hole ques-
tion of population. Finally, let it be noted that Godwin
held that the existing system of property results in a con-
tinued state of imder-population. Since it is a principle
of human society, as he believed, tliat population is always
kept dovm to the level of subsistence, private ovmership of
land and unequal property rights "may be considered as
strangling a considerable portion of our children in their
cradle. "^^
D. UTILITARIAN PRINCIPLE IWOLVED
Note that Godwin consistently holds to the utili-
tarian principle of the greatest happiness for the great-
est number. He vie^js it as a natural consequence that the
quantity of happiness experienced in a society is in pro-
portion to the number of individuals capable of happiness
and consequently to the total number of individuals.^^
^"^^or complete bibliographical data, see 226 below.
Godwin, Political Justice, II, 467.
39 'Halevy discusses this point rather fully. See
his Grov/th of Philosophical Radicalism, 218.
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This reasoning coincides with that of Paley-,"^ It is the
purpose of good government, Paley argued, to provide the
greatest amount of happiness for the people. Happiness is
an individual exx^erience, and the quantity of it ordinarily
can he increased only hy increasing the number of beings
who experience it. How In countries like Western Europe
where economic conditions come more nearly to equality, it
may be assujned that a greater amount of happiness can be
found among ten people living in comfort than among only
five living in luxury. Thus, for Paley, the great task of
government was to increase population and thereby increase
happiness
o
Not all thinkers shared Paley »s optimism as readily
as did Godv;in, We have seen how Maithus later presented
a much less sanguine view.^"'' Wallace, too, in his Various
42
Prospects of Manl;ind, Nature and Providence, had advocated
that all private property be abolished. Such abolition
would help increase population. But this action v/ould not
remove what he regarded as the natural obstacles to
"^See Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, XI.
4-1
See 99 above.
Published in 1761, See bibliography.
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population increase* He believed that the earth would he
unable to novirish a human race v/hose population was
steadily growing larger,
Godwin, however, saw no real difficulty in the carry-
ing out of his utilitarian principle of increasing happi-
ness by increasing population. Only a fourth of the habit-
able ¥;orld had thus far been cultivated, the fourth already
cultivated could undergo great improvement in its cultiva-
tion, and man*s intelligence and perfectibility v/ere incal-
culable in their possibilities of solving what might appear
at the present time to be insoluble difficulties. These
arguments gave Godwin great confidence in his point of viewc
The fact that the Marquis de Condorcet in his Equiss e d*un
Tableau Historique des Progres de 1* Esprit Humain carried
to their fullest development Godwin* s optimistic views
probably added to the latter 's confidence that he had
written with a true prophetic pen,^^ In any case, it is
quite clear that Godwin does not lose sight of his utili-
tarian criterion in his study of the existing system of
property. He closes his discussion v/ith these words:
Condorcet »s book was not published until a year
after the first edition of Political Justice had appeared*
r(1
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"liVhatever may be the value of the life of man, or rather
whatever would be his capability of happiness in a free
and equal state of society, the system we are here oppos-
ing may be considered as arresting, upon the threshold of
existence, four fifths of that value and that happiness ."^^
E. LiARRIAGE AS PROPERTY
"IVhatever else Godwin may have charged against the
institution of marriage, he never obscured his chief reason
for discrediting it. This chief reason Is that marriage
can be viev/ed as nothing more than a branch of the prevail-
ing system of property. He says bluntly that "the
44 Godv/in, Political Justice II, 467.
Note the views of Marx and Engels: "Abolition of
the familyl , . . On v/h^t foimdation is the present family
based? On capital, on private gain • « • The bourgeois
family will vanish as a matter of course when its comple-
ment vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of
capital." Manifesto of the Communist Party . 27.
Note, also, the quite opposite point of view con-
cerning the connection betv/een marriage and property as
presented a few years after Political Justic e by the Chris-
tian (Catholic) socialist. Baron von Kettler. In The Labor
Question and Christianity, he approves of the right of
private property, provided it be realized that man is a
steward and that God is the true owner. Marriage, far from
being a species of property, is basic to the life of the
worker. It protects his very existence, his morality, and
gives meaning to his labors. (See The Labor Question and
Christianity, 101 and 118.)
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institution of marriage is made a system of fraud* "^^ V/hile
he admits that "human beings are formed for society,"" It
is nevertheless true that "individuality is of the very
essence of intellectual essence»"^^ Marriage impairs indi-
viduality and spoils self-reliance* Even more, "marriage
,49is a monopoly and the worst of monopolies," The wishes
of any two people can never coincide, ov/ing to the differ-
ences of their early training. Moreover, marriage results
in a degrading economic dependence for the v;oman, and it
tends to develop in the man an unjust sense of mastery and
superiority, Godwin does not see any harm that can result
from the abolition of the system of marriage. "The mutual
kindness of persons of an opposite sex Y/ill fall under the
same system as any other species of friendship," The
problems of promiscuity and sex laxity are dismissed as of
46 Godwin, Political Justice, II, 507.
47 Ibid., II, 499.
48 Ibid., II, 500.
49 Ibid., II, 508.
50 Ibid., II, 511.
rr
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easy solution. He apparently over-simplifies the whole
problem of changing the established marriage pattern.
His omi lack of sentiment and ardent affection is
possibly accountable in part for his matter-of-fact han-
dling of what he terms the iniquitous marriage system. It
was in the first edition of Political Justice that he was
most rigorous in his treatment of the subject. In the sub-
sequent editions, he slightly modified his position, but
nevertheless opposed marriage. It x^as in his preface to
St, Leon that he almost completely reversed his arguments,
and gave full place to domestic affection and marriage.
As we suggested in another connection, it is possible that
his personal experience of an ardent love for Mary
51Wollstonecraft influenced him in this change of attitude.
It is also possible that his boyhood experience of observ-
ing the economic burden thrust upon his mother by a well-
meaning but none too successful father may have encouraged
CO
him to T,Yrite as he did in the first edition,'^ At any rate,
Godv;in»3 views of inarrlage resulted in Y/idespread conster-
nation among the more conservative people. The vitriolic
51 See 30 above. Also 185 below«
52 For his boyhood experience in this connection,
see 23 above.
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attacks printed in the Anti-Jaco"bin give some indication
of the opposition he aroused© Possihly some of the oppo-
sition would have been softened had his opponents inquired
into his reasons for disavowing marriage as an institution.
It apparently was enough for them that he criticized mar-
riage; it did not matter to them why he did so.
€
CliAPTER VI
GODWIN'S RELIGIOUS AlTD THEOLOGICAL VIElf/S
A, RELATION OF HIS THEOLOGY TO HIS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
Godwin* s social philosophy and his theology - more
explicitly, his anarchism and his religion - were never two
separate elements for him. They were but tv/o aspects of the
same truth. They v/ere by their nature integrated and not
dichotomized. Except possibly Tolstoi, no other anarchist
so effectively made his social and religious views of one
piece as did Godv/in, Let us therefore turn our attention
to the religious implications inherent in Godwinism,
B. VARIETIES OP RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES
ViTilliam James might well have said of Godwin that he
had a variety of religious experiences. It is true that he
held in favor a number of theological strains, some gro-
tesquely conflicting v/ith each other. His ecclesiastical
connections, too, Y/ere varied and inconsistent.
Yet undue confusion marks m^y of the referencesto
Godwin's religion. Theological labels have been applied toil
him too indiscriminately. Inaccurate statements and hasty
|
conclusions have given rise to several v/rong impressions.
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V/e must consider this phase of Godwin's life as carefully
as possible. To understand his religious views is largely
to understand the grounds of his anarchism.-^
j
C. CALVIITISTIC AND NONCONFORMIST IlxTPLUENCES
In the first place, it must be remembered that Godwin
vms born and reared a Calvinist» We have already seen how
rigorous his Calvinism was.^ This influence colored his
entire life* Even when he seemed remotest from Calvinism,
he was in reaction and in protest against it; hence,
|
Calvinism was even then tincturing his beliefs. Max Beer i
oversimplifies the matter, but nevertheless indicates a
truth, when he calls Godv/in's materialism, an inverted
Calvinist theology. Hearnsha?/ observes that Godwin may
have dropped the specific tenets of the Calvinist creed, but
his spirit continued to be CalvinisticS
For a discoverable God he sustituted a dis-
coverable universe. For grace v;orking silently
in the heart of man he substituted reason.
Instead of righteousness as the principle of
See 1 above.
^ See 23 above.
^ Max Beer, A History of British Socialism
,
I, 115.
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conduct he pleaded for enlightenment, since the
mind - once awakened to the sublimity of eter-
nal truth - must of necessity act in conformity
with it.^
In the second place, the psychological conditioning
of G-odv/in's youth must "be borne in mind« From earliest
youth he viritnessed, as only a son of a rigid dissenting
minister could witness, both the unrelenting adherence of
a man to unpopular convictions and the persecutory zeal of
the conformists toward anyone who disagreed v/ith the estab-
lished faith. In his Thoughts on Man Godv/in makes this
interesting comment: "V/hen I was a child, I was taught
that there were four religions in the world: the Popish,
the Protestant, the Mahometan, and the Pagan.
Neither from within or from without v/as religion
made attractive in his eyes. Within, he had all too inti-
mate contact with a stern, almost pathologically pious
father.^ Without, he looked upon an ecclesiastical world
in which invectives and small contempts obstructed its
^ Fossey J, C. Hearnshaw (Editor), The Social and
Political Ideas of Some Representative
.
Thinlrers of" the
Revolut ionary Era, 153.
^ Godwin, Thoughts on Man, 186.
^ For a poignant and wistful essay on the tragedy of
youth, see Godwin, The Enquirer , 65 ff
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essential charity and loveliness. The wonder is that, in
face of all this adverse conditioning, he even temporarily
considered the pulpit as a means "by which he could spread
his social views* But, as vj-e have noted,^ he held several
pastorates before he turned to writing as his chief mode of
expression. Saintsbury thinks Grod¥;in "slipped almost insen-
sibly out of ministerial and into literary work,"^ The
transition was hardly that imperceptible
i
Previte-Orton thus summarizes Godwin's theological
and ecclesiastical mutations: "Bred a Calvinlst, he had
become a believer in materialism and necessity, passing, in
1792, to atheism, and renouncing it soraev/here about 1800."-^^
Another observer comments: "He halted for awhile at Socin-
ianism as a resting-place on his pilgrimage from Calvinism
carried to the highest point to utter unbelief, "-^ Tovmsend
^ See North American Review, Vol. 125, 224»
^ See 27 below.
Q
George Saintsbury, The Collected Essays and
Papers
,
III, 567.
''^ C. V/. Previte-Orton, The CajnbrjLd^ lilstorj of
English Literature, XI, 48.
•^•^ North American Ftcview, Vol. 25, 225; article
unsigned.
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states that Godwin* s theological views had been changing
from Calvinism to Socinianism, and thence to deism* We
are indebted to Kegan Paul for preserving Godwin's own
statement concerning this transition. The quotation fol-
lows :
Till 1782 I believed in the doctrine of Calvin,
tliat is, that the majority of mankind were objects
of divine condemnation, and that their punishment
would be everlasting. The Systeme de 1^ Nature j
read about the beginning of that year, changed my
opinion and made me a Deist .13
Some parts of these summaries are incorrect, as we
shall see later, but they serve to point out that Godwin's
thinking traversed the wide range from orthodoxy to appar-
ent heresy within the compass of several decades. As a
matter of fact, there were several added stages in his
change from Calvinism to materialism and back, not to Cal-
vinism, but to a modified form of theism,
D. SANDEMANIANISM
Sandemanianism was one of these stages of belief
which the above summaries fail to mention. Even as early
as his college days he was interested in the Sandemanian
doctrines. The authorities at the Dissenting College at
_
Townsend, St. James's , Vol. Ill, 80.
-"-^ Kegan Paul, Vfilliam Godwin
,
I, 26.
1
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Homerton suspected Godv;in*s Sandemanlan leanings. He was
rejected at Homerton and finished his formal education at
the Hoxton Theological Seminary largely because his Sande-
manianism was not objectionable at the latter institution.
This small sect had its rise in the teachings of John
Glas in the middle of the eighteenth century. The creed was
soon called Sandemanianism, after Glas's son-in-law and
collaborator, Robert Sandeman. Sandemanianism has never '
been popular nor had a large membership; in fact, one of
the rules of the sect is that there shall be no attempt to
convert or attract any new members. It is possible that
Godwin was attracted somewhat by this complete lack of coer^
cive practice, since he so thoroughly opposed any infringe-
ment upon the rights of the individual to act voluntarily.
The sect deemed it unlawful to lay up treasures on earth.
Again, v/e note a teaching highly consonant with Godwin* s
social views concerning economic equality. "^^
Like Calvinism, Sandemanianism held to an orthodox
Christology. In fact, its orthodoxy involved more authori-
tarianism than did Calvinism, and in this respect vms even
more antithetical to Godwin* s anarchism than was Calvinism.
•^^ For further views of this sect, see Samuel Pike,
I
^ Pl^^^- and Full Account of the Christian Fractices^
Observed by the Church
.
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Note the following reference to Christological tenets in
Sandemanianism
:
• • • Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the Liv-
ing God, and as such, the only Prophet, Priest
and King of God's Church; so that, all the divine
Knowledge we can possibly acquire is contained in
his revealed Word, as he is the Prophet; all our
Hope of Salvation is derived from the Compleat
Atonement he has made, and perfect Righteousness
he has wrought out for Sinners, as he is the
Priest; and we are therefore bound to do whatsoever
he hath commanded us, as he is the King and the
Head of the Church, 15
Again, note the authoritarian view implied in this excerpt:
We think it our Duty as much as in us lies,
to live peaceably with all Men; to be obedient
to Magistrates Qsic^, s-nd discountenance every
Thing that may disturb the Peace of the State
or lTeighbourhood»16
Apparently, though he did not express himself in the
matter, Godwin found more in Sandemanianism v;ith which he
disagreed than ?/ith v/hich he agreed* At any rate, he
turned his interest from, this sect to another one»
E, SOCINIANISM
It was to Socinianism that Godwin turned. Since.
Socinianism, like Sandemanianism, has not been popularly
understood, except in its Unitarian development in England
Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 26.
4
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and America. Godwin apparently iDecanie interested in the
17
movement during college days, as we have noted above*
BroTO indicates that "Socinianism. was not a safe or a logi-
cally complete theology; it was in fact not a religion at
all, said Coleridge, 'but a theory, and that, too, a very
pernicious, or a very unsatisfactory, theory. ' "•'-^ But
whether Brovm and Coleridge were right or wrong in their
criticisms, Godwin for a time nevertheless embraced this
creed.
Let us therefore consider some of its principles in
order that we may try to understand its influences upon
Godwin and possibly its correlations with his social phi-
losophy.
Soclnianism can be traced back to Michael Servetus
who, in the sixteenth century, declared tiiat the nature of
the Deity was indivisible. He thereby laid the basis for a
See 26 above. Brovm, however, implies that
Godwin earlier came close to Socinianism. "At the age of
fourteen", he says, "he renounced the principles of Calvin-
ism in which his family had bred him, and only narrowly
escaped the dangerous and probably heretical doctrines of
Socinianism." Both the statements that Godv/in at fourteen
renounced Calvinism and that "only narrowly escaped"
Socinianism seem not to be founded on anything Godv/in him-
self said or upon anything his most authentic biographer,
C. Kegan Paul, since said. Brown's authority is therefore
to be questioned. For this reference, see Ford K, Brown,
The Life of Y/illi8jn Godwin, 11.
IS Ibid., 17
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theological belief which has persisted until the present 6.a.j.
finding its fullest expression in raodern Unitarianism.
Lelio Socini (or Sozzini) should be given credit for
founding Socinianism. It was he who urged the viev; that
Christ was a prophet, not part of the Godhead. Early death
cut short the influence of Lelio Socini, but his nephew,
Paustus Socini (or Socinus) fell heir to the uncle's theo-
logical heritage. It was Faustus who gave impetus to
Socinianism, He not only denied the Trinity and the deity
of Christ, iDut also the personality of the devil, the native
and total depravity of man, the vicarious atonement, and the
eternality of punishment. His theory Y/as that Christ was a
man divinely commissioned, who had no existence before he
was conceived by his mother Mary, He believed, too, that
the Bible was to be interpreted by human reason and that
its metaphors v/ere not to be taken literally. Involved in
this theology was the rejection of the Calvinistic doctrine
concerning predestination. Emphasis was placed on the high
value of the individual personality and on the freedom of
will. It became increasingly a friend to Unitarianism and
a foe to Calvinism and especially Roman Catholicism, In
short, it may be regarded as a simplified and rationalized
ethical Protestantism with the Unitarian vieivpoint in its
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Christology*-^^
It is slgniflc€Lnt that Socinlanism v/as diametrically
opposite to Sandemanianism in several instances. To reca-
pitulate, Sandemanianism emphasized the authority and deity
of Christ, as we have already indicated; Socinianisn, on
the other hand, completely rejected His authority and deity.
For the follov/er of Socini, Christ v/as a man divinely com-
missioned, but merely a man. Both predestination and future
punishment were cast out. The Bible was to be interpreted
by human reason.
Hence, at several important points v/e observe that
Socinianism could be easily integrated with Godwin's social
philosophy. The emphases in both were upon reason, man's
autonomy and dignity, and the rejection of authoritarianism
and future punishment. From a theological point of view^
it is interesting to note that Socinianism paved the way
for Godwin's further departure from Calvinism. We shall
consider his transition in the follov/ing section.
For fuller accounts of Socinianism, see the North
British Review, Vol. 30, 467-491; Unitarian Review, Vol. 31,
224 ff; Christian Disciple , Vol. 3, 429-34, and Hastings*
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics , Vol. XI, 650-654.
rr
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F. DEISM
Godwin next turned to deism. This change, as he
himself states, took place about 1782,^^ Paul suggests
that deism suited Godwin^ s temperament While this com-
ment is probably true, it is hardly definite enough to be
informing. ^JVhat, one may ask Paul, were the elements in
Godwin's temperament to which deism appealed? Moreover,
just what elements in deism found favor v;ith Godv/in? Possi-
bly we can deal more explicitly with this relation between
Godv/in and deism by considering several revealing factors.
The first is the emphasis in deism upon reason. We have
22
seen ho;7 central a place reason held in Godv/in's thought.
A deistic conception of God is strongly couched in reason
and intellectual comprehension, and is v/eakly couched in
2*^
the more human elements of love and sympathetic warmth.
Thus Godwin's temperament, as Paul puts it, would find har-
monious response in this rationalistic emphasis. A second
^ See 111 above.
Paul, William Godwin
,
See 157 above,
2*^
For a summary exposition of deism, see the article
on "Deism" by G, 0, Joyce, Hastings * Encyclopaedia of Reli-
gion and Ethics
,
IV, 540 ff
.
rr
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factor, closely related to the first, is the stress upon
man*s independence v/hich desim gives. Joyce states: "Man
learns to think that his v/elfare depends entirely upon the
accuracy of his Imowledge of those general laws by which the
course of the world is determined. "^^ Here, then, are two
definite characteristics of deism which logically v/ould find
favor with Godwin* s emphasis upon reason and man's essentia!l|
autonomy, and hence we note at one more point the high cor-
relation between his views of religion and of social phi-
losophy.
There Is, hoTirever, a further explanation to be
offered for Godwin's acceptance of deism. Deism had expe-
rienced a revival of interest in the eighteenth century.
It is not within the province of this present study to
trace the history of eighteenth-century deism, except to
observe that thinkers by whom Godwin avowedly was influ-
enced - Hume and Locke among them - had interested them?*
selves in this theological position. ° One vn?iter.
24 Go C. Joyce, Ibid., IV, 542,
For an account of this revival, see Leslie
_i Histo:
Century, II, 460
Stephen, A tory of English Thought in the Eighteenth
~ff.
But it should be pointed out that some of these
thinkers stimulated interest in deism, not because they
accepted it but because they attacked it directly or
indirectly. Locke serves to illustrate the point.
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possibly more than any other, was responsible for popular-
izing the deism of that time. It was Thomas Paine, the
very one to v/hom Godwin acknowledged great debt for influ-
97
encing his own trend of thought Stephen indicates what
force the reading of Paine *s Age of Reason exerted in
reviving interest in deism. Stephen comments: "Deep obliv-
ion had, indeed, settled upon the deists; but the publica-
tion of the Age of Reason suggested an unpleasant explana-
tion of the phenomenon. Deism was not dead, but sleeping,"^'
In another passage, Stephen declares that "in Paine *s
rough tones they recognised not the mere echo of coffee-
house gossip, but the voice of deep popular passion. Once
and forever it was announced that, for the average mass of
manl-cind, the old creed was dead."^^ With some of the
eighteenth-century intellectuals in general showing inter-
est in deism, and with Thomas Paine advocating in particu-
lar, it is quite probable that these influences had effect
upon Godwin.
See Godwin, Political Justice .
28
Stephen, op. cit II, 462.
29 Ibid 463.
I
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G. MATERIALISM
It would be an easy step for Godwin to take from
deism to materialism,'^^ In deism, "the worshipper adores
an infinitely distant God*""^-^ Psychologically viewed, this
remoteness would seem to invite materialism. Without the
corrective of believing in God's immanence also, the deists'
emphasis upon His transcendence might v/ell lead to such an
attenuated relationship as to lose God altogether. But, in
spite of several references by biographers to Godwin's
32
materialism, only one explicit statement is offered by
Godwin himself to confirm the opinion that he actually took
the step. This statement is found among Godv/in's notes
which Paul has preserved for us, Godwin here says that "I
was not a complete disbeliever till 1878. "'^'^ But, then,
Paul advisedly explains: "By complete unbeliever, however,
Godwin must be understood to mean an infidel to Creeds
only, and. not an infidel to God."*^"^ Inferentially, we
Materialism seems to be used in all references to
Godwin, not in the more philosophical sense, but simply as
a synonym for atheism.
"^•^ Go C, Joyce, "Deism", Hastings^ Encyclopaedia of
Religion and Ethics
,
IV, 542.
'^'^ See, for instance, Jolin Morley on "William
Godwin", The Fortnightly Review, (Nev/ Series) XX, 461. Also
note Henry Crabbe Robinson's coimnent in his Works , 32.
33 Paul, William Godwin, I, 26.
34 Loc. cit., "26.
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might gather that he became materialistic because of some
of his views concerning the nature of God and the future
life*'^^ But these are inferences only, and uncertain ones
at that.
There was one influence in particular upon Godwin,
however, v/hich lends support to the view that he became
materialistic. It was the influence of the arch-materialisi
Helvetius. In this connection, Broi'm coranients concerning
Godwin as follows:
He read particularly the Systeme de la "Nature
and De 1' Esprit , with their calii but vigorous
and assured objections to the belief in which
he was already wavering - in the being of a
God - and found that he could not answer them.^^
Godwin himself admits the influence of Helvetius was great
upon hlnit'^^ But as to the specific influence of Helvetius 's
Yet one is inclined to feel that Godv/in was
attacking misconceptions rather than the true nature of God
and immortality, V/hat Stephen says of Paine, might apply
likev/ise to Godwin: "Paine *s appeal was not sLnply to licen-
tious hatred of religion, but to genuine moral instincts.
His 'blasphemy' v/as not against the Supreme God, but againsi
Jehovah ... He was denying that the God before whom rea-
sonable creatures should bow in reverence could be the
supernatural tyrant of priestly imagination • • • who
lighted the fires of everlasting torment for the mass of
manliind." Stephen, Ibid., 463.
36 Brown, The Life of William Godwin, 15
See Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, ix.
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materialism, one can only surmise. Yi/hatever influence there
was in this particular, it must have been powerful; for
Helve''tius was an ardent materialist* Plekhanov^s state-
ments are revealing at this point:
Helvetius was not only a ma.terialist but among
his contemporaries he maintained the main ideas
of his materialism with greatest consistency.
He was so consistent that he horrified the other
materialists. Not one of them was bold enough
to follow him in his daring conclusions 38
Helv^ius argued, for instance, that our soul is only the
capacity for sensation. Everything is sensation. Even
memory is purely physical, and it has for its function the
vitalizing of past impressions. Man is a machine, he says
further, and he is put into motion by physical sensibility
and must do everything which it demands ."^^
We have indicated that Godwin might have gone from
deism to materialism because of the degree of relationship
of one to the other. We have his one statement of unbeliefs
We have also indicated that the influence of Helvetius adds
weight to the possibility of Godwin^ s acceptance of materi-
alism. Yet precisely how far and for how long Godwin
occupied himself with the materialistic position there
5S- Georgii V, Plekhanov, Essays in the History of
Materialism
, 92«
^'^ For a full discussion of this point of view, see
his essay, "De I'Hoinrae", X»
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seems to be no way of ascertaining*
H» PANTHEISM
At least two references suggest a pantheistic strain
in Godv/in's theology •'^^ This element seems to be of little
significance and possibly represents a phase of his deism.
No clear evidence in Godwin* s writings supports pantheism.
The following passage, cited by Paul, closely relates God
with nature, but it does not necessarily identify Him with
itj41
Religion is among the most beautiful and most
natural of all things; that religion which "sees
God in clouds and hears Him in the wind", which
endoY/s every object of sense with a living soul,
which finds in the system of nature whatever is
holy, m^^'sterious, and venerable, and inspires
the bosom with sentiments of awe and veneration. '^^
Godwin reveals a similar attacliment for nature in another
passage which, like the above quotation, has been accessibly
through Paul's collection of Godwin's other\7ise -unpublished
notes.
50
See Paul, op. cit., I, 28 and an unsigned edi-
torial comment, North American Review, July 1876, Vol. 123,
223,
^"^ Pantheism says that God is all and all is God.
42
Paul, op. cit,, I, 28.
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I should pine to death. If I did not live in
the midst of so majestic a structure as I behold
on every side. I am never v/eary of admiring and
reverencing; it. All that I see, the earth, the
sea, the rivers, the trees, the clouds, the animals,
and, most of all, man, fill me with love and aston-
ishment. My soul is full to bursting with the
mystery of all this and I love it the better for
its mysteriousness. It is too wonderful for me;
it is past finding out; but it is beyond measure
delicious. This is what I call religion.^^
1, Hm-IMITARIANISM
Even more striking than regard for nature in Godwin'
i
religion was his ardent regard for humanity* His deism
apparently never became humanism, though the elevation of
man's sense of autonomy is strongly present in both theo~
logical systems. But throughout his life, he expressed a
profound devotion to hutnanltarianlsm. The following choice
paragraph from Godwin's pen reveals how trenchant this
humanitarianism was in his thinl^iing:
I know many men are misanthropes, and profess
to look down with disdain on their species. My
creed is of an opposite character. All that we
observe that is best and most excellent in the
intellectual v;orld is man: and it is easy to per-
ceive in many cases that the believer in mysteries
does little more than dress up his deity in the
choicest of human attributes and qualifications.
Paul, ibid., I, 53»
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I have lived among, and I feel an ardent inter-
est in and love for, my bretliren of humanity.
This sentiment, which I regard with complacency
in my OYm breast, I v;ould gladly cherish in
others. In such a cause I am well pleased to
enrol myself a missionary«44
J. NEAR-THEISM
It has heen mentioned that Godv/in*s latter days
brought him back to a more thelstic positioners This
impression should be clarified. Never did Godwin avow his
acceptance of theism after he had once rejected it. As a
matter of fact, almost at his very death he reaffirmed his
skeptical posltion.^^ But, even so, Godv/in's fervent ado-
ration of God as revealed in nature and his intense belief
in the worth of man had in them certain theistic tendencies^
Note, for example, his repeated declaration in his Thoughts
on Man (written as late as 1831) that "God made man
upright."'^*'' He reminds his readers, too, in one of his
earlier essays (not published until 1783) that man is but
"a little lower than angels and cro\med by the system of
the universe v/ith glory and honor. "'^S Such statements seem
Godwin, Thoughts on Man, v-vi.
^S See lllabove.
46 See Broim, The Life of William Godwin , 371.
Godwin, op. cit., 456, 457, 467.
4^ Godv/in, Essays, 214.
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to show an inclination towards a more immanent view of God»
And to the degree that immanence tempers the extreme tran-
scendence in deism, to that degree would it seem that
theism is approached,
K. m SYSTEIvIATIC TliEOLOGY OR CHRISTOLOGY
We have attempted to indicate the several theologi-
cal foundations upon T;hich Godwin* s religion was hased, hut
no consistent theology appears ever to have obtained in
Godwin* s thinking. Indeed, the theologian will have diffi-
culty in ascertaining precisely what Godwin* s views of God
and of Christ v;ere, Xlhen he v/as preaching, he voiced fer-
vent trust in Jesus. Several references will suffice to
shov; this attitude. In one sermon, he exhorts: "Look up
to Jesus. Ke never forgets you. He will comfort you
tinder all your infirmities, and all your sorrows. He will
wipe a?7ay the tear of the mourner, will exalt him to man-
sions of eternal joya'"^^ In another, he declares: "He is
the bread of life, a fountain of living water, and the
great shepherd of his sheep . . . Ke is for a cornerstone,
the son of righteousness and the rock of ages."^^ And,
T9 Godwin, Sketches of History, 160.
50 Ibid., 169
0
127
again; "Clirist has assured us of a mercy extending to the
sins of the whole world. His salvation is proffered unto
all."^-'- At no time, however, does he present a systematic
account of his theology and Christology* This lack will
perplex the theologian even more than will the fact that
Godwin's views underwent such frequent and fundamental
changes.^2 We must remember that, in spite of G-odVirin»s
training and ministerial experience, he was essentially
interested in social philosophy, not theology. For
instance, he made no attempt to provide a rounded con-
ception of the nature of God, hut he dealt at length
with those particular conceptions of God which bore upon
his social philosophy. Let us therefore give attention to
several elements in Godwin's religion which have more
direct bearing upon his social views,
L. GOD AS TYRANT
One of the most striking instances of the correla-
tion betT/een Godwin's anarchism and his religion is the
51
52
below.
Ibid,, 62,
Concerning the changes, see 110 above and 133
See Godwin, Political Justice , 61,
fr
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zeal with which he challenges the right of God to be a
tyrant. His argument follows:
In the first place, v/e may remember that God
is our master, and proprietor, and may do what
he v/ill with his ovm. This observation asks one
word by way of explanation* The creator may
place his creatures in a high or a low station;
he may make some vessels to honour, and of others
to dishonour. But the right of the creator does
not extend to the making an innocent being, in a
comprehensive sense, and with a viev/ to the whole
of his existence, miserable. God himself has not
a right to be a tyrant. 54
Likewise, in his Essays he refers to this same viev; of God:
"To say all, then, in a word, since it must finally be told.
The God of the Christians is a tyrant. "55 Balmnin gave
more dramatic utterance of this idea Y/hen he saidx "If God
existed, it would be necessary to abolish him. "56 g-Qt it
was Godwin who argued the point with persistent logic. We
see in this attack not only the essence of pure anarchism,
but also the psychological results of Calvinistic doctrines
which portrayed a God more fierce than fatherly. 5*7
Godwin, Sketches of History, 20.
55 Ibid., Essays
, 72.
56 Mikhail A. Bakmiin, Dieu et I'Etat, 17.
57 See 127 above.
f
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M, REJECTION OP BELIP]F IK FUTURE PUl^ISHIvIENT
Another phase in Godwin's religion v;hich has bearing
upon his social philosophy was his rejection of the belief
in future punishment. Godv/in possibly reflects here the
influence of Dr, Rees of Hoxton Seminary, who cautiously
taught the heretical view that there can be no such punish-
ment»^^ Godwin cannot reconcile a God of love with belief
in future punishment o He states:
I am truly astonished when I call to mind ho?/
many persons have admitted the sentiment, or
rather, I might say, ho?; universal is the creed
of hell and damnation, and that much the greater
part of mankind are reserved in a fut^ire state
to a perpetual exile from joy, and a condition
of great suffering and ?a''etchedness, as the due
retribution for their behaviour in this transitory
world. For myself, I must franlily confess that
if one human crea.ture is reserved for eternal
punishment herea.fter, it appears to form a more
serious difficulty in the ?;ay of the assertion of
the Divine benevolence, than the sufferings of
thousands and tens of thousands of our fellow-
beings in the present state, ?/here we "come forth
like a flov/er, and are cut dovm; we flee like a
shado?/ and continue noto" Job 14:2,^9
No human conceptions of Divine benevolence can j^istify the
infliction of everlasting torment on the m.ajority of man-
kind. Furthermore, "The punishments of a future world can
59
See 26 above.
Godwin, Essays
,
15-16,
I
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answer none of the proper ends of punishment* "^^ Such a
justification v/ould outrage our common sense. He admits
that Isaiah asserts that God's thoughts are not our
thoughts, ^-^ "but ive cannot talk of the Divine benevolence
unless in a way accordant to our ovm ideas of that equal-
ity."^^ Here Y/e see revealed the Pythagorean principle
implicit in all of Godwin's thinliing, whether' it be in
social philosophy or in religion; namely, that man is the
measure of all things. The test of any institution, be it
political or theological, is its effect upon man. Eternal
punishment is abhorrent to man's common sense; therefore,
eternal punishraent is a fallacy in religious thought « This
protest against belief in future punishment has significant
correlation with Godwin's views concerning punishment in
human society, and thus again indicates the integration
of his anarchism with his religious philosophy.
But there v/as a time when Godwin clearly avowed his
belief in such punishment - and let this be noted as a
^0 Ibid., 22.
^^ Isaiah 45:8.
Godv/in, op. cit., 17.
Ibid., Political Justice
,
II, 153 ff.
fI,-
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further instance of the many changes which took place in
his religious views. It is in his Political Justice (first
edition, 1793) and in his Essays (18V3) that he so reso«»
lutely opposes belief in future punishment. In his
Sketches of History (a hook of six sermons), however, he
fervently exhorts his people to avoid being punished with
fire»^^ This nov; rare volume was published in 1784, a
fact which carries its ov/n evidence of the change in
Godwin ^s views#
As to whether Godwin believed in any form of future
life, we can be certain only in our ansv/er concerning the
earlier part of his life. In his sermons collected under
the title of Sketches of History , we find references to a
belief in immortality. The following excerpts indicate
this view: "And will you contentedly give up the joys
beyond the skies, that you may escape a little thwarting
and disappointment in this transitory state?" He con-
cludes this same sermon v/ith this appeal: "Hay we all of
us exemplify the quietness of an Aaron, and the unresentful
mildness of a redeemer, that so we may be united with these
See Godwin, Sketches of History
, 57, 63, and 184.
Ibid., 23.
rr
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great and illustrious characters forever hereafterl"^^
Bearing in mind that these sermons v/ere published as
early as 1784, we can see that Godv/in was yet a young man
and that his belief in the future life was strong during
that period when he v/as closer to Calvinism and less given
to skeptical viev/s.
In his Thoughts on Man, published in 1831, we find
tv;o informing accounts. In one connection, Godwin states
that when man reflects deeply upon the perishableness of
his frame, "he has indeed an irrepressible longing after
immortality."^*^ The second account is Y/orthy of full quo-
tation. It follov/s:
Hence it is that unenlightened man, in almost all
ages and countries, has been induced, independently
of divine revelation, to regard death, the most
av/ful event to which v/e are subject, as not being
the termination of his existence. We see the body
of our friend become insensible, and remain with-
out motion, or any external indication of what we
call life. We can shut it up in an apartment, and
visit it from day to day. If we had perseverance
enough, and could so far conquer the repugnance
and humiliating feeling v/ith which the experiment
v/ould be attended, we might follow step by step
the process of decomposition and putrification,
and observe by what degrees the "dust returned
unto earth as it was." But, in spite of this
Ibid., 33.
67
Godvjin, Thoughts on Man, 101.
f
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demonstration of the senses, man still believes
that there is something in him that 13.ves after
death. The mind is so infinitely superior in
character to this case of flesh that incloses
it, that he cannot persuade himself that it and
the body perish together.
In his Essaysj however, he is less confident of his belief
in immortality. We read: "We know what vie are but we know
not v/hat we shall be. !i69 Again, in this essay, he raises
the question as to what lies beyond and ansv/ers; "Probably
70
nothing: neither work, nor device, nor knov/ledge." in
the same volume, he writes that "there is no need for the
theory of a future state," But it should be noted that
rrn
these last three references v/ere published posthumously,
and we cannot be certain as to the time they were written,
Hi REJECTION OP BELIEF IN HWiILITY
Again, GodY;in relates his social philosophy and
theology in his rejection of the idea of humility. Next in
gravity to the evil of punishment in the Christian religion
Ibid,, 14-15.
69 Ibid,, Essays , 283.
70
Loo. cit.
'71 Ibid., 30.
In 1873,
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is the evil of teaching that man is hut a worm. "G-od made
man upright," he insists.''''^ He holds arrogance as con-
temptible, but he adds that self-respect and unv/illingnoss
to debase one»s viev/ of oneself are essential to the nature
of true worship.*^"^ Man is at least important enough to
have his thoughts knoivn by God. "God, it may be said,
knows the thoughts of a man, and will judge him accord-
ingly,"'''^ Godwin consistently elevates man, whether in
terms of religion or of anarchism*, "Let us then learn to
respect man, and to be proud of ourselves that we belong to
a species capable of so high achievements."'''^ We have
already noted how limitless was his confidence in man's
perfectibility.''"'' This confidence was essentially a reli-
gion for him.
It is interesting to note that G-odv/in took occasion
to point out that the Pounder of Christianity rose from
humble parentage and environment to recognized greatness.
He thus pays tribute to Jesus:
"^3 See 125 above.
Godvd.n, op« cit., 30.
Ibid., 61.
Godwin, Thoughts Occasioned by the Perusal of
Dr. Parr * s Spital Sermon, 82.
~
'^'^ See 166 below.
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Christianity is another of those memorahle
chapters in the annals of manlcind, to which
there is probably no second. The son of a
carpenter in a little, rocky country, among a
nation despised and enslaved, undertook to
reform the manners of the people of whom he was
a citizen. The reformation he preached was
unpalatable to the leaders of the state P'^J he
was persecuted; and finally suffered the death
reserved for the lowest malefactors, being
nailed to a cross « He was cut off in the very
beginning of his career, before he had time to
form a sect. His immediate representatives and
successors were tax-gatherers and fisherman.
What could be more incredible, till proved by
the event, than that a religion thus begun,
should have embraced in a manner the whole
civilised world, and that of its kingdom there
should be no visible end,
Utopia would one day be achieved. Reason and perfection in
manlcind v/ould triumph, Stephen comments: "Godwin believes
as firmly as any early Christian in the speedy revelation
80
of a new Jerusalem, four-square and perfect in its plan,"
We conclude our study of Godwin* s views of religion
by emphasizing again that his beliefs in this area are
remarkably integrated with his views in social philosophy.
The very elements in his religion which seemed to him of
greatest importance were likewise the dominant convictions
in his anarchism. The primacy of reason, the unalterable
79
80
Note here the anarchistic implications.
Godwin, Essays
,
194,
Stephen, History of English Thought in the
Eighteenth Century
,
II, 264,
6
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law of justice, the dignity of man, and the promise of per-
fectibility were the foimdations upon which he built his
thought. He made a religion of his social philosophy, and
his social philosophy was his religion.

CHAPTER VII
G-ODWIN'S VIEWS OF MIND AND REASON
Godwin's views of mind and reason are germane both
to his social philosophy and to his religion. He devotes
several large sections of his Political Justice to the
implications of such viev/s and shows ho\'i basic his theories
are to the whole structure of his social thought,"^ Laying
no claim to originality, Godwin borrowed heavily from
earlier and contemporary thinlcers in formulating his own
views. ^ From Locke, Hume, Condillac, and Helv^tius came
the greatest influences.^ v/e shall attempt, therefore, to
trace the nature of some of these influences. Such princi-
ples as empiricism and associationism, utilitarianism,
necessitarianism, perfectibility, and the primacy of reason
will be examined in their relation to Godwin's views.
A. EMPIRICISM AND ASSOCIATIONISM
Empiricism may be loosely defined as that school of
philosophical thought which holds that knowledge is the
See Godwin, Political Justice, I, 24-120; I, 361-
420.
2 Note 176 below,
^ See Godwin, op. cit., I, ix.
1
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result of experience « It is usually contrasted with ration-
alism, which holds that knowledge is the result of reason.
Chief among the English empiricists - and empiricism seems
to have been more at home in England, while rationalism
found greater favor in Prance - were Locke and Hume,
Locke begins his arguoient by observing that "there
is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there
are certain principles universally agreed upon by all man-
kind • • • T/hich must needs be constant impressions which
the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which
they bring into the world with them,^ Then, he argues
that universal consent proves nothing innate,^ That these
principles are not "haturally imprinted" on the mind is
evidenced by the fact tiiat children and idiots do not pos-
sess them.^ Nor does reason "discover" Innate principles.'''
In another chapter, Locke holds that morality can lay no
claim to innate qualities.^ Virtue and vice are the
results of experience, not of birth,
^ John Locke, An. Essay Concerning Human Understand-
ing, 12,
^ Ibid,, 13.
6 Ibid., 13,
Ibid., 14-15,
S Ibid,, 28 ff.
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Empiricism was then elaborated into a psychological
theory which is conimonly called associationism or sensationr|
alism. In his most important work, Traite^des Sensations
(1754), Gondillac gave new emphasis to Lockers position,
and sensationalism became a great influence in the last
half of the eighteenth century. Like Locke, Gondillac
denied the existence of innate ideas Indeed, Gondillac
went farther, Locke had been careful to distinguish between:]
perception and reflection by explaining that the former was
the fimction of the senses but the latter was the function
of the mind, Gondillac rejected the belief that there vms
any difference, and summarily reduced all functions, v;hich
10
we ordinarily call psychical, to mere sensation patterns
•
That is to say, not only did Gondillac believe that the
intellectual processes were sensations, but likewise the
volitional and the em.otional. This psychology had practi-
cal significance in that it intensified the empiricist view
that all knowledge came through the senses alone, and that
therefore man was solely the product of influences ?7hich
bore upon his life after birth. Moreover, this psychology
g )
Etienaie B, de Gondillac, Treatise on the Sen-
sations, (Geraldine Carr, trans,), 8.
10 Ibid., 17.
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taur^ht that man was not eternally confirmed in sin by reason
of a predisposition towards evil, but that his post-natal
experiences v/ere entirely accountable for his moral nature#
Such teaching, of course, found diametrical opposition in
Calvinism and other religious groups • Memory, too, was
reduced to sensation.-'--'- For Condillac, there v/as only one
basis for pleasure and pain, and that was physical,-'-^ To
speak of pleasures and pains of the soul was another vmy of
speaking of physical pleasures and pains, since the soul
was merely the seat of the feelings •^'^
Helve'^:ius, whose strong influence upon Godvdn we
have already noted, developed the popular empirical philoso-
phy of Locke and Condillac to the point v/hereby it repre-
sented a new and significant interpretation of social facts.
This psychology of sensationalism was forcefully presented
in Helv^ius*s v/ork, ^e ^1 ^Esprit (1758). So forceful was
the presentation, in fact, that it created a tumult in
ecclesiastical circles. The book was publicly burned, and
Helve'tius was ordered to leave Prance.
Ibid., 6.
12 Ibid., 12.
1^ Ibid.
5.
ft
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According to this pronounced sensati onalist, man is
born into the v;orld with no predisposition for good or ill.
He is endo¥/ed by nature, hov/ever, with a susceptibility to
pleasure and pain* This susceptibility brings about a self-
love which causes him to seek those experiences ¥/hich
result in pleasure and to resist those experiences which
involve pain. Thus, man alv/ays considers his own interests*
Even seeming acts of unselfishness are actually motivated
by a selfish desire, that of self-gratification. Altruism
1
4
thus becomes a form of egoism.
this interest in the group may conflict with the selfishness
of the individual, he argues that the individual v/ill not
contribute to the public benefit unless such contributions
can be made to appeal to his self-love* It is the task of
the legislator to make public and private interests compati-
ble* Influenced by external circujnstances, individuals wil3
develop those attributes which their government approves,
and at the same time satisfy their selfish interests. V/her-
ever a nation does not make public and private interests
Helvetius believed, however, that probity consists
of conduct directed to social ¥/elfare. 15 Realizing that
1¥ Cf . 161 below.
15 See his Discours II for an elaboration of this
point.
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identical, it fails. Reform of legislation is the only way
to insure virtue and eradicate vice* Hence, the signifi-
cance of proper government is emphasized*
Talent and genius, Helvetius argues, are not inborn
hut are the product of government. A study of various
countries at different periods indicates that talent and
genius are more often present when government is good, and
more often lacking when government is bad.-^^ Character, he
insists, is not the product of innate predispositions, but
is rather the product of social influences and forces. It
then follows that, if ignorance and misery prevail, it is
because the government is bad. The great need is for a
reconstruction of the social system. The power of educatior
and good government is thus made incalculable in its possi-
bilities for creating a superior race of people.
Baron dHiolbach published his famous work, Systeme
de la Nature in 1770. Godwin refers to the influence which
tliis work had upon him.^'^ The empiricism of Locke and
Condillac are carried into avowed materialism by d'Eolbach.
Absolute order exists in nature. The total activity
observable in the imiverse is in accord v;ith law. Cause
16 See his Discours V for this argument in full.
17 Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, ix. See also Paul,
Willisjii Godwin I,
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and effect is a chain which is never broken. Chance is
ruled out altogether. As for the nature of man, he is a
purely physical "being, controlled entirely hy physical laws.
Human nature is essentially egoistic, hut it can be made
compatible with public interest tlirough good government.
For d*Eolbach, as for Eelv^tius, education and government
hold the key to man's character. In fact, d'Kolbach assails
bad government relentlessly. He states:
L'homme n'est si souvent iijechant que parcequ'il
se sent presque toujours interesse a I'etre; que
I'on rende les homraes plus eclaires et plus heureujc,
et on les rendra meilleurs, Un gouvernenent
^
equitable et vigilant rempliroit bientot son etat
de citoyens honnetes • • . Les vicieu?: et les
mechants sont si commim^ sur la terre, si opiniatres,
si attaches a leurs deregleinens, parcequ'il n'est
aucun gouvernement qui leur fasse trouver de
I'avantage a '^tre justes, honnetes et bienfaisans;
au contraire partout les interets les plus puissants
les solicitent au crime, en favorisant les penchants
d'une organisation vicieuse que rien n'a rectifiee
ni portee vers le bien • . . Ce n'est done point la
nature qui fait des mechants^ ce sont nos insti-
tutions qui determinent a I'etre.l^
Thus we see that d'Holbach advocated the empiri-
cistic doctrines to their fullest extent. There are no
innate principles for him; experience is the sole factor
in making character. More explicitly, education and
^ ^
For the full exposition, see- his Systeme de la
Nature, I, 1-69.
1^ d'Holbach, ibid., 360.
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government are the determining factors in producing a
desirable type of mankind. Furthermore, we have noted, that
Godwin acknov/ledges that he was influenced by this group of
empiricists, and especially by Helvetius and d^Holbach,^^
Indeed, had Godwin not expressly stated this influence,
even a casual reader of his works ?/ould find evidence of it,
In the first place, Godwin in typical associationist
fashion asserts that each mind at birth is a tabula rasa.
"The mind is like the slate of a schoolboy, " as he puts
it.^-^ There are no innate principles. "Man considered
in himself is merely a being capable of impressions, a
recipient of perception. "^'^ Yve are what our im.pressions
PA
make us. These impressions are what we ordinarily mean
by sensations.^^ In these Impressions lie tremendous
potentialities. "Compared with the empire of impression,"
Godwin says, "the mere differences of animal structure are
inexpressibly unimportant and powerless."^® Godv/in further
Godv/in, Political Justice, I, Ix,
21 Ibid., Thoughts on Man, 254.
22 Ibid., Political Justice, I, 27, 31,
23 Ibid., II, 78.
24 Ibid., II, 79.
See Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, 179,
2^ Godwin, op. cit,, I, 38.
rc
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indicates his enpiricistic point of view by holding that
principles depend on ideas •^'^ Nov/ it is untenable that
principles are innate, he reiterates, because we would by
the sane token be born with pre-established ideas. He
declares that the fallacy of such a conclusion is obvious.
And, since we have no pre-established ideas, our moral
qualities are the result only of perceptions and impressions,
not of any innate elements. As we have seen above, these
are precisely the views of Eelve'tius and d^Holbach,^^ T/Yith
Godwin, the environment is everything and heredity is noth-
ing. He says that "moral qu.alities in men are the product
of impressions made upon them, and there is no instance of
an original propensity to evil."^^ He goes farther by
insisting that "our virtues and vices may be traced to the
incidents which make the history of our lives, and if these
incidents could be divested of every improper tendency, vice
v/ould be extirpated from the world."*^^ Embryo man is thus
so nearly a zero that everything which makes the complete
adult is due to the accumulation of ideas poured into his
life since his birth, In a later work, he indicates the
Ibid,, I, 33,
2S See 140 above,
Godwin, Political Justice, I, 18,
30 Ibid,, I, 18,
Ibid,, I, 95,
ft
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persistence in his nind of this belief in no innate ideas.
He v/pites:
• • • Man is born without innate ideas • • • A
child is not designed by his original formation
to be a manufacturer of shoes for he may be bom
among a people by whom shoes are not worn • • •
But it is not the less true that one man is by
his structure best fitted to excel in some one
in particular of these multifarious pm-'suits
• • • Every one has probably v/ithin him a string
more susceptible than the rest, that demands
only a kindred ijnpression to be made, to call
forth its latent character. 32
B. MIND-BODY PROBLEId
Godwin gives some attention to the mind-body rela-
tion, but ho is not too c^-ear in his conclusions* In one
instance he states that the mind is the seat of sensation
and reason. "V/here it resides we cannot tell nor can we
authoritatively pronounce, as the apostle says, relatively
to a particular phenomenon, 'whether it is in the body or
out of the body. Later he says thai; the mind cannot
subsist v/ithout the body."^'^ Yet he assigns some importance
to the place of thought as apparently a phenomenon to be
distinguished from mere sensation or Impression. He states;
^'^ God\7in, Thou^ghts on Man, 32-33,
S3 Ibid., 7.
34 Ibid., 9.
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No inconsiderable arg'Lunent may "be derived from the
singular and important nature of that property of
hurian beings, which we term thought; which it is
surely somev/hat violent to strike out of our
system as a mere superfluity.^^
Stephen goes so far as to conclude concerning Godwin
that mind has been abolished along with innate ideas or
principles, "Nothing is left, one may almost say, but a
number of logical processes, of which it is convenient to
assume that they talce place in a vehicle called the mind
but which are everywhere unaffected by external condi-
tions. "^^
But this conclusion seems to be unwarranted* Godwin
does not dismiss the meaning of mind so easily as Stephen
thinlcs. There are deeper implications. Note, for instance,
in the following passage how Godv/in assigns to the mind an
almost mystical quality:
The human mind is a creature of celestial origin,
shut up and confined in a wall of flesh, Y/e feel
a kind of proud impatience of the degradation to
¥/hich we are condemned, V/e beat ourselves to
pieces against the wires of our cage, and long to
escape, to shoot tlirough the elements, and be as
free to change at any instant the place where yjo
dwell, as to change the subject to which our
thoughts are applied. 37
'^^ Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, 402.
Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eight-
eenth C entury
, 268,
37 Godwin, Thoughts on Man, 100,
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While Godwin does use the mind as signifying the chain of
thoughts which, when linked together, produces the complex
notion of personal identity, he nevertheless refuses to
agree that mind is what mind does. On this disagreement
with sensationalism, he is very clear. Note his argument:
« , • If our business is to discover the consider-
ation entertained by the mind Y/hich induces us to
act, this tells us nothing. It is like the case of
the Indian philosopher who, being ask what it was
tliat kept the earth in its place, answered that it
was supported by an elephant, and that elephant
again rested on a tortoise. He mast be endowed
with a slender portion of curiosity, v;ho, being
told that uneasiness is that which spurs on the
mind to act, shall rest satisfied with this expla-
nation, and does not proceed to enquire. V/hat
makes us uneasy? An explanation like this is no
more instructive, than it would be, if, v/hen vie
saw a man walking, or grasping a sword or a bludgeon,
and we inquired into the cause of this phenomenon,
anyone should inform us that he walks because he
has feet and he grasps because he has hands, "59
-C, MIND Airo CLIIdATE
As to the influence of climate on mind, like Hume
Godwin endeavored to show that the mind - the sheet of
blank paper, as it were - is the same in all times and
places ."^^ He would not agree with Rousseau that "la
See Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, 26.
Godwin, Thoughts on Man, 211.
^0 Ibid., Political Justice
,
I, 100.
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n41llberte est pas xm. fruit de tous les climats^" nor with
Montesquieu's observation that " conibien les hoinme s sont
differents dans les divers clir.iats l"^^ An anonymous Yn?iter
in Time gives the impression that Godwin admitted that both
individuals and nations were powerfully affected by the
influence of climate even though reason in the main is
omnipotent, 43 Like Helvetius, Godwin gives no such
quarters to the influence of climate. He is consistently
an associationist at this point. The mind, unaffected by
climate, is at the outset everywhere the same,"^^
D.-" ITECESSITARIAUISM
Part and parcel of his viev/s of mind is Godwin's
belief in necessity. Like Hime,^^ he applied the logic of
Rousseau, Du contrat social ; ou principes du
tiquc j 671.
Montesquieu, De 1' esprit des loix
,
XV, 307.
41
droit poli e ^ l7
42
Time, 1890, 510*
Helve^tivis argued that history and experience dis-
prove the theory of climatic influence, V/hy, in the face
of unchanging climate, do intellectual achievements of a
nation change from age to age? The ansT/er is that it is
the form of government, not the climate, which determines
the nature of the people. See his Discours III
,
Ch, 27,28,
See Godwin, Political Justice, I, 369,
Hume said: "There is but one kind of necessity, as
there is but one kind of cause, and the common distinction
bet?;een moral and physical necessity is without any foun-
dation in nature." Hume, A Treatise of Huriian Nature
,
III, 4,
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necessitarianism to all areas of thoiight, and it influenced
both his theology and his social philosophy.
Mind, as we have seen, is the result of sensations
and associations. It is a rigidly causal system. "All
actions of men are necessary," Godwin asserts. "^^ The
doctrine of moral necessity "leads to a more bold and com-
prehensive view of luan in society, than can possibly be
entertained by him v/ho has embraced the opposite opinion. "'^^
Because necessity is so Important a principle in his system,
Godwin wants to make as clear as he can what the term means*
He explains the concept in these words:
He Y7ho affirms that all actions are necessary,
means that the man, who is acquainted with all
the circumstances under which a living or
intelligent being is upon any given occasion,
is qualified to predict the conduct he will
hold, with as much certainty, as he can predict
any of the phenomena of inanimate nature* Upon
this question the advocate of liberty, in the
philosophical sense, must join issue. He must,
if he mean any thing, deny this certainty of
conjunction between moral antecedents and con-
sequents. YiJhere all is constant and invariable,
and the events that arise, unifoi*mly correspond
to the circumstances in which they originate,
there can be no liberty. 50
Godwin argues that all the events in the material
universe are subjected to necessity. He holds that the
^' See 144 above.
48 Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, 363.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 364.
((
(
151
more we understand this universe, the less do v/o ascribe to
chance. The uniformity of events clearly indicates law and
necessity. Science will increasingly reveal the constancy
and regularity of such law.^^
Then, Godwin proceeds to apply his arguments to the
nature of mind. "Can intellect be made a topic of science,
"
he asks# "Are we able to reduce the multiplied phenomena
of mind to any certain standard of reasoning?"^^ Now, we
may not be able to see the ground of that necessity, or to
understand how sensations are able to generate volition. and
motion; but neither are we always able to perceive a ground
of connection between any two events in the material uni-
verse. There are, nevertheless, definite indications of
necessity in human mind. "That mind is a topic of science,
may be argued from all those branches of literature and
enquiry which have mind for their subject. "^^ History, for
instance, would be quite meaningless, if there were no
principle of necessity operating in the human mind. He
states:
Y/hat species of amusement or instruction v;ould
history afford, if there were no groimd of
Ibid., 366-568,
52 Ibid., 368.
52 Ibid,, 369.
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inference from moral antecedents to their conse-
quents, if certain temptations and inducements
did not, in all ages and climates, introduce a
certain series of actions, if v/e were unable to
trace a method and unity of system in men'
s
tempers, propensities, and transactions ?^'^
The idea of character is a second example of the
force of necessity in human life* "The character of any
man is the result of a long series of impressions, communi-
cated to his mind, and modifying it in a certain manner so
as to enable us . • to predict his conduct»"^^ If there
Y/ere not this original and essential conjunction between
motives and actions, there could be no such thing as
character. Nor could there be any ground of inference
which enables us to predict v;hat men T/ould be from what
they have been,^^
Again, from the same idea of necessity arise all
"the schemes of policy, in consequence of which men propose
to themselves, by a certain plan of conduct to prevail upon
others to become the tools and instruments of their pur-
poses,"^''' All the arts of courtship and flattery, of play-
ing upon men's hopes and fears proceed upon the supposition
that the mind is subject to certain laws*
53~Jodwin, Political Justice, I, 369.
^5 Ibid., 370.
See ibid., 370.
Ibid., 371.
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Finally, argues Godwin, the principle of necessity
is involved in the idea of moral discipline. "If I care-
fully persuade, exhort, and exhibit motives to another, it
is "because I believe that motives have a tendency to influ-
ence his conduct."^^ If motives do not as yet function
reliably, it is only for the reason that we do not under*-
stand the human mind sufficiently well, V/hen the science
of the material universe was in its infancy, chance and
accident were more commonly used as explanations of phe-
nomena. The science of the mind is yet in its infancy;
hence, our inadequate understanding of motives.
Godwin thus presents his main arguments in favor of
necessity. He is unwilling to say that there is no freedom,
and he holds that necessity does not destroy all distinc-
tions. Ee states: "Happiness and misery, wisdom and error
will still be distinct from each other. "^^ But for the
"vulgar" conception of free v/ill, he has little use.
"E. NECESSITY AKD MORAL CHOICE
Godv/in anticipates the argument that belief in neces-
sity invalidates virtue; that is to say, he does not believe
Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, 371
o
Ibid., 588.
1
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that necessity makes goodness automatic and not subject to
choice. He says that "the regularity of events in the
material universe will not of itself afford a sufficient
foundation of morality and prudence He infers that
virtue does not mean "the opera.tion of an intelligent being
in the exercise of an optional power, so that under the
same precise circumstances it might or might not have taken
place. "61 Virtue rather means the employment of that prin-
ciple by which v/e assert a preference for such values as
happiness and wisdom rather tiian such disvalues as misery
and. error, "it is a system of general advantage, in their
aptitude or inaptitude to which lies the value or worthlcss-
ness of all particular existences. "^^ Again, in character-
istic utilitarian fashion, he regards virtue as the appli-
cation of one's capacity "in promoting the general good. "6*5
Despite Godwin's attempt to reconcile necessity and
virtue, he is not convincing. He does not make at all cleai
his proof that determinism leaves morality unaffected. Fur^
thermore, he seemingly ignores the arguments in favor of
free will. Wordsworth was more optimistic than critical
Y/hen he proclaimed: "Throw aside your books of chemistry
60 Ibid,, I, 574.
61 Ibid., 588.
62 Ibid., 180.
63 Ibid;,, 590.
^e
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and read Godwin on necessity," Godv/in presents little, as
a Eiatter of fact, which would v/in disciples to his necessi-
tarianism. His doctrine at this point seems logically
incompatible v/ith the accepted view of virtue; moreover,
his necessity can hardly be integrated with his anarchism
and its exaltation of unrestricted freedom. Though he
argues that belief in the doctrine of necessity and its
emphasis upon the unfailing connection betv/een causes and
effects sliould accelerate moral action, he fails to shov/
how his necessity and his freedom can be harmonized. The
force of determinism and the freedom of anarchism appar-
ently dichotomize Godwin's philosophy, ^4
One might argue similarly that Calvinism, like
Godwin's later necessitarianism., is antithetical to moral
action. But the case is different, as Sabine clearly
indicates: "The belief that men are saved not by their
ovm merit but by the free act of God's grace might seem,
on its face, to take the heart out of human effort. In
fact it had exactly the opposite effect , , , Calvinist
ethics ¥/as essentially an ethics of action. And indeed,
what better motive can there be to relentless activity -
to steel the Yilll and, if need be, to harden the heart -
than a whole-souled conviction that a man is the chosen
instrument of God's v;ill? The Calvinist theory of pre-
destination had nothing in common with the modern con-
ception of universal causality," Sabine, A History of
Political Theory , 364,
rr
r
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p. UTILITARIANISM
Another element in Godwin's system of thought which
we shall attempt to exaralne in this present chapter is his
utilitarianism* \'>Jhile the history and principles of utili-
tarianism are too involved to permit any adequate account
to be included here, it will nevertheless be necessary to
trace some influences of this theory if we are clearly to
understand Godwin *s position. Let us therefore turn our
attention to several pertinent aspects of the subject.
Most definitions of utilitarianism seem to confine
rather than define the concept. There is no easy or short
definition. The term has too many facets to make that kind
of definition possible. On its ethical side, utilitarian-
ism may be said to hold that the summum bonum of life is
that which gives the greatest good to the greatest number,
and it may be further said that the theory is essentially
hedonistic. But even here v/e must qualify our statements
and explain th^t, while a utilitarian like Bentham would
accept the quantitative implication we have given, a
utilitarian like John Stuart Mill would insist that the
qualitative criterion should have primacy. Moreover, the
bare statement that utilitarianism is a form of hedonism
would be challenged by those 7;ho dislike the emphasis on
rr
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the pleasure-principle v/hich is suggested in our formulatior
On its socio-economic side, utilitarianism can be said to
represent "interest in the welfare of mankind, wedded to
practical efforts to ameliorate the conditions of human
life on rational principles, and to raise the masses
through effective state legislation."^^ Yet, let it be
repeated, utilitarianism is too pervasive a principle to
allow any restricted definitions. Of several other forms
of it, we shall have something to say later.
That this study of utilitarianism follows at once
after the discussion of empiricism and associationism is
not mere chance* There is a logical relationship between
utilitarianism and associationism. Davidson goes so far as
to declare that "in the history of philosophy, utilitarian-
ism and associationism have gone together: indeed, the
greatest of the utilitarians have also been leaders of
associationism."^*^ He proceeds to give three reasons for
this relationship*
Williajn L. Davidson, Political Thought in
England, 9,
For informative accounts of this branch of utili-
tarianism, see such works as Ernest Albee, A Histor;^-' of
English Utilitarianism and Leslie Stephen, The EnglisIT"
Utilitarians.
^"^ Davidson, op. cit., 26o
•
* r
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In the first place, associationism necessarily deals
with experience. If it Y/ere possible to define happiness
apart from experience - still more, if it were possible to
secure happiness by means of mere abstract principles sup-
plied to us from without, regardless of experience - associ-
ationism would hold no quarters. But if happiness can only
be conceived in terms of what man is and what his nature is
formed to be, and if it has necessary relations to human
wants and aspirations, we mvist then discover in the concrete
circumstances of human life how happiness can be effected
and increased. This procedure demands a study of hov; men
actually find pleasure and promote their interests. Further-
more, we m.ust study how pleasures can be combined and, it
may be, transformed; and, accordingly, how the principle of
association operates in deepening men's experience. Since
conduct counts most for a happy life, it is necessary to
be able to know in advance the consequence of an act - to
know how the present may tell upon the future. All such
procedure means application of the principle of association-
ism. And association is necessary for the formation of gooc
habits and for the reformation of bad habits. Thus, associ-
ationism is of great importance if utilitarianism is to be
the guiding principle.
r
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Secondly, Davidson argues that utilitarianism is
closely related to associationism, since it is the latter
alone which can provide scientific explanations concerning
the nature of conscience. Also, if there is to "be any
rational explanation of the fact that, though pleasure is
to be the end at which man aims, he does not always aim at
it directly; rather he makes it his chief business to act
in life in accordance with what he conceives to be right
and duty. To the utilitarian, as much as to every other
serious ethicist, duty stands for the supreme moral mandate;
but the utilitarian undertakes to analyze the concept of
duty into its constituent factors and to shoYi hov/ it has
attained its authority and what experience lies behind it«
This analysis, again, means association. Moreover, the
utilitarian strongly insists that this resolution of v/hat
is usually taken as ultimate in ethical experience into
v/hat is simpler, and reconstructing it, in no way detracts
from the value of this ultimate. On thk contrary, such
scrutiny may v/ell enhance it, inasmuch as it is no?/ seen to
have stood the test of experience and to have been evolved
by society as a whole rather than by one man.
Finally, utilitarianism is closely related to
associationism in that the latter enables the former to
achieve a scientific position. A non-utilitarian ethics
i
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may have merits, but it can hardly be described as scien-
tific. It appeals only to a part of man's being, and fails
to reach the springs of action that follow from the emotioi>-
al and active sides of his nature. In other words, a
merely formal ethics is ineffectual for guiding a warm-
blooded social being, Davidson argues.
With these background data in mind, we can perhaps
better understand the utilitarianism Y/hich v/e discover in
Godwin, Associationist that he was, he would probably find
utilitarianism harmonious to his general system of thought.
Godvdn explicitly states that "good is a general
name, including pleasure and the means by which pleasure
is produced. In another work, he states:
One of the first and highest duties that falls
to the lot of a human creature, is that which he
owes to the aggregate of reasonable beings inhabit-
ing what he calls his country. Our duties are then
most solemn and elevating, when they are calculated
to affect the well-being of the greatest number of
men.'^O
But Godwin's utilitarianism was not of that selfish variety
—
°° For the complete argument concerning the relation
of utilitarianism to associationism, see William L, Davidsoj
Political Thought in England, 26 ff
,
Godwin, Political Justice, I, 440.
"70 Ibid,, Thoughts on Man, 320.
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which paralyzed social reform. '-^ It was a period, to be
sure, in which indifferentism was evident. Says one
writer: "It v/as difficult to convince people that something
ought to be done ... There v;as a fatalistic attitude
abroad."'''^ Godwin had sympathetic awareness of the prevail-
ing misery in the social system. He insisted that all was
not T/ell and that something must be done. The following
paragraph indicates the intensity of his feelings concen>-
Ing the situation:
There is no mistake more thoroughly to be
deplored on this subject than that of persons,
sitting at their ease and surrounded v;ith all
the conveniences of life, who are apt to explain,
"We find things very v/ell as they are;" and to
inveigh bitterly against all projects of reform
as "the romances of visionary men, and the
declamations of those who are never to be satis-
fied." Is it Y^ell, that so large a part of the
community should be kept in abject penury, ren-
dered stupid with ignorance and disgustful with
vice, perpetuated in nakedness and hunger, goaded,
to the commission of crimes, and made victims to
the merciless laws v/hich the rich have instituted
^•^ Mill v/amed against this selfishness in these
words: "I must again repeat ... that the happiness which
forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct,
is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned
As betv;een his o\m happiness and that of others, utili-
tarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a
disinterested and benevolent spectator." John Stuart Mill,
Utilitarianism
, 24.
72
L. C. A. Knowles, The Industrial and Commercial
Revolutions in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century
,
e> i.
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to oppress them? Is It sedition to enquire
whether this state of things may not be
exchanged for a better? Or can there be any
thing more disgraceful to ourselves than to
exclaim that "All is v;ell, " merely because
we are at our ease, regardless of the misery,
degradation and vice that may be occasioned
in others?'''^
Kor was Godwin's utilitarianism to be classed as
theological, Albee makes the folloT/ing explanation:
The true distinction i.e., between theological
and non-theological utilitarianism may conveniently
be indicated by briefly comparing Paley and
Bentham in a single respect. The criterion of
morality was the same for both. Actions were
regarded by both as right or T/rong, because they
made for or against the greatest happiness of the
greatest number; and the greatest happiness was
taken by both to mean the sum of pleasures with
a consistent disregard of so-called qualitative
distinctions. So far they agreed; but Paley,
unlike Bentham, thought it necessary, not merely
to mention, but to lay very special stress upon
the doctrine of rewards and punisliments after
death, in order to prove that it is for the ulti-
mate interest of the hypothetically egoistic
moral agent to act for the common good. In so
doing, he was merely taking what had long been
the characteristic position of theological utili-
tarianism, "74
Morley prefers to call Godwin an intellectual utili-
tarianist,*''^ as distinguished from the old utilitarianism
Godwin, Political Justice, I, 487,
Ernest Albee, A History of English Utilitarianism^
xiii,
John Morley, The Fortnightly Review XX (New
Series), 452,
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which was essentially selfislmess sanctioned by ethical
formulation. Also, Godv/in's conception of utilitarianism
was not that kind which sought to discover the moral law in
76pure reason x'/ithout regard to empirical findings. To
GodT/ln, morality was nothing but a calculation of conse-
quences.''"'' Vice is wrong calculation, and virtue is right
calculation. It is merely a matter of moral arithmetic,
and the common denominator is happiness. Morality is that
"which teaches us to contribute on all occasions, to the
extent of our power, to the well-being and happiness of
every intellectual and sensitive experience,"'''^
To attain this utilitarian ideal, it is possible
that one will be required to forego one's personal prefer-
ence. Allen makes a pertinent comment in this connection:
V/ith a conscientiousness which today impresses
us as almost comic, these ideologists attempted
to practice their doctrines. Godwin refused to
visit Thelwall, vihile the latter was imprisoned
in the Tov;er, on the ground that as some danger
was entailed by such a visit, he sacrificed the
personal gratification of seeing Thelwall to the
greater utility served by protecting his life
for the public benefit! Thelv/all himself T/as
inspired to lecture upon the evil of retrospection
by his recognition of his duty to control his grief
at his mother *s recent death and to betake himself.
^_
Fossey J. C. Hearnshaw, Social and Political
Ideas
,
156.
Morley, op. cit., 453.
'^^ GodT/in, op. cit., 159.
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even at that painful hour, to his humble task of
spreading truth among the living •'79
Godwin's much-quoted illustration of Penelon and his valet
further exemplifies this characteristic about which Allen
has written. That life ought to he preferred, argues
Godwin, which will he most conducive to the general good«
In saving the life of Fenelon, suppose at the moment he con-
ceived the project of his immortal TelemachuS j Godwin
believes he would have been promoting the benefit of thou-
sands who have been cured, by the perusal of that work, of
some error, vice, and consequent unhappiness. Even more,
his benefit would have extended further, for every individ-
ual helped by reading Telemachus has become a better member
of society and has contributed in his turn to the happiness
and betterment of others. Then Godwin asks what he should
have done had he been the valet. He answers that he should
have chosen to die, rather than Penelon should have died.
The valet should have preferred Fenelon to himself, because
the archbishop's value was so much greater. Even if the
valet had been Godwin's brother, or father, or benefactor,
the principle would have remained unchanged. Justice would
Beverly Sprague Allen, "Godwin's Influence upon
John Thelwall", Publications of the Modem Language Associ-
ation of America, XXXVII, No. 1, 676. (March 1922).
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have taught him to save the life of Fenelon at the expense
of the valet. SO
In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavored to
show the utilitarian principles v/hich are to be discovered
in G-odwin's thought and to indicate their bearing upon his
associationism« Since Godwin himself acknowledges no debt
to any specific utilitarianist, we cannot ascribe particular
influences with certainty. Halevy says that one is tempted
to believe that Bentham had a direct influence upon him
because the expressions which Godwin used were so much akin
to those used by Bentham in his Introduction.Ql But not
once does Godv/in mention the book. Plalevy suggests that
the air was so full of such expressions that Godwin could
have used the very ones phrased by Bentham, and yet not
have been guilty of plagiarizing. This explanation seems
to be satisfactory.
G, PERFECTIBILITY
A further element in Godwin* s view of mind which
influenced at once his social philosophy and his theology
SO See Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, 127-128. For a
somewliat modified view of his belief, see Godwin, St. Leon,
preface.
81 Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism^
192,
S2 Ibid., 193.
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in his strong "belief in the perfectibility of man. "Noth-
ing can be more unreasonable," says G-odv/in, "than to argue
from men as we now find them to men as they may hereafter
be made. This point of view colors all of his thinJ^ing
concerning the possible future of man. He said on one
occasion: "I love to contemplate the yet unexpanded pov/ers
and capabilities of our nature, and to believe that they
will one day be unfolded to the infinite advantage and
happiness of the inhabitants of the globe. "^'^ Perfecti-
bility was not a new idea, to be sure, but Godwin gave it
conspicuous place and popular appeal.
Priestley v/as one who influenced Godv/in in his
85
roseate views of man*s future, thinlcs Stephen, Godv/ln
does not acknowledge this influence in particular, but he
does refer to reading Priestley »s works. In his Treatise
on Civil Government
,
Priestley declares that, no matter how
the world may have begun or however pessimistic a view one
Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 116.
84
Ibid., Thoughts Occasioned by the Perusal of Dr.
Parr ' s Spital Sermon
, 48.
See Stephen, History of English Thought in the
Eighteenth Century
,
II, 256.
°^ Paul provides us with a fragment of Godwin*
s
diary in v/hich this reference is made. See Paul, William
Godwin, I, 19.
im
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may hold of the past, "the end will be glorious and paradi-
saical beyond v;hat our imagination can now conceive."^'''
Stephen attributes Priestley's optimism to his sanguine
temperament and to his scientific abilities. The old super-
stitutions were disappearing, and vast possibilities of
future progress seemed to be presenting themselves in every
direction, A further comment concerning Priestley's
enthusiasm for man's futuj?e attainments may indicate a
further influence upon Godwin. Priestley, "with unconscious
inconsistency, says that government is the great instru-
ment of this progress of the human species towards this
glorious state," and then adds that "government is to
promote progress by letting things alone
Preston intimates that much of the ridicule of
Godwin has arisen over the use of the term perfectibility.^-'-
Ridicule is a stronger word than seems necessary. Yet it
is true that Godwin's naive belief in man's capacity to
improve received criticism. His viev/s at this point were
grw
' Joseph Priestley, Treatise on Civil Government
, 5,
See Stephen, op. cit., II, 256.
Stephen, ibid., II, 256.
90
Priestley, op. cit., 296.
^1 See Preston in the Introduction to his edition of
Political Justice
,
I, xxviii*
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hardly consistent with his rigorous application of princi-
ples of reason, even though he insisted that perfectibility
was most reasonable. Is it impossible for us, he argues,
to contemplate v;hat man has already done v/ithout being
impressed with a strong presentiment of the improvements he
has yet to accomplish, "Once establish the perfectibility
of man, and it will inevitably follow that we are advancing
to a state, in which truth vn.ll be too well known to be
easily mistaken, and justice too habitually practised to be
voluntarily counteracted."^^ He then develops the point
that sciences have already made great advances, and there
is every probability that their progress will continue o^*^
"Man is in a state of perpetual progress, "^^ he believes.
Not;, if this progress is true of the sciences, v/hy is it
not just as likely that moral and social standards will
improve? "If we can still farther demonstrate it to be
part of the natural and regular progress of mind, our con-
II 9 Sfidence and our hopes will then be complete."
Godwin, Political Justice
,
II, 117,
Cf, Priestley's optimism for the future of scienc^
in his Treatise on Civil Government , 5,
God\7in, op, cit,, I, 119«
Godwin, op. cit,, I, 27,
4
169
Such is Godvdn's basis for confidence in man^s per-
fectibility, a confidence which is grounded in man»s
unlimited possibilities in the use of reason. It is inter-
esting to note that to the very end of his life Godwin
retained this great faith in man's continual improvement
and ultimate perfection. In his "Preliminary Essay" found
in the posthumous volume. Essays ^ he declares: "The equality
of huiaan beings as such, opens upon us the prospect of per-
petual improvement. ... It opens to us the prospect of
indefinite advancement in sound judgment, in real science,
and the just conduct of our social institutions."^^ In
view of his ovm wealmesses, failures, and disappointments,
this testimony of undaunted faith is all the more impressive,
H. PRII.IA.CY OP REASON
GodT/in uses reason both as the center and the cir-
cumference of his system. All other concepts considered
in this chapter revolve about reason, and all principles
are bounded by it. He repeatedly asserts the primacy of
reason. Yet at no time does he make clear what he means by
reasoni Is it both intellect and v/ill? He does not make
Godwin, Essaysj 6«
i
)\
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the matter clear. 97 indeed, what inrerences he does make
as to what he means by the concept are confusing, if not
contradictory # Let us examine several implications of his
views of reason as they bear upon his social philosophy.
In the first place, God?/in's own temperament and
psychological conditioning thro?/ light on his view of
reason. Academic to the core, he reduced life to abstrac-
tions, formulae, and analytical speculations. Once critic
comments that Godv/in "saw life in simple outlines ... and
drew all lines of doctrine v/ith an -unqualified logical dis-
tinctness. He was quite incapable of appreciation, emo-
tional subtlety, and the complexity of human contacts. Com-
plexity was the very antithesis of his nature. "^^ Conceiving
life as a series of syllogisms, he would announce the most
radical and revolutionary conclusions "as calmly as a math^
ematician manipulating a set of algebraic symbols."" He
held that reason rigidly excludes instinct, insight, and
sentiment. Herein Godwin^ s view of reason is antipodal to
Rousseau^s. All knowledge, believed Godv/in, is derived
from sense experiences, and there is nothing in the social
— qVi ' •
See Fossey J, C. Hearnshaw, The Social and Politi-
cal Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Revolu-
tionary Era., 155.
Ibid., 145.
99 Cornhill Magazine, "Godvdn and Shelley", Vol. 39,
286.
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or religious realm v/hich reason cannot master. The exercise
of reason toY/ard ascertaining and doing one's duty is the
whole purpose of life.-^^^ Reason should be the sole judge
of truth, the sufficient sanction of morality, and the sole
agent in regenerating society. One of the most naive
expressions of Godwin's complete faith in reason is found
in the folloTsdng excerpt:
Reason is omnipotent; if my conduct be wrong,
a very simple statement, flov/ing from a clear and
comprehensive view, will make it appear to be such;
nor is it probable that there is any perverseness
that would persist in vice, in the face of all the
recommendations v:ith which virtue might be invested,
and all the beauty in which it might be displayed. 1^2
Religion, for Godvvin, must stand or fall at the test
of reason, -^^^ Man is not only a reasoning being but is, in
a sense, created by reason. His very tissue is woven out
of argument.^0^ The only reality which religion possesses
is the reality of its reasonableness. Any belief in God wai=
100 Solomon F. Gingerich. Essays in the Romantic
Poets
, 102,
101 cf . The Fortnightly Review, Vol. X}[, 453,
•^^^ Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, 341.
I'-'S See Godv/in, Essays
, 13,
^^^ Morley, The Fortnightly Review, Vol. XX (Nev/
Series), 453,
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to be as coldly calculated as a problem in geometry.
Likewise in his social philosophy, Godwin gave full
scope to reason. To inform, not to infleune, v^as his ajjn.
The light of reasonableness, not the heat of passion, ¥70uld
bring men to the acceptance of justice as the rule of their
life. In one of his essays he makes the follov/ing observa-
tion:
The ancient Goths of Germany, vie are told,
had a custom of debating everything of impor-
tan.ce to their state tv;ice: once in the high
animation of a convivial meeting, and once in
the serene stillness of a morning consultation. -'^^
To Godwin, the debating of a matter would never fall under
the first circumstance, but always under the second.
I. l^TEAKl^SSES IN HIS VIEV/S
Several comments are pertinent to Godwin's exalta-
tion of reason. In the first place, his concept of reason
is nov/here clearly given. -^^^ We do not know just hov/ much
he includes in the concept, but we are rather led to believe
that he makes it conveniently elastic to include other men-
tal processes and attributes. Surely the concept is not
used so rigidly as the representative philosophical
•^^^ GodTrin, Thoughts on Man, 255.
106 48
^^^^^^
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rationalists would use it. Secondly, he resorts to the
paradox of making an unreasonable use of reason. He makes
a fetish of it. It stands in the way of his free reasoning
power. Viewed semantically by one like Stuart Chase,
Godwin* s concept of reason illustrates "the tyranny of
v/ords," Pie resolutely turns his back, both in his religion
and in his social philosophy, upon their inherent elements
of feeling and v/amith, and presumes that because he ignores
them they do not exist. One feels that, though Godwin dis-
avows them, he nevertheless senses their presence in his
philosophy. He at times makes a passionate use of reason.
In G-odwin^s plea for justice, for instance, it is his heart
as well as his head which articulates a profound convictiiS7
The most forceful parts of Godv;in»s writings are those in
which reasoning is shot through with deep feeling, Grierson
made the trenchant observation concerning Edmund Burke that
his "unique power as an orator lies in the peculiar inter-
penetration of thought and passion , , , he thinks most pro-
foundly when he thinks most passionately,"-'-^^ Thus it is
One is here reminded of Pascal's truth: "Le coeui
£ raisons que la raison ml^me ne connait pas ,"
108 Herbert J, C, Grierson, The Cambridge History of
Literature, XI, 35,
I
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frequently with Godwin in his writing. His argument, in
spite of himself, transcends cold logic, and his reason
becomes rhapsodic* Allen makes this apt comment about
Godwin: "Indeed, Godwin may be said to sentimentalize about
reason itself, for certainly his faith in its power creates
109
a boundless optimism that plays upon susceptible feelings."
Thirdly, there is in Godwin's insistence on the
primacy of reason the irony of practical inconsistency. He
endeavored to govern his life by the rules of pure reason,
and yet what a tempest of passions his life actually
incitedi He strove to lead a severely studious career and
to rise above human frailties, and yet domestic tragedies
and stormy romances dominated the scenes of his life.-^-*-^
Thus in Godwin's insistence on the primacy of reason there
was an Hegelian-like reach for the unattainable.
Later in his life,!^-'- however, he expressed the
desire to give "a proper attention to the empire of feel-
ing. "^^^ Indeed, one reads quite unexpectedly in one of
Beverly Sprague Allen, "Godwin's Influence upon
John Thelv/all, " Publi cations of the Modern Language Associ-
ation of America (March 192^), Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, 6^S^
Tin
— Cf « ToiTnshend-Mayer, St. Jaxie s ' s Magaz
i
ne and
United Sn^ire Review, Vol. Ill,
111
112
It T/as in 1798.
See C. Kegan Paul, V/illiam Godwin, His Friends
and C ontemporari e s
>
I, 294.
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his later essays this mystical statement:
It is difficult to think of an institution
more consonant to the genuine sentiments of
human nature than that of masses for the dead.
"liVhen I have lost a dear friend and beloved
associate, my friend is not dead to me. The
course of nature may be abrupt; but true affec-
tion admits of no sudden breaks. I still see
my friend; I still talk to him* I consult him
in every arduous qLiestion; I study in every
difficult proceeding to mould my conduct to his
inclination and pleasure. ^'V'hatever assists this
propensity of the mind, will be dear to every
feeling heart.
What noble feeling to be expressed by one who sought
primarily to ennoble reasoni Can it be that llrs. Shelley
wrote more truly than one might at first suppose v/hen she
stated that "Godv/in knew the hijman heart so well?"-^*'-*
124.
^^^ Godwin, Essays, 193,
•'-•^^
I.Irs. Shelley's letter, Paul, William Godwin, I,

CliAPTER VIII
CRITICISMS RAISED AGAINST GODWIN
While specific criticisms of Godv/in's system of
thought have been incorporated in the several chapters as
we have developed the dissertation, it is the purpose of
this present chapter to give attention to the more general
weaknesses for which he has been attacked.
A. LACK OF ORIGINALITY
Godwin has been criticized for his lack of origi-
nality. Before this criticism can be accepted, however,
it is necessary to know clearly what the critics mean by
originality. If by the term it is meant that Godwin pre-
sented a quite new social philosophy without antecedents
among other related theories, that he inaugurated his sys-
tem entirely de novo, then of course the criticism is just
If by the term, however, it is meant that Godwin made new
and original formulations of data already available, then
he was original to that extent. Preston makes this dis-
criminating comment:
That Godwin has originated a new philosophical
system is sometimes denied. It is true that all
the component parts of the system propounded by
him had been set forth earlier by others; but the
combination is new, and the result of the synthesis.
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to which the somewhat dubious name of "philosophi-
cal anarchy" has been attached, is distinctly
original, anticipating Proudhon, the first avowed
anarchist. Godwin is the fountain supplying water
from streams whose sources may be remote.-^
After stating that it is impossible to discover in the
works of Godwin "une seule idee dont la conception lui soit
personnelle", ^ Roussin explains that Godwin's originality
is " s implement d' avoir uni et pousse a leurs extremes
limites , avec son intelligence intrepide et toute logic ,
certaines tendances de son epoque .
"
The question whether Godv/in was original is thus
shown to be academic and dependent upon formal definitiono
The significant point is that Godwin never claimed origi-
nality; rather, he freely acknowledged many of the sources
of his ideas, Stephen observes that Godv/in's intellectual
genealogy may be traced to three sources. Prom Swift,
4Mandeville, and the Latin historians he had learned to
regard the whole body of ancient institutions as corrupt;
from Hume and Hartley he derived the means of assault upon
Preston, Preface to his edition of Political
Justic e, xx-xxi
•
2 Henri Roussin, William Godwin
, 167.
^ Loc. cit.
^ See Godwin, Political Justice
,
I, 10.
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the old theories; from the French ?n?iters, such as Rousseau,
Helvetius, and d'Holhach, he caught the contagion of revo-
lutionai»y zeal,^
Let us turn to G-odwin's own Indications concerning
the sources of his ideas. In the first place, it is evi-
dent that he was familiar v/ith the social philosophies of
the classical Greeks. His broad conception of politics is
S
of the nature of Plato and Aristotle*
Godwin v/as fond of the political satire of Swift
and made several references to him,' Gulliver *s Travels
afforded satirical examples of the fact that trivial
incidents can precipitate nations into warfare. This same
work is used to show how meaningless are titles and how
foolish are oaths of office. Swift's Sermon on Mutual
Subjection also gave Godwin suggestions for his views on
the coercive nature of government.
We have already considered the significant influ-
ences of tiiinkers who lived during or just prior to Godwin's
5
See Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in
the Eighteenth Century , 265-266.
Note Godwin's references to them in Political
Justice I, 140.
*^ Ibid., II, 229.
*C
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life. Locke's contrllDution to Godwin's thought can Jiardly
be overstated, especially In tenns of his empiricism and
doctrines of revolution. ^ Huine llkev/lse Is explicitly
referred to again and again in Godwin* s writings. From him
was derived not only emplriclstlc teachings, but also ele-
ments in Godwin's skepticism.^ Condillac, as well as
Helvetlus who is mentioned above, increased Godwin's inter-
est in sensationalism.-^^ To Eentham, Hill, and other utili*
tarlans Godwin owed in substantial part his own adaptations
of that theory."^-'- Priestley, as we have seen, strengthened
Godwin's belief in perfectibility and views of mind. Paine
did much to promote the doctrine of the rights of man,
12
which Godwin also advocated. Beccarla encouraged Godwin
in his viev/s of punishment of crime, Rousseau offered a
point of contrast with his contract theory, as did Burke
also.-^'^
^ See 77 above.
^ See 120 above.
•^^See 158 above.
'--'-See 156 above.
See 44 above,
'^See 47 above.
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It is not the purpose or province of tliis disser-
tation to trace all the influences v/hich affected G-odv/in's
thinking. The few summaries above suffice to sho?/, however,
that Godwin not only made use of other sources, hut that
he did not hold that his V7ork is original in any other
sense than that it is a new synthesis of old thought pat-
terns. Hence, criticisms concerning Godwin* s lack of
originality require careful statement lest they he unfoun-
ded and unfair,
"^B. LACK OF HISTORICAL SEIISE
In the second place, Godwin has been criticized for
his lack of the historical sense. To he sure, this lack
is frequently manifest in his writings. His prevailing
fault of over-simplification is not lessened by his short-
range view and his neglect of the implications of the past.
It is not surprising, then, that this absense of historicl^
should be noted by later commentators, Gourg, for instance,
states that " on peut roprocher a Godwin; de manquer totale-
ment de sens historique,"-^^ Gourg, hov/ever, renders Godv/in
an injustice in failing to make clear that historicity was
^ ^
Raymond Goi,irg, William Godwin
,
299,
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deliberately disregarded by many vn?iters of that period.
Maltlius, Mackintosh, and Parr likewise criticized Godv;in
on this accoimt, Earper underst8.nds this neglect of his-
tory better. He observes that "to say that Godvirin was
lacking in historical feeling is putting the case too
negatively. It is more correct to say that he chose not
to be hampered by history. "-^'^ Godwin, as one of the last
of the thinkers of the Enlightenment, remained true to the
tradition. His attitude towards history is precisely the
attitude v/hich characterized the v;hole period. It is not
shall ov/ness of literary culture v;hich caused him to neglect
history. Rather, it was the belief that the historical
method was of little value as compared with the philosoph-
ical. Beer represents Godwin in this connection much
better than Gourg,-^^ Note that Godv/in himself sets forth
explicitly his attitude concerning history in the follow-
ing quotation:
There are two modes, according to which we may
enquire into the origin of society and government.
V/e may either examine them historically, that is,
consider in v/hat manner they have or ought to have
begun, as Mr. Locke has done; or we may examine
them philosophically, that is consider the moral
principles upon which they depend. The first of
^^George M. Earper, "Rousseau, Godwin, and Words-
worth", Atlanti c Monthly , Vol. 109, 645.
16 See Max Beer, A Ei story of British Sociali sm, I,
115.
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these subjects is not without its use; but the
second is of a higher order 8.nd more essential
importance. The first is a question of form;
the second of substance. It would be of trivial
consequence, practically considered, from what
source any form of society flowed, and by what
mode its principles were sanctioned, could we be
alv^ays secure of their conformity to the dictates
of truth and justice .l*^
It is an over-simplification of the truth, therefore,
to assert that Godwin lacked the historical sense. He him-
self indicated the attitude he held v/hen he said that we
should look back in order that v;e may profit from the
experience of mankind, "but let us not look back as if the
wisdom of our ancestors Y/as such as to leave no room for
future improvement, "'^
C. LACK OP CONSISTENCY
A third possible criticism against Godwin is his
inconsistency and shifting views. Let us examine this
criticism from the point of viev/ of one of his severest
critics at this point, Thomas de Quincey accuses God?;in
of indeciveness on the basis of differences foimd in the
tliree editions of Political Justice (1793, 1796, and 1798),
Godwin, Political Justice I, 78»
Ibid., J, 27. Also I, 10.
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De Qulncey states:
In the original edition of his Political Justice ^
Mr, Godwin advanced against thrones and dominations,
pov/ers and principalities, T/ith the air of some
Titan slayer • • o but in the second (1796) edition
and under v/hat motive has never been explained, he
recoiled absolutely from the sound himself had
made: everybody else v/as appalled by the fury of
the challenge and, through the strangest of accidents,
Mr. Godwin v/as also appalled. The second edition as
regards principles is not a recast but absolutely a
travesty; nay it is all but a palinode.
This criticism is hardly fair to Godv/in. It is true,
as de Quincey points out, that there are modifications in
the second edition of Political Justic e, De Quincey should
have borne in mind, however, Godv;in*s own statem.ent which
is found in the preface to the second edition. Godv/in here
comiiients that although Books I - IV "may without impro-
priety be said to be re-v/ritten ... the spirit and great
outlines of the work remain untouched," Moreover, de
Quincey apparently ignores Godwin* s own statem.ent as to the
motive he had for altering the second edition. "There are
many things," explains Godwin, "that novi appear to the
author upon a review not to have been meditated with a
sufficiently profound reflection and to have been too
•^^ Thomas de Quincey, "Godwin" in Notes on
Gilfillan' s Literary Portraits, 63
20 Godwin, Political Justi ce, I, ix,
m
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hastily intruded upon the reader. These things have been
pruned with a liberal hand,"
Indeed, it v/ould seem that Godwin had anticipated
the criticisms of de Quincey, as the following statement
may indicate:
It will be perhaps asked by some persons in perusing
the present edition how it has happened that the
author has varied in so many points from the propo-
sitions advanced in the fonner? And this variation
may be treated even as a topic of censure* To this
he /5-odwinJ has only one ansv/er • • • that it is
reasoned in various particulars v/ith more accuracy
from the premises and fundamental positions than it
was before. Secondly, he presuines to ascribe the
variations to an industrious and consecutive
endeavour to keep his mind av/ake to correction and
improvement. He has in several Instances detected
error; and, so far is he from feeling mortified at
the discovery, that he hopes yet, by such activity
and impartiality as he shall be able to exert, to
arrive at many truths, of v/hlch he has scarce].y at
present perhaps the slightest presentiment.
Godwin* s explanation, in spite of de Qulncey's
attack, seems reasonable and ingenuous. The modifications
appear to be not the evidence of indecision and vacillation,
as they seem to be the products of a grov/ing mind and greatqj^
development of thought. Now as far as the third edition
(1798) is concerned, Godwin correctly observes that the
^ Ibid., I, X.
2^ Ibid., II, XV.
23 Ibid., II, ix.
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changes in it are slight,'^- With characteristic candor,
he remarks that the alterations v/ere inade in order to
remove a few of the crude and ill-considered remarks. "The
ideas of the author becajiie more perspicuous and digested,
as his enquiries advanced. "^^
A further instance may be furnished concerning this
charge of inconsistency. Godwin in his Political Justice
v/as opposed to family affections, as we have already noted'i
Rather thaji violate his supreme principle of justice and
his utilitarian theory of the greatest good for the greatesij
number, he would deem it no unpardonable offense if he
allowed his own father to be burned to death in a flai2iing
house if the situation were "necessary", "What magic is
there in the pronoun 'my», that should justify us in over-
27turning the decisions of impartial truth?"
Several years later, in his preface to St. Leon
(1799), Godwin acknowledged that he had changed his point
24 Ibid., II, VIII,
25 Note Hazlitt's comment about Godwin: "He is not
one of those v/ho do not grow wiser with opportunity and
reflection: he changes his opinions, and changes them for
the better." Y/illiam Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age
,
IV,
212.
26
27
See Godwin, Political Justice, I, 128.
Loc. cit.
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of view concerning the family » Note his forthright state-
ment:
Some readers of my graver productions will, perhaps,
in perusing these little volumes, accuse me of
inconsistency; the affections and characters of
private life being everywhere in this publication a
topic of warmest eulogium, while in Political Justice
they seemed to be treated with no great degree of
indulgence and favor. In ansv^er to these objections
all I .think it necessary to say on the present
occasion is that for more than four years I have
been anxious for opportunity and leisure to modify
some of the earlier chapters of that work in conform-
ity to the sentiments inculcated in this. Not that
I see cause to make any change respecting the prin-
ciples of justice or anything else fundamental to
the system there delivered; but that I apprehend
domestic and private affections inseparable from the
nature of man and from what may be styled the culture
of the heart and am fully persuaded that they are
not incompatible v/ith a profound and active sense
of justice in the mind of him that cherishes them.
True wisdom v/ill recommend us to individual attach-
ments and it is better that a man should be a living
being than a stock or a stone
Let one charge Godwin with inconsistency here if one must,
but let one at least respect the intellectual - and like-
wise emotional - honesty of the man.
Was it Mary 'Yolls tone craft who had convinced
him of his error? llo clear evidence is available to
support this assumption, but it seems tenable. Surely,
there v/as an ardent and reciprocal affection between them,
(See above,)
29 Godwin, St, Leon, preface, v.
i
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D, IINREASONABLE FAITPI IN REASON
A fourth criticism which may be raised against
G-odv/in is the exaggerated confidence he placed in abstract
reason. He made a priori generalizations v;hich had no
proof. In fact, his emphasis upon the power of reason
is an inconsistent element in his otherwise empiricistic
leanings. He yislS an enthusiastic follower of English
empiricism, especially of Locke; yet, in his exaltation of
reason he seems to he more in harmony v/ith French rational-
ism.
It is interesting to note that the rigorous use of
reason which he advocated in his Enquiry Concerning Politic
cal Justice was softened in a later Y/riting.^-^ Affection,
he later adjnitted, is inseparable from the nature of man.
Nevertheless, in spite of Godwin's comments in the preface
to St. Leon, the total effect of his teaching was to make
reason almost a tyrant over life.'^'^ Godwin failed to
realize that to live rationally means to live not merely
by reason alone, '^'^
32
See Chapter VII.
Preface to St. Leon,
^2 See Frazier' 3 Magazine , Vol. 10, 463«
Possey J, C. Hearnshaw, Social and Political
Ideas
, 144.
See Driver in Ibid., 178.
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Eo FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR ERROR
The fifth criticism against Godwin's social philoso-
phy is a more subtle fallacy v/hich the several investigators
have apparently overlooked. It pertains to his implicit
faith in reason, as indicated in the foregoing paragraph.
He has implied that man is perfectihle and that reason can
usher in the millenium,'^^ Man is, moreover, merely a pas-
36
sive receptacle for logic and reason. Much in the same
fashion that earlier Christian theology established a
dualism between God and the devil, Godwin seems to have
held that there is some monstrous incubus which prevents
reason from reigning. But v/hy is the perfectible being so
far from being perfect? Why cannot the power of truth pre-
vail? How can we account for the presence of error? Godwin
makes no explanation at all concerning this serious flav/ in
his philosophy,
F. FAILURE TO CONSIDER IMPLEMENTATION
A sixth criticism raised against Godwin's social
philosophy is its lack of clear implementation. It is a
God?d.n, Political Justice, I, 11,
See Stephen, op. cit., II, 272,
A
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set of principles without a program. He is vague as to how
the transition from existing society to anarchism is to be
made. He deplores violence; yet he provides no substitute
for it, and apparently overlooks the implications of vio-
lence in the cataclysmic social change which would be
involved in establishing anarchism. He assumes that reason
suffices. He neglects the possibilities of revolution by
violence, and envisions only an evolutionary change wrought
solely by reason. *

CHAPTER IX
COMPREHENSIVE DIGEST OF DISSERTATION
The purpose of this dissertation, as indicated in
the introduction, has been to malie a careful examination
of the social philosophy of William Godwin, The emphasis
has been upon the theological and ecclesiastical factors.
Behind this explicit purpose has been the motive of con-
sidering philosophical anarchism, as represented by its
acknowledged founder, in the light of a corrective and
check against prevailing totalitarian philosophies of state.
In the introduction, attention was given to the
broad base from which the present study has been derived.
Depersonalization was stressed as being the chief problem
facing human society. How both the physical and the social
sciences are related to depersonalization was shovm. The
relation between individualism and anarchy was next con-
sidered. Anarchy vjas stated to be a check against totali-
tarian trends, V/illiam Godwin was selected as the most
logical representative of philosophical anarchism*
Comparatively little has been written about Godwin
as a social philosopher, and several of the few available
accounts cannot be regarded as scholarly studies. Moreover,
Godwin^g o'vm writings reveal contradictions which add to
c
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the difficulty of any investigator. This present study
has not attempted to offer a complete account of Godwin
as a social philosopher, hut rather has sought to ^ive a
thorough treatment of data most pertinent to the field as
demarcated,
A brief review of the work done by other investi-*
gators in the field was next presented. The paucity of
such contributions was pointed out. Apparently, no other
investigator has concerned himself specifically with
G-odv/in's social philosophy, especially in its relation to
his theology, C, Kegan Paulas two-volume v/ork was found
to be at once the most complete and the most scholarly
study of the life of Godv/in, Other works investigated
included those by Brovm, Stephen, Gourg, Roussin, Allen,
Driver, and Halevy,
Godwin^s life offered significant clues to Ms
social philosophy. The psychological conditionings of
his youth and his social milieu were indicated. Much
emphasis was placed on his religious experiences. Other
influences observed v/ere his introverted boyhood, his
zealous father, his marital frustrations, and the contem-
porary socio-political scene,
Godwin* s views of anarchy, society, and government
were next analyzed. Confusion and contradictions were
?
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found both in what writers said that Godwin believed and
in v/hat he himself v/rote. At no time did he explicitly
define what he meant by his anarchism. Stephen noted that
Godwin admitted at one time that anarchy was an evil, but
Stephen failed to note that Godwin viewed anarchy as an
evil when it became what he called despotism© Indeed,
while Godwin did not declare in so many words that he was
a believer in anarchism, his whole philosophy - including
his views concerning government, force, law, and property -
was of the very essence of anarchism* Godwin favored a
simple society but opposed government because it necessarily
involved force. He borrowed Paine 's distinction between
society and government, but Godv;in failed to explain
clearly what his own vi.ews were. He rejected the contract
theory and endorsed the rights of man point of view. Mon-
archy and aristocracy were severely attacked. Democracy,
of all forms of government, v/as considered most desirable.
Godwin* s ideas concerning force in its several
relations werenext considered. The confusion which existed
in his use of the terms force, coercion, and violence made
it difficult to Icnow precisely his beliefs at certain
points. It would seem tiiat he used the term force to mean
action less physical and more organized than violence.
Coercion was more physical th-an force but less so than
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violence. Coercion was not to be condoned except under
extreme necessity. It \7as to be used to cliecli violence.
Again, however, Godwin opposed the use of coercion even as
an expedient. Violence v/as not the result of man»s nature
but of his evil institutions. He argued that man possessed
no free ¥7ill; hence, nan was not responsible for crime.
Punishment was therefore an injustice. An inconsistency
appeared in his argument when he stated that, while the
community had no right to exercise coercion upon its members
coercion might be the duty of individuals v;ithin the comrau-
nity. Temporary restraint was stated to be the only proper
motive in using such coercion. Revolutions were denounced
as products of passion, not of reason. They were engendered
by indignation against tyranny but were themselves pregnant
with tyranny; moreover, they were considered as crude and
premature in their effects. Monarchy and aristocracy were
accused of being breeders of war. Godwin emphasized his
hatred of war. Defense of one's ovm liberty and the liberty
of others were held to be the only justifiable causes of
war. Thus Godv/in weakened his argument. He failed to make
clear v/hat he meant by a justifiable defensive war.
Godwin^s views of property were essentially anarch-
istic. Property was denounced as an evil, except those
personal belongings which were among the rights of man.
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Property was condemned because it created a sense of depend-
ence upon the rich, a craving for opulence, a system of
crushing toil, a cause of crime and a continued state of
under-populatlon. Property v/as not in accord with utili-
tarian principles. Marriage for Godwin, as for Marx, was
a fom of property, though Godwin later modified his views
here.
Social philosophy and religion were not two separate
considerations for Godv/in. He viev/ed them as of one piece.
Variety characterized his religious experiences. He was
bom and reared a Calvinist, This influence colored his
whole life. Owing to his father's nature, God?;in*s ear-
liest impressions of religion must have been of a stern,
unlovely sort. He became interested successively in Sande-
manianism, Socinianism, deism, materialism, and finally a
near-theism. A trace of pantheism- was also observed. He
deplored the viev/ of God as a tyrant, rejected belief in
future pujiishment and man's humbleness, and made humani-
tarianism and man's perfectibility the foundations of his
faith. He lacked a consistent theology and Chrlstology.
Godwin v;as a wholehearted empiricist. He rejected
the belief in innate principles and insisted that mind was
everywhere a tabula rasa at birth. The influences of
Locke, Hume, Condillac, Helve'tius and d'Hblbach Yirere
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indicated. The mind-body problem was considered, Stephen
claimed that Godwin completely rejected mind as other than
a seat of sensations, but Godv/in himself assigned more
place to the mind than Stephen indicated. Unlike Rousseau
and Montesquieu, Godv/in held that climate did not influence
mind, Jlerein he agreed with Hunie and Helvetius, Godv/in
was strictly a necessitarian; he attempted at great length
to shov/ that free will did not exist. Yet, he argued that
necessity did not invalidate virtue. Utilitarianism was
a fundainental working principle in his system. The greatest
good for the greatest number was ever a consideration. He
avoided, however, the selfish implications. Utilitarianism
was shov/n to be a natural concomitant of associationism.
Perfectibility was the next element to be dealt with. Like
Priestley and Condorcet, Godwin believed man could attain
inconceivable heights. Evil in government was the worst
stumbling block to man*s progress. Finally, Godwin^s
insistence on the primacy of reason v;as examined. He never
made clear what he meant by reason, but he used it almost
as a fetish. He ignored, until late in life, the realm
of emotion and sentiment. Reason was the panacea for all
evil in human society, God\7in made no clear connection
betv;een his exaltation of abstract reason and his thorough-
going sensationalismo
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Sm'IAHY' OF CONCLUSIOiTS
! Godwin* s life was conditioned in early days by a stem
father, a marked degree of Introversion, religious non-
conformacy, and the socio-political vmrest of his age.
2« Godwin advocated that society be reduced to its sim-
plest form. He was never clear as to the precise
nature of this form. He opposed government because it
necessarily employs force. The contract theory was
rejected, and the rights of man stressed.
5. Godwin opposed force, coercion, and violence; yet he
failed to make clear distinctions between these terms.
Coercion must be resorted to as a means of preventing
violence, but force in any form should be used as
little as possible. He rejected the Thrasyraachian
principle. Revolutions were denounced as products of
passions.
4. God-iirin abhorred war and stressed its destructiveness
and cruelties. Yet he held that a defensive war to
protect liberty was justified, and thereby made his
position vulnerable.
5. Godwin believed that property is an evil, except in its
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simplest form as representing the direct fruits of
man»s own labor. Marriage was denounced as a form of
property. He later modified his views concerning
marriage.
6. Godwin was successively a nonconformist, a Socinian,
a Sandemanian, a deist, somewhat of a pantheist, an
atheist, and finally a near-theist. Throughout his
varied theological interests, Calvinistlc influences
remained,
7. Godwin Y/holly rejected the "belief in innate principles.
He was an avowed associationlst. The mind everywhere
was at birth a tabula rasa
.
8. Godwin was thoroughly a necessitarian. He argued
lengthily against free will, but insisted that
necessity did not Invalidate virtue.
9. Godwin was consistently utilitarian in his thought.
The greatest good for the greatest number was a
dominant principle in his social philosophy.
10. Godwin believed that life could be governed solely by
the dictates of abstract reason. Life was no more than
logic to him. In later years, however, he gave some
place to sentiment and affection.
•1
11, Godwin held that man was perfectible. Reason and
justice would prevail. All evil would be abolished.
12» Godv/in neglected to consider the power of public
opinion. He ignored what are now regarded as elemen-
tary principles of social psychology.
13» Godwin has been criticized for his lack of the histori-
cal sense. The criticism is valid in part, and is
probably due to the emphasis on the future which his
associationism and belief in perfectibility gave to
his thinlcing,
14. Godwin presented no systematic nor wholly consistent
social philosophy. Inconsistencies and contradictions
indicate both the incompleteness of his system and the
developmental processes of his thought,
15, Godwin failed to implement his social philosophy. His
principles lacked specific programs and procedures. He
was especially vague as to how the transition from
government to uncoerced society would be effected.
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